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Unknown to me, this dissertation had its beginnings in 1959, while 
I was a cadet attending the Reserve Officer Training Corps summer encamp-
ment at Fort Hood, Texas, home of the 2d Armored Division. The following 
year, as a newly commissioned Second Lieutenant, I was assigned to the 
First Howitzer Battalion, 14th Field Artillery, 2d Armored Division, 
where I spent six months waiting for-artillery school at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma. Little thought was given to the topic until ten years later, 
when searching for a dissertation project, I discovered that the 2d 
Armored Division did not have a detailed narrative concerning its 
existence. This was especially disappointing because of the relation-
ship of the 2d Armored Division and General George S. Patton, Jr., and 
the fact that the division served under this colorful individual in 
North Africa and Sicily. 
No writer has ever compiled a history without incurring debts. 
This is especially true of this effort. The author wishes to publicly 
acknowledge the' aid and support given by the 2d Armored Division 
Association, for many years under the able leadership of Colonel Redding 
F. Perry. He announced the project in the Association's Bulletin, 
which led to some favorable responses. Members of the "Hell on Wheels" 
Association agreed to be interviewed and spent many hours recounting 
their experiences. Especially valuable for the very large view were the 
conversations with Generals Jacob Devers and William H. Simpson. 
Former Division Commanders, Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger, 
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Major General Ernest N. Harmon, Brigadier General Allen F. Kingman, and 
General I. D. White, were extremely valuable for their detailed thoughts 
on the operations in which they participated. Others interviewed were 
most helpful in reliving experiences at division or lower levels. Major 
Generals Robert W. Grow, Harold Peckham:, and Lawrence R; Dewey, Brigadier 
Generals Sidney R. Hinds andWheelerMerrian:,·and Captains James M. Burt 
and Donald A. Chace helped to clarify many of the·questions raised. 
Archivists of various research libraries, including Dr. Richard 
Sommers, the United States Army Military History·Research Collection 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Timothy Nenninger, Charles Phillips, and especial-
ly Mrs. Gloria Wheeler of the National Archives, Washington, D. C.; and 
Mrs. Ann Turner, Reference Librarian at the Henry·Prescott Chaplin 
Memorial Library, Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, were most 
valuable in their assistance. With their expert knowledge these dedi-
cated librarians often anticipated this researcher's needs. 
The Office of the Chd.ef of Military History, Washington, D. C., 
provided much assistance through its collection of unpublished materials, 
and extensive knowledge of the topic. Mrs. Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley 
Russell Conner of the Unit History Section provided guidance on the 
formation of the 2d Armored Division. Mr. Detmar Finke and Miss Hannah 
Zeidlik of the Reference Section opened their collections to this 
researcher and helped him to find what was needed. The Deputy Chief 
Historian at the Office of the Chief of Military History, Mr. Charles 
B. MacDonald, was most helpful. As the author of several volumes in the 
United States Army in World War.!!, he was more than familiar with the 
role of the 2d Armored Division on the European Continent. He loaned 
me the Manuscript to the forthcoming volume, "The Last Offensive," 
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which concluded the European phase of the War. 
The United States Armor School Library at Fort Knox, Kentucky, under 
the supervision of Brigadier General Robert W. Galloway and his succes-
sor, Brigadier General George S. Patton, loaned studies of 2d Armored 
Division actions done by advanced course students. Armor and its two 
able editors, Colonel 0. W. Martin, Jr., and Major Robert E. Kelso, 
also loaned materials and scheduled appointmentswithseveral of the men 
interviewed. 
On the Oklahoma State University campus,· the author is deeply 
indebted to the late Mrs. Marguerite Howland, and to Mr. Josh H. 
Stroman, who guided me through the documents section of the library. 
Mrs. Heather MacAlpine Lloyd and her assistants kindly secured the 
other needed materials on interlibrary loan. 
Special consideration is owed the· faculties of the Departments of 
History and Political Science. The author's graduate studies committee, 
composed of Drs. Harold F. Gordon and Harold V. Sare of the Department 
of Political Science; Drs. Douglas D. Hale, H. James Henderson, John 
A. Sylvester, and chaired by Dr. LeRoy H. Fischer, led me through the 
tangles of graduate study, rendering valuable advice and assistance 
along the way. A special tribute goes to Dr. Homer L. Knight, Professor 
and Head Emeritus of the Department of History, who provided a graduate 
assistantship which permitted me to pursue graduate· study. Dr. Fischer 
read, edited, and supervised the dissertation from the opening word 
to the final period; without his able directions, encouragement, and 
most of all friendship, this project may never have been completed. 
Special thanks have been saved for last. John and Carole Albright 
provided a home away from home while I was doing research in Washington, 
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D. C. John led me through the many mazes at the Office of the Chief of 
Military History, introducing me to those who aided my search for 
materials. Captain William K. Emerson, an enthusiastic student of 
history, read the manuscript, rendering invaluable.service and advice 
to clarify points which might have confused the reader. 
My parents, Mr. and Mrs. Truman P. Houston·,· a±ded and encouraged 
me in my entire graduate program, giving constant encouragement to 
finish the project. My son, Donald Jr., could not· understand why I 
did not stop to play with him, nor did he know that loud noises and 
concentration do not mix. My wife, Guyla,edited, typed, critiqued, and 
supervised the study from the selection of the topic to the last word, 
while serving as full-time serials librarian at·Oklahoma'State University. 
In spite of all the valuable assistance, advice, and aid, this is my 
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A FOREWORD VIEW 
A former chief of staff of the 2d Armored Division once commented 
that the only thing more difficult than fighting a war was attempting to 
write about it. Perhaps that comparison could be taken one step further 
to say that the only thing more difficult than writing about a war is 
attempting to write about one unit in that conflict. 
The American Tank Corps came into existence during World War I 
because of the stalemated situation in Europe. The armies had battled 
for almost two years with little change in the territory gained or lost. 
The tank was the technological answer to restore movement to the battle-
field. Once the war ended the Tank Corps returned to the United States 
and for a moment it appeared that it was to become a separate branch 
of the service. Unfortunately, Congress agreed with General of the 
Armies John J. Pershing that the tanks had been an infantry support 
weapon and should remain with that branch. 
With the assignment of the tanks to the infantry, Congress became 
the·author of a conflict which was to dominate military thinking for the 
following two decades. One group of officers wanted to use the tanks 
as cavalry, while the other group wanted to maintain the tanks in their 
traditional infantry support role. Inability to compromise the issue, 
together with branch jealousies, forced the Chiefs of Infantry and 
Cavalry to assume dogmatic positions which only served to slow the 
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development of tactics and vehicles for conducting mobile warfare. 
In spite of official barriers raised against the tank enthusiasts, 
a few far sighted officers began to write encouraging, thought provoking 
articles, advocating what they considered a new means of conducting 
warfare. These spokesmen reasoned that with the development of the 
tank, mobility had been restored to the battlefield. Since cavalry had 
traditionally been the branch of maneuver, they argued that cavalry 
should either have the tanks, or that, at the least, infantrymen. should 
be trained to use cavalry tactics. They foresaw that the stagnated 
situations of World War I would in all probability cease to exist. 
This study is based on three fundamental theses. During the 1920's 
and 1930's tactics and leaders emerged which would place the Armored 
Force of 1940 on a firm footing. Contrary to-several writers, the 
Armored Force was not. left to shift for itself and grope for methods and 
means, but had twenty years of experience on which t9 draw. The tactics 
and methods to.employ the 2d Armored Division proved the soundness of 
the earlier efforts. 
The second thesis is that the training of the 2d Armored Division, 
both at Fort Benning, Georgia, and in the peacetime maneuvers placed 
the division on a solid foundation for combat, once the tankers entered 
World War II. After each major engagement, the division reinstituted 
training as a means of maintaining its battle condition. The division, 
as a result of its constant attention to training, had only to learn 
a few new techniques: attacking under overhead artillery fire, moving 
through hedgerows, and participating in amphibious landings. Again, 
this proved the soundness of the 1920's and 1930's influence and 
efforts. 
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The third thesis is that continuity of command was maintained 
because of the policy of promoting to senior command positions from 
within the 2d Armored Division. This policy permitt~d the men to main-
tain faith in the tactical ability of their leaders. Furth~r consider-
ation has to be given to the large number of enlisted personnel and 
junior officers who joined the 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning, 
Georgia, fought through all the actions, and entered Berlin as the first 
American division to occupy the enemy's capital. These men provided 
not only continuity, but battle knowledge and experience to the replace~ 
ments. 
The three themes, when followed throughout the history of the 2d 
Armored Division, portray the unit as the epitome of armored warfare. 
However, to maintain that the 2d Armored Division was the best in Europe 
is to fail to remember that the division was one of the two heavy di-
visions which retained its 1942 configuration. The others were light 
divisions, which had less than half the tank strength and fewer infantry 
than the heavy divisions. The 2d Armored Division was able to sustain 
heavier losses while continuing to advance, with little impairment of 
its battle ability. A light division suffering the same percentage of 
losses may well have been required to be relieved and be resupplied with 
additional men and equipment. 
A tank is a fully tracked, armored enclosed vehicle, which serves 
as the principal assault.weapon of armored divisions. Prior to 1930, 
tanks were classified into three catagories. Light tanks were those 
which weighed less than ten tons and which could be moved ori tank 
carriers. Medium tanks weighed between ten and twenty-five tons and 
were either too large or heavy to be moved on transporters. Heavy tartks 
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were those which weighed over twenty-five tons, During the 1930's and 
continuing until the end of World War II, transporters were no longer 
required because of the improved mechanical efficiency which permitted 
tanks to move long distances under their own power. This ability also 
forced a new set of definitions for tanks. Light tanks were those which 
weighed less than twenty tons while medium tanks were those over twenty 
tons. As World War II drew to a close, the new M26 tank weighing some 
forty-six tons, was introduced. Because of its extreme weight it was 
rated as a heavy tank, Today, apparently the weight classification 
system has been abandoned. 
Tactical terms may cause some confusion, Penetrations are when 
armor passes through defensive positions of the enemy in attempting to 
destroy the positions or his separated forces. Turning movements 
attempt to get armor on the flank of the enemy, bypass his main force, 
and race for a distant objective. Its purpose is to force the enemy to 
abandon his positions or to divert major forces to meet the threat, 
Usually armor is out.of supporting range of other ground combat elements. 
Envelopments, single or double·, are short range turning movements around 
the enemy, Usually some friendly force attacks at a point to distract 
the enemy while the friendly armored force attacks at one or both 
flanks to reach the objective. The attacking friendly force diverts 
the enemy's attention, either preventing his escape or reducing his 
ability to react to the armor attack, Exploitations are the rapid ad-
vance against lessening resistance. Usually, armor is given.a distant 
objective, By employing maximum speed, bypassing, avoiding, or break-
ing through enemy resistance, the goal is to se~ure the objective with 
a minimum of time. Pursuits are characterized by the race to destroy 
the enemy before the foe regains the ability to present a defense or to 
regroup his forces. During its history, both in maneuvers and actual 
combat, the 2d Armored Division executed every type of action in which 
tanks could be employed. 
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CHAPTER II 
CREATING AN IDEA: THE INFANTRY ERA 
On 28 February 1945, the 2d Armored Division crossed the Roer 
River and attacked northeastward towards the bridge over the Rhine 
at Krefeld-Uerdingen, Germany. Sidney Olson, a correspondent for Time 
magazine, described the scene: 
From the air in a Piper Cub the tank drive 
was a thing of the sheerest military beauty: First 
came a long row of throbbing tanks moving like 
heavy dark beetles over the green cabbage fields 
of Germany in a wide swath - many, many tanks in a 
single row abreast. Then a suitable distance behind, 
came another great echelon of tanks even broader, out 
of which groups would wheel from their brown mud tracks 
in green fields to encircle and smash· fire at some 
stubborn strong point. Behind this came miles of 
trucks full of troops, maneuvering perfectly to 
mop up by-passed tough spots. Then came the field 
artillery to pound hard knots into submission. From 
the flanks sped clouds of tank destroyers cutting 
across the landscape in wild swoops that hit the 
enemy and cut off communications with bewildering 
speed. 
And always overhead swung and looped the 
Thunderbolts in perfect air cover, keeping 
the tanks under absolute safety umbrellas 
and from time to time diving to knock out trouble 
points beyond the front. Above them rode farther-
roving P-47 missions to dive bomb and strafe 
every moving truck, self propelled gun or railroad 
train for many miles beyond, while higher still was 
the rumble of the great silver Fortress in the top-
most sky, purring distantly on to knock out the 
rearmost reinforcement are.as, supply points, and 
marshalling yards. 
This was one of the war's grandest single 
pictures of united and perfectly functioning mili-




What the correspondent did not see in this classic armored attack, 
however, was the many years of training, thinking, and rehearsal that 
went into the attack. Before anyone obtained this powerful war machine 
its doctrine slowly evolved from 1917to 1940. More·importantly, during 
the same period, tank leaders were receiving their training. Not 
mentioned by the Time writer were two pioneers' ·in' armor warfare, Major 
General I. D. White and Brigadier General Sidney R. Hinds, who were 
leading the very attack which he was watching. 
The tank came into existence because· of military- necessity in 
World War I. The European battlefields had become· stalemated, when 
machine guns, barbed wire, and massed artillery had all contributed to 
eliminating maneuver from the battleground. The only attacks possible 
were very costly frontal assaults against well-prepared defensive 
positions. These attacks usually followed massive artillery barrages 
intended to overcome defensive positions, but more often tore up the 
ground in no man's land, thus slowing the assaulting force. 
A British Lieutenant Colonel, Ernest D. Swinton, conceived the 
idea of an armor-covered vehicle after seeing a tracked farm tractor in 
France. He recommended that the vehicle be armora..covered, armed with 
guns, and used in combat. Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the 
Admiralty, liked the idea and urged its adoption·. Because of his en-
couragement, naval terms, such as hull, turret, deck, ports, are used 
today to describe various parts of the tank. 2 The first time tanks 
were used in combat, in the Battle of the Somme on 15 September 1916, 
they were considered a failure, despite limited success. An extremely 
ardent tank enthusiast, Nathan A. Smith, explained that these tanks 
were employed over unsuitable terrain, in small numbers, and without the 
' '~. 
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element of surprise. The attack was a failure not because of mechanical 
problems or tactical usage, but because of lead·ershi:p~ - -Smith said: 
Generals trained under·an·ultra .. conservative 
system- were too· hide-bound·; thetr .. minds too in-
elastic to grasp· the possibilities of the new 
weapon or to see the ·similarity-- with,· the past. All 
they could seewere mechanical fai:lures. [It was] 
••• better to suffer defea:t .. whiie·obeying·the ancient 
tactical· customs than--to·w±n·by-th~~·u-se··of a radical 
idea.3 · 
By the time of the Battle of Cambrai,·where·tanks-were-next engaged 
on 20 November 1917, some of the earlier problems·had·been overcome. 
Tanks were used en masse, achieved surprise, and··.,.loc·a±"·,reserves were 
provided. Some tanks were assigned· distant-- objectiveeV-while others 
were detailed to help the infantry forward. The-basic idea was to go 
as far and as fast as possible to attack reserve find-· rear area positions. 
( 
Cambrai, while a tactical success, was a strategi~·failure, again because 
of poor generalship. The British commanders did not·think that the 
tanks could achieve surprise, they failed to provide sufficient 
reserves, and neglected to exploit the breakthrough·or to hold the 
ground won. The Germans launched a vicious counterattack and regained 
their lost territory.4 
Following the Somme battle, the Amer'i:can military mission in France 
had submitted a report on the use of-tanks.- Major General John J. 
Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, approved the 
report and decided that tanks would be a useful addition to the American 
Army.5 Pershing had his staff study the tank question, and they deter-
mined that between 375 and 600 heavy and 1200 to 1500 light tanks 
would be needed. Pershing accepted these figures and asked the War 
Department to secure the tanks for him. 6 
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The American Tank Corps, which came into existence because of the 
Battle of the Somme and the report by the American military mission, had 
two beginnings: in France in 1917 and in the United·States in 1918. 
In a letter of application for a command in the Tank·Corps in France, 
Captain George S. Patton, Jr., stated ·that·the·mission-of light tanks 
would be similar tb light cavalry. His·command·request·was approved, 
and he was given the duty of organizing and training the first American 
tank troops. 7 
While training his command, Patton ·stressed··that tanks must 
aid the infantry's advance. To do·this,·the tanks·would cut barbed 
wire not destroyed by artillery', stop enemy· infantry from manning the 
trenches when artillery barrages lifted, prevent·enemy·machine guns and 
cannons from firing on friendly infantry,·help·mop·up·positions, neutra-
lize strongpoints or blind them with smoke,·patrol to prevent counter-
attacks, and be ready to pursue: the enemy af·ter· friendly forces had 
consolidated the positions. Equally important, he-stressed-coordination 
between tanks and infantry. Later, he said that tank-infantry operations 
had two serious limitations -- the physical exhaustion of the infantry-
men and terrain obstacles for the tanks. While·readying·his command, 
Patton urged ending preparatory artillery fil::e because of terrain damage. 
As an alternative, he proposed using smoke tcr blind antitank guns, and 
urged using airplanes to maintain radio contact between artillery and 
tanks.8 
Lecturing at the tank school, Patton stressed·that tanks and 
other "auxiliary arms are but a means of aiding infantry." In his 
final report of operations, he emphasized in capital letters the dictum 
that "Tanks Must Stay With the Infantry."9 Patton· set the tone and 
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doctrine that would govern tank usage for two decades. Although 
originally he thought that the tank would be use~ similarly to light 
cavalry, he later changed his view, insisting th~t the tank was an 
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auxiliary arm to aid infantry. Yet, in some concepts, he was far-
sighted and would use these ideas when connnanding the 2d Armored 
Brigade and later the 2d Armored Division. 
The second beginning for tanks was the creation of the Tank Service 
of the National Army, authorized by the ·war ··I>epartm·ent ·on 16 January 
1918. On that date the Chief of Engineers, Major·General William M. 
Black, raised the first unit under this authorization. The 65th 
Engineer Regiment was composed of two light tank battalions and two 
heavy battalions: the 1st Separate Battalion, Heavy Tank Service, and 
2d Battalion, Heavy Tank Service.10 Most units raised under this 
authorization stayed in the United States. 11 
The Tank Corps and Tank Service were merged into the Tank Corps 
in 1919, but remained a separate and distinct organization because of 
funding in the Army Appropriation Act of 19 June 1919. This act per-
mitted the continuance of the Tank Corps until 30 June 1920. 12 This 
may have led to optimism for the tankers, who possibly foresaw their 
status as a separate arm. On 3 June 1920, the National Defense 
Act of that year transferred the tanks ''lock, stock, and monkey 
wrenches," according to Brigadier General Sidney R. Hinds, to the 
infantry. The force was divided. between Fort Benning, Georgia, and 
Franklin Cantonment, Camp Meade, Maryland. Later, the infantry broke 
up the tank battalions into companies, deactivated some, and assigned 
the remainder to infantry divisions . 13 
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The National Defense Act-of 1920-was-a crucial-step in armor 
development. Probably because of tank usage as-an auxiliary of infantry 
during World War I, and perhaps because of the lack of mechanical 
reliability and speed, the infantry assignment was fairly logical at 
the time. An independent tank corps was most probably doomed by Per-
shing's testimony before the House Connnittee on Military Affairs on 
31 October 1919. He said that the tank was a valuable weapon for use 
with infantry and that its development should be encouraged. He then 
stated what would be the death knell of a separate tank corps: "The 
Tank Corps should not be a large organization; only of sufficient 
numbers, I should say, to carry on investigations and conduct training 
with the infantry, and I would place it under the Chief of Infantry as 
as adjunct of that arm. 1114 During questioning, Pershing said that he 
saw tanks closely allied with infantry and that-tank development would 
be encouraged "perhaps to a greater extent" than if the Army maintained 
a separate Tank Corps. 15 Later, again replying to questioning, he said 
that in the future tanks may become one of the principal specialized arms 
of the service, and that the Tank Corps if maintained as a separate 
unit, would want all the promotions and would probably get them. 16 
In his final report as Chief of the Tank Corps, Brigadier General 
Samuel D. Rockenback correctly observed that "the successful development 
and value of the arm in the future depends upon the sympathy and support 
it is given. 11 17 Infantry gave it very little of either during the 
next two decades. 
Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower in a 1920 article, "A Tank Discussion," 
observed that since the infantry had tanks it was incumbent on that 
branch and its officers to study the tank question to determine the 
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capabilities, limitations, and possible future-usage of tanks. 18 
Infantry studied the question for two decades and their a~swer was to 
maintain the tank as a support weapon to-aid the footsoldiers' advance. 
Because of that decision, tanks lost their independence·of action and 
were relegated to the speed- of infantry-:·· - about- two- and one-half miles 
per hour.19 
Infantry thinking was influenced by severalfactors during the 
1920' s and 1930' s. There was a tendency to embrace· the" successful 
tactics of the past with little or no thought of-change for future wars. 
The attempts to establish absolute methods and procedures based on past 
experiences were efforts to reduce constantly evolving complexities of 
war to static methods. This attitude fostered a belief that the next 
war would be the same as the last and encouraged mental rigidity and 
absolute dogma, neither of which proved serviceabie-in warfare. 20 
The early tanks were either mechanically unreliable, or when 
functioning properly, moved forward quickly and left the infantry 
behind. In either case, the foot soldier was left without tank support. 
The view that tanks were unreliable failed to consider that mechanical 
devices could be improved, and apparently no thought was given to 
speeding up the pace of the infantry. The tank was originally developed 
to solve a particular problem -- impenetrable defenses. This might 
not occur in a future war. Why, the infantrymen asked, should tanks 
be developed? 21 This view contradicts the idea that success in war 
will influence future thinking. If tanks were successful in breaching 
the static defenses of 1917 and 1918, would they not be successful for 
the same use in the future? If the next war was not along static 
defense lines, then it would be one of maneuver. In that case, the tank 
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would be most useful in escorting the infantryman while he was maneuver-
ing to reach an advantageous position. 
Tactical tank employment and later the official' infantry branch 
policy had been ordered by Headquarters First·Army;·American Expedi-
tionary Force, on 27 August 1918, in a-memorandum,-"Combat Instructions 
for Troops of First Army." The first mission of·tanks was to clear gaps 
through wire. Their second role was to drive the enemy into shelter to 
prevent the manning of machine guns and cannons·against friendly 
infantry. Infantrymen were instructed to follow their assigned routes 
regardless of the direction of the tanks; they were not to place them-
selves between tanks, as that would prevent the tanks from firing to 
the flanks. The infantry was to remain closer to the tanks to take 
~dvantage of the shock action of a tank attack, and to point out targets. 
Finally, engineers were to be near enough to help tanks over rough 
ground. Artillery was instructed to fire a high percentage of smoke 
shells to impair the vision of antitank defenders~22 In 1921, while 
visiting the tank school, Rockenback stated that there was no such thing 
as an independent tank attack. Tanks were· an infantry auxiliary, and 
as such, tank tactics had to conform to infantry-tactics. Tanks may 
proceed, follow, or accompany infantrymen, but were·to·be controlled 
by the infantry commander. 23 
In the late 1920's, thinking began to change slowly and impercept-
ibly. The Chief of Infantry stated that the tank was essentially an 
offensive weapon, and that it should be-used to support the·unit deliver-
ing the decisive attack. These ideas came from the oid·Tank Corps, but 
any idea that light tanks could be used in exploiting a successful 
attack was new to the infantry. In this new role, tanks could be 
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could be assigned the task of moving forward quickly to deliver the 
attack which could possibly turn the enemy's·· defeat into a rout. Tanks 
could attack the tails of enemy columns, crushing wagons and artillery. 
They might even race enemy columns to bridges ·and··railroad centers, 
attempting to prevent their escape~ 24 They couid··do .. that even if 
mechanized cavalry was available.·· · The- ri-sk" involved,·- including the 
possibility of being out of range of supporting·infantry· or artillery, 
was justified when there was a reasonable·possibility·for decisive 
results. A decade later, in the 1938 and· 1939 era,· infantry tanks were 
restricted to their role of exploiting breakthroughs or chasing defeated 
I . 
enemy. This new stance was a sltghF retreat from the former position. 
However, both gave tanks a mission similar·to cavalry--a mission to 
pursue, attack, and perhaps desttoy.25 
While the official infantry position was that tanks were auxiliary 
' ' 
weapons to aid the foot soldiers' advance, a few people foresaw mobile 
war in the future. These spokesmen, whom historians have labeled 
"progressives," argued that tanks would be a principal weapon used with 
supporting infantry,·artillery~ and engineers;· ·The-unit would be 
organized, trained, and function as· a· team;· it· wouid::be·· an independent 
striking·force attacking deep into·enemy territory. This view caused 
rivalry and branc.h jealousy. Th~ proposal transgressed the traditional 
roles of infantry and cavalry. Neither branch could tolerate the idea 
of being subordinate to tanks, a problem not encountered by the artillery 
and engineer branches, which have historically been support units.26 
There was little tank activity in· the 1920's, when the tanks belong~ 
ed to the infantry and were subordinate to it. There were occasional 
articles in professional military journals and some experimental 
problems were conducted by· tank enthusiasts~ · But·· the· same time, the 
mobility concept began to spread throughout the Army, and by the end 
of the 1930's a few military leaders were in positions to impelement 
27 
these ideas. 
In 1922, the infantry conducted tests·inthe Panama Canal Zone 
15 
to determine if· tanks could be used there. Colonel John w·. Heavey, the 
commanding officer of the 33d Infantry Regiment; had-the World War I 
vintage tanks, removed from storage so that his men·could have the 
experience of working with and against ·armored·,·vehtcles. In each 
instance, when battalions were maneuvering against··e·ach other, the tank-
supported unit won. The tanks, commanded by Captain Sereno E. Brett, 
a World War I tanker and one of Patton's battalion commanders in that 
conflict, showed that they could maneuver-over the·rugged, wooded 
terrain. At the end of the tests there was little doubt that tanks 
could operate anywhere in the Canal Zone--anywhere·artillery could go 
and almost anywhere that mountain units could go. It was thought that 
the experiment would lead to some modifications about using tanks in 
jungles, but apparently that did not happen. 28 
Although the Canal Zone experiment was reported in the Cavalry 
Journal, the largest single factor in the dissemination·of·the mobility 
concept was the Tank School at Camp Meade, Maryland. Brigadier 
General Sidney R. Hinds, while a first classman at·the United States 
Military Academy, had his introduction to tankwa:rfare·in a lecture 
by Brigadier General Rockenback. After graduation·in 1920, Hinds 
attended the infantry officers school at Fort Benning, Georgia, where 
he received about a week I s instruction in tanks. · The class was taught by 
Captain Brett, who emphasized that land warfare had entered the gasoline-
16 
powered age, and that the days of the two and one--half·mile per hour 
infantryman was over. Brett challenged· the young officers·to attend the 
full year course at the Tank School, and Hinds was among those who 
attended in 1928 and 1929. 29 
The Tank School faced several problems;· ·including little budgetary 
support, lack of War Department interest,·worn-ootWorld War I tanks, 
official infantry doctrine,· and no library·; Some-instructors such as 
Lieutenant Colonels Allen F. Kingman, Sereno E. Brett, Alvin C. Gillem, 
Jr. and Captain Walter McAdams resisted official doctrine, and challenged 
students to find a better way. The students spent two weeks on map 
reading, reconnaissance, and road sketching; three weeks on weapons main-
tenance and firing; seven weeks on all phases of vehicular maintenance; 
three weeks on driving and convoy routing; a week on history and organi-
zation; and two weeks on tactics, including night problems. The final 
examination was unusual. After completing the course, the student was 
assigned to the ordnance shop for two or three weeks during which time 
he had to repair a tank and drive it out of the shop under its own 
power. The student was then assigned to a tank unit at Camp Meade. 30 
After completing the Tank School program, First Lieutenant Hinds 
was assigned to the 1st Tank Regiment at Camp Meade, and fell into the 
routine of garrison life. He recalled that after·necessary work details 
and other distractions, only two or three men were·available for training. 
The tanks were mechanically unreliable and ·while··training··often one tank 
was kept in reserve to be used as a tank retriever if the first broke 
down or got stuck. 31 
While at Camp Meade, Hinds uttered the most serious heresy con-
ceivable for an infantryman: he suggested that tankers should be 
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trained in cavalry tactics, He was··,qu±ekiT'·rem±n'ded·"'that tanks were 
inf an try support weapons and woo:id' be .. ma'i:nt::1frred;.c±il~tfia:t·~ro::ke. Admitted-
ly, he reflected at a later time, the equipment·of-·the ·1920'·s and 1930's 
would not support a· realistic ·version· of~·w±d·e~enve-1:opments; · break-
throughs, or distant and powerful pursuit;·· ail ·maneu;rers that Hinds 
would participate in while commanding·'.the• 4lst·Armored--·Infantry Regiment 
- 32 
and later Combat Command B, 2d Armored Division···±n·--world·War II. In 
spite of inadequate equipment, thoughts still turned ·to finding a better 
way to fight a war. Hinds was of the opinion, ·shared -by many, that it 
was not "fair to credit [General Heinz] Guderian,--the Germans, or 
General [G. S.] Patton, alone, with inventing blitzkrieg.-- The idea had 
been germinating for a long time and only·when the vehicles to ferti-
lize it became available did it come to full fruit. 1133 
If there were outside influences on the Army or on tank concepts, 
Hinds was of the opinion that the British made the-larger contribution. 
While a student, the tactical lessons taught by Captain McAdams re-
fleeted the thinking of B. H. Liddel Hart and J.F.C. Fuller. Later, 
Hinds subscribed to· the Royal--Tank Corps J·ournai; -which :tor almost 
twenty years was the only exclusively tank publication in the world. 
· 34 He donated his copy to the day room where· the·troopers·"ate it up." 
While some Americans attended the French Tank School, United States 
tank doctrine was not perceptibly influenced by the French. 
In 1931, ·Hinds was transferred to Schofield Barracks in the 
Hawaiian Islands and was assigned to the 11th Tank-Company, which 
supported the Hawaiian Division. There tanks were ·used·· according to 
standard doctrine: one tank''!)'latoon· atta-ehed-to --an··infantry battalion 
for offensive action. Tanks·were-not massed for-use in-exploiting a 
,'l 
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breakthrough of enemy lines~· :En··defen!re; ·-e-spec1:aily against an 
invasion, tanks were to be dug in and··used··as-armored ·p±llboxes. The 
tank company officers urged that this ·conc-ept·be···abandoned, and that the 
tank company be held in reserve· to counterattack··against any landing 
force. To do this required complete motorcyc·ie ··reconnaissance of trails 
and roads on the islands. Hinds drove and~second···t.±eotenant Ralph W. 
Zwicker, later a general involved in the· Senator·· Joseph .. McCarthy era 
demagoguery, sat on the rear holding·a stick onl:y·slightly longer than 
the width of a tank. Thus where the·motorcycle-and stick could go, 
tanks could go also. In a later exercise, the concept of tanks in 
counterattack proved itself, and the tank plans were changed accordingly. 35 
Though a small change, it was a deviation from accepted infantry doctrine. 
In the 1930 1 s, the War Department transferred the Tank School to 
Fort Benning, Georgia. The reason behind the transfer was the contro-
versy between the old concept of linear·tactics versus the·new doctrine 
of mobility which was about to break into the open; -- ·:By transferring 
the school to Fort Benning, it would be directly under the Infantry 
School and conform to its doctrine. Because of·this move infantry 
tanks would continue to reflect infantry thinking up to the creation of 
the Armored Force in 1940. 36 
In the period from 1920 to 1928, there was·little activity in tanks 
or tank thinking. One man, however, came to the fr(;)nt, and this was 
Major Bradford G. Chynoweth, described by a former·editor of Armor as 
the leading tank philosopher in the 1920' s and· 1930 '3 ; 37 ·· In the period 
from 1920 to 1940, there tended to be three schools of thought about 
the tank. First was praise; this came from former tankers who had 
fought the vehicles and who had acco:mplished·their mission. Next was 
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sarcasm and eomdemnation; this came from those~whc,~had··served in tanks 
which failed to accomplish their ·missioll'; .. ta·st"came·a ·more balanced 
and objective evaluation from those who ·had either·heard··stories and/or 
studied and arrived at their independent ctmclus±ons; ·· ·ehynoweth was 
one of the latter group. 38 
In an article, "Tank Inf an try," Chynoweth· ·reviewed the reasons 
for adopting tanks, concluding that in a mechanica:J:·age the Army had 
to prepare for mechanized warfare. 39 He carried· the··argument further in 
"Cavalry ·Tanks,'' stating that future tanks would have greater speed 
(twenty-five to thirty-five miles per hour) andincreased vision. 
Tanks afforded speed, shock, firepower, and protection, but their use 
raised a fundamental question in the author's mind:· would tanks be 
controlled by a separate arm? Chynoweth delivered a stinging attack 
when he said that the Army was holding to previous concepts of 
organization, refusing to create a new branch whose existence contra-
dieted accepted tactical principles; simply because the tank had 
supported infantry in World War I. 40 
Cavalry tanks would, in Chynoweth's·opinion; be better than in-
fantry tanks, for cavalry was the maneuvering element of·an army. Cav-
alry could be concentrated for an attack·and·dispersed·for·reconnaissance 
and security missions. Many cavalry functions could be carried out with 
a slight change of equipment. Cavalry, the author reasoned, had to have 
the firepower and mobility that tanks offered. Concluding, he stated 
that a tank was only "an iron horse," and did not·detract from horse 
flesh. Such a comment, at that time, did notwin·the author friends 
in eit:her the infantry or the cavalry;· and may have been one of the 
many factors which led to branch jealousies for the next two decades. 41 
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Chynoweth sent the "Cavalry Tank" art:f::cle·to·Ma:Jor George S. 
Patton, Jr., for comment; -the· reply was printed· immediat~ly following 
the article. Patton argued that the United States needed neither 
infantry nor cavalry tanks, ·but an independent"tank-eorps·as they were 
special, technical·, and vastly powerful weapons. Cavalry, Patton 
argued, had to advance by enveloping movements, ·or await·a tank break-
through; it could not batter itself ·against· a· stone-wall. Fulfilling 
other cavalry missions such as screens, raids; ·and·· long ·turning move-
ments would make the tanks more a 0 handicap than'a·heip; Cavalry lived 
off the land; tanks were dependent on long supply lines. Patton saw 
further that there were places where tanks could not-function, such as 
in Philippine Rice paddies, the mountains-of Mexico; in the face of 
competent artillery fire, in the forests of Canada, and in the hills 
and gullied plains of Texas. Patton then predicted that·he could not 
"picture a large overseas force giving up that priceless commodity, 
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deck space, to large shipments of tanks. Twenty years later as 
commanding general of the 2d Armored Division he would lead tanks into 
the mountains and forests of Tennessee, North and South Carolina, 
and the swamps of Louisiana. As Commanding General of the Western 
Task Force, and later the II Corps, he would·have"annor'operating in 
the hills and gullied plains of North Africa. Stranger still, the 
Western Task Force was built around the 2d Armored Division. 
In 1922 and 1923, Brigadier General Rockenback also entered the 
literature battle. In an interesting article, ·"Weight and Dimensions 
of Armored Vehicles," he stressed that mability was ··essential to success 
in war, and that the ArJ!ly ~hould no longer think in terms of animal-
drawn wagons. He suggested that engineers should think of modifying 
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their bridging equipment to conform to the heaviest·of,armored vehicles. 
He cautioned that there was a need for tracked troop, artillery, and 
cargo carriers. Heretofore tanks had been transported on special 
carriers. This had to cease; tanks needed·to·be·able·to move under 
h . 43 t e1.r own power. 
Rockenback wrote "American Tanks" in 1923, and-showed a more 
conservative outlook than he had in his 1922·article. ·'fanks were to 
be used when terrain permitted and where their use would cause the 
uninterrupted and economical advance of infantrymen~· He argued that 
there was no such thing as an independent tank attack anymore than 
there was an independent artillery attack. Tank tactics·were those of 
"modern technical infantry." Tanks would be most useful attacking 
prepared enemy positions as in World War I and would probably follow 
the assault battalions and be used when needed. - fiuring a breakthrough 
tanks would probably be attached to the advance guard, but could also 
be used in rearguard situations to delay 0 or stop enemy units that might 
be pursuing an American force. This was a change'in attitude, as 
Rockenback was a cavalryman, but here he was espousing infantry doctrine. 44 
Patton reentered the word battle in 1924; In·ahumorous and 
interesting article in the Cavalry Journal, he argued that men had 
always used the wheel in warfare, but that under most conditions they 
were limited to roads. Now, man had a "more advanced wheel--the cater-
pillar tread track," giving more mobility both on and off roads. Patton 
continued that the United States did not have a tank·that was capable 
of keeping pace with cavalry. In a style uniquely his own he recommend-
ed that cavalry be equipped with armored cars. The American armored car 
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would start with a connnercial two-ton truck chasis,-the advantage being 
abundant and readily available spare parts. The engine, gas tank, and 
crew compartment would be armored to .. w:i:ths·tand·'rifle -fire' at 100 yards. 
There would be no roof to the gun compartment'-or- armor· plate on the 
floor to reduce weight:· and· increase ··speed-~---- .. 'I'he .. car·wotrld be used for 
reconnaissance, but editor~of· the~~cava:lry Journal -labelled this article 
a "military fantasy. ,,45 
During this war of words,· the Chiefs-of ·eavai--ry-and Infantry 
apparently ordered their respective branch.officers·to hew·to the ortho-
dox line. After leaving the White House in 1961;-~nwi:ght·D. Eisenhower 
related in At Ease: Stories That.!._ Tell to Fr:iends, how he and Patton 
while stationed at Camp Meade, experimented with tanks, machine guns, 
and tactics to improve their efficiency. Since their-printed ideas 
were in conflict with accepted doctrine, Eisenhower wa.s·called before 
the Chief of Infantry, Major General Charles F~ Farnsworth, who told 
him to desist as his ideas were not only "wrong; but·dangerous" and 
that any deviant opinions were to be kept to·himself. If the young 
infantry captain could not comply with accepted doctrine, he would be 
court-martialed. Eisenhower also thought that Patton-received the same 
message from the Chief of Cavalry; Major General Willard-A. Holbrook. 
Eisenhower stated that while they he.ld' to the accepted line, such 
admonitions only strengthened·their resolve to continue to-seek the ways 
and means to improve tank usage. 46 
Probably the outstanding article on tank tactics was written by 
Captain Sereno E. Brett in 1925. "Tank Combat" could have served as 
a textbook for the Tank School. -- Among the points that he·made was that 
tanks should be used by those elements deliverin,g-tqe·main attac!<:, if 
terrain permitted. They could also be used at other points to create 
diversions, if the opposition was such that the infantry would suffer 
heavy losses. Tanks, Brett said, should be used·in·large numbers, 
causing the enemy to spread this antitank ·defense~- -•This much of the 
article was a restatement of· command ·doctrine; .. ·but··then · Brett got to 
active usage of tanks he introduced some new ideas. 47 
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Tanks should be employed in successive lines; Brett contended, 
permitting fresh units to continually push forward; bypassing points of 
resistance and calling in loeal reserves, available if needed. The 
second and third waves could eliminate bypassed resistance. This was 
a new idea and it posed problems. Tanks cannot hold terrain; infantry 
had to follow the tanks closely, and the distance·varied·according to 
circumstances and terrain, ideally about 100 yards behind the first 
wave. If for some reason the infantry could not advance, then the 
tanks were to continue onto their objective, hopefully eliminating enemy 
opposition. The infantry would then join the tanks·at the captured 
position. Brett seemed to say that tanks could have a cautiously 
limited independent attack role. 48 
Tanks would normally form for attack behind·the·infantry, Brett 
continued, then pass through the infantry lines·toward their objective. 
After the tanks had reached the objective, they remained·there on it, 
patrolled enemy trenches, sought out automatic weapons positions and 
helped the infantry consolidate their positions. The tanks would then 
pull back to regroup, resupply, and prepare for a new attack. 49 
Tanks were infantry offensive weapons and the·tankers had to 
conform to infantry tactics, Brett said.· In defense; tanks should be 
used to counterattack enemy ground forces. In attacking antitank guns, 
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all tanks that could fire on the guns should do so; and move toward 
them; attempting to crush the guns. Infantry·and·artillery·should bring 
their weapons to bear on antitank guns also. Perhaps using an escape 
phrase, Brett said that the concepts he had discussed·-were based on 
"existent materials," not on future developments; Amazingly, these 
reflections on Brett's experiences in France in 1917 and 1918 accurate-
ly described tank warfare in·World War II. 5o 
One of the most caustic critics·in the literature struggle was 
Colonel Hamilton S. Hawkins, a horse cavalryman,·and ·a·critic of tanks 
into the 1940's. He complained that mechanical devices were capturing 
too much public attention. Boys were playing war in terms of tanks and 
airplanes instead of the "old standys" infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 
h . d h . h 0 ld b i · 51 He prop es1e tat in war, men, not mac 1nes, wou e v ctor1ous. 
Hawkins, however, had totally misread all the articles to that time. 
Tank proponents had argued that·tanks were·a means 0 to an end, and not 
the end itself, ·They had never discounted men; but continually pointed 
out that tanks without trained, competent men were worthless. Hawkins 
restated all the·arguments against tanks.· Tanks only assisted cavalry 
and infantry to move forward but could not replace·e±ther; tanks 
cquld not capture terrain, could not hold objectives, and had mechani-
cal and supply problems.·· Finally, since tanks seemed ·to be merely 
escort'vehicles for infantry, they had to hold down their speed during 
an attack or lose their infantry and the advantage one afforded the 
other would be lost. 52 
A refreshing article by J. · F. C. Fuller appeared in 1927, in which 
he said that strictly speaking a tank was a cross~country vehicle that 
carried wespons, it was but a mobile gun platform, and not a weapon itself. 
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Since tanks were to precede infantrymen,·· tanks··were · the assaulting 
element and footsoldiers were the follow-up or· slow pursuit unit, He 
cautioned that the army had to cease thinking in:"terms·0 ·0f names and 
start thinking in terms of functions; if· they did not, then minds would 
be rigid and unreceptive to new ideas. ·He argued that in suitable 
terrain, tanks could attack and hold· posit±ons··mor·e0 ·economically than 
infantry. Holding, according to theaothor,·did·not·mean sitting on 
a position, but taking a position to deny the'enemythe opportunity to 
move from the one he was on. 53 Brigadier General Rockenback wrote a 
critique of the article. To him, infantry was the only arm and all 
others existed to make its advance easier. 54 
The literature battle settled nothing. Supporters and opponents 
lined up and delivered their defenses or criticisms of tanks in a sterile 
sameness. Brett's "Tank Combat" was the most detailed and complete 
defense, while Hawkin 1 s "The Importance Of" was the most scathing 
attack. Historical hindsight affords an opportunity to examine the 
two positions. Both acknowledged that tanks had mechanical problems. 
The supporters felt that these problems could be·overcome while opponents 
felt that they could not. Both admitted that tanks were inseparably 
tied to supply lines; if they were cut or overextended, tanks would be 
of little use. Both held that tanks and infantry had to work together, 
and each recognized the need for cavalry, artillery, and engineer 
support. A rudimentary team concept that would become the basis of 
armored operations emerged from this early thinking, but neither side 
was willing to admit this at that time. Both sides admitted that tanks 
could outrun the foot soldier, thus denying him tank support. For 
unknown reasons, apparently no one thought of mounting the infantry in 
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carriers so that it could keep pace·with the tanks; The only solution 
would be to slow down the tanks. 
If one considers that tlie first sucees·s···of tanks· was in b-eing 
transferred to the infantry inl920·and--not·being--ab'oiis'hed outright, 
then the second success for them came in 1928. · That· year Secretary 
of War Dwight F. Davis visited the British-armor-demonstration at 
Andershot, England, and was impressed·.-- Upon·returning·home·he expressed 
a desire that the United States· should develop a·similar force. The 
War Department had up to that time not· given any·thought to such a 
force, its possible role, mission, or organization. 55 
While the War Department was considering whether to create a 
mechanized force, the first nontank armored unit came into existence. 
General Order Number 5, issued by Heriqua:rt-enr·,--···Th-iTcr'A'rmy Corps, in 
February 1928, created a provisional platoon, the 1st Armored Car Troop, 
made up of one officer and twenty-three enlisted·men. The platoon had 
studied at the Motor Transport School and was stationed at Fort Holabird, 
Maryland. In May the platoon road marched' to Fort Benning, Georgia, a 
i ii 
distance of 875 miles in three and one-half days; They returned to 
Fort Holabird by way of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a distance of 925 
miles, in five days. On 10 July 1928, the Third Army Corps issued 
General Order Number 19, which changed· the platoon· to the 1st Armored 
Car Troop, with a strength of two officersand·forty""seven·enlisted men. 
This platoon would become part of the·mechanized force.56 
In 1928, the War Department authorized an Experimental Mechanized 
Force to be assembled at Fort Leonard Wood, now Fort George G. Meade, 
Maryland. The force, organized in June 1928, was to be a completely 
mechanized, self-contained unit of great mobility and striking power, 
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but of limited holding power. It was to be considered a special 
offensive unit, since armored divisions were not envisioned at the time. 
The tank was to be the principal attack element and·all other components 
were to assist. Tactics were to be built around·· this· tank concept as 
well as the rapid consolidation, securing, and ·exploiting successes 
achieved by the tanks. Tactics should· insure·surprise; speed, and deep 
penetrations; members·of the command were to--be imboed·with an attitude 
of using speed to the maximum advantage. Finally, the force was to be 
considered a tactical unit as well as a tactical laboratory. 57 
The Experimental Mechanized Force, dubbed the "Gasoline Brigade," 
was activated 1 July 1928. It contained an infantry battalion from the 
34th Infantry Regiment; 1st Armored Car Troop; 2d Battalion of the 6th 
Artillery; a company of Engineers; a signal company; a chemical warfare 
platoon armed with 4. 2 inch sm0ke m@rtars; an antiaircraft artillery 
battery; the 16th Tank Battalion (light tanks); the 17th Tank Battalion 
(medium tanks); and the 2d Platoon, 4th Tank Company (light tanks). It 
was a balanced force patterned after the British: a striking force 
(tanks), a holding and mopping up group (infantry), fire support 
(field artillery), chemical mortars, anti-aircraft·artillery, support 
troops (engineers and transporters), and supply trains. 58 
In the early summer of 1928 the Experimental Mechanized Force, 
commanded by Colonel Oliver S. Eskridge, and·the G-3 operations and 
training officer, Major Douglas T. Greene, later commanding officer 
of the 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division, supervised the 
organization and training of the individual units~ They conducted 
essentially strategic or pre-engagement road marches to Upper Maro-
boro, Maryland,Gettysburg and Toby Hanna, Pennsylvania. The marches 
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showed that most of the equipment was obsolete, a fact previously known 
to the men, and that vehicular convoy marching·was slower than individ-
ual vehicular speed, The positive side was the demonstration that 
convoy marches of seventy-five miles a day were normal; this was three 
to five times further than foot troops could march. Distance and speed 
permitted a larger radius of action and·increased·capacity·for achieving 
surprise.59 In late summer, the units started combat training to deter~ 
mine the best tactical use of such a force, All elements of the command 
took part in road marches, but only the tracked vehicles underwent 
combat exercises. Overall these were of limited value, for only the 
newer vehicles could attain a speed over seven miles per hour, but 
several valuable lessons were learned,such as supply methods, command 
and control, and procedures for conducting night operations. 60 
In the concluding exercise, three tanks and two cargo carriers, 
marched from Camp Meade to Gettysburg and returned under their own 
power. The route was seventy-two miles; going to Gettysburg the force 
averaged six miles per hour, which included stops; on·the·return trip, 
it averaged eight miles per hour. In marching, using all vehicles, 
wheeled and tracked, the force averaged seven and one-half miles per 
hour. The conclusion was that while tracked vehicles were not signifi-
cantly slower than a mixed vehicular column, tanks should not move long 
distances under their own power because of short track and vehicular 
I 
life. This march was evidence of the Army's technical advancement and 
a major factor in bringing about the Army's ultimate mechanization,61 
The Experimental Mechanized Force learned valuable lessons from 
these maneuvers which it passed on to the War Department-for study and 
evaluation. A need for uniformity in the speed·and characteristics of 
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armored vehicles was evident. Also, the personnel needed to be intelli-
gent and highly trained to operate the equipment. In the combat phase 
of training, the force showed that it had enormous firepower compared 
to a non-mechanized force. The importance of chemical warfare was 
established, especially the use of smoke; airplanes also proved to be 
vital for all aspects of mechanized operations. 
The two main problem areas were communications and armored 
infantry carriers. For want of improved radios, a force should be 
highly trained so that it could respond to various types of situations. 
For infantry carriers, full-tracked vehicles should be developed that 
would carry between one-half and a full squad with weapons. 62 
The 1928 experiment proved or disproved various positions previously 
adopted. One positive effect was the start of a second literature 
battle, for now writers had a positive example from which to work, and 
not merely theory. One editor saw the experiment as an apparent effort 
to emulate Europe. He cautioned: "Let not the·glamour of the great 
armies of Europe be a cause for mechanization which may result in war 
material unsuited for physical conditions in possible theaters of 
operations. 1163 
Major Clarence C. Benson, a cavalry officer, evaluated the 
experiment, concluding that it was time to consider mechanizing the 
ground forces. The size of the force was immaterial, he said, but it 
should be of balanced composition and highly mobile, with light tanks 
(which do not need railroad transportation), light artillery, and 
reconnaissance aircraft, He did not foresee a need for a separate 
branch, as mechanization would benefit both infantryand cavalry. 
He acknowledged that both branches would have to change their existing 
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philosophy. One solution would be to reconstitute the old tank corps, 
answerable to one chief. 64 
Benson found the major obstacle to the creation of a mechanized 
force was that tanks belonged to and reflected infantry doctrine. 
The Chief of Infantry would not voluntarily give,·up· this weapon and he 
had the 1920 National Defense Act to support his·refusal to do so. 
Benson left unanswered the question that was the basic problem for the 
next twelve years: which chief would control a mechanized force? 
K. B. Edmunds wrote the first article expressing a belief that the 
mechanized force should be a separate branch, and by doing so put into 
print what was being whispered. The Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry did 
not want a separate arm; they intended to control the mechanized 
force. Edmund foresaw technological and mechanical·improvements in 
tank development. Speed would increase from three to sixty miles per 
hour, the radius of operation would increase from five to hundreds of 
miles. With improvements, the mechanized force would be a weapon 
available to Army o.r General Headquarters not merely to infantry. It 
would become a separate arm whose operation would be characterized by 
firepower, shock, rapid movement, and the capacity for self-sustained 
actions. 65 The vehicles of such a force would have common·characteris-
tics and probably be built utilizing a light tank 0 chassis; Tactically 
the unit would be primarily offensive, driving straight to the 
objective in attacks or counterattacks. The assault·wave lasting minutes 
instead of hours, would bulldoze through defensive-positions supported 
by artillery and followed by the holdingelements~- The-holding force, 
infantry, would move onto the objective, clear enemy defenders and per-
haps capture the supporting enemy artillery. The-holding force would 
finally serve as a pivot around-which the tanks·could organize to 
66 meet any counterattack. 
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The 1928 experiment was a failure or a success-depending on who 
happened to be expressing an opinion. Critics ·usually .. emphasized that 
mechanical problems justified their contentions-· about static warfare 
for the future. Supporters countered by pointing out that mechanical 
reliability would improve. ·Most importantly; the· Experimental Mechan-
ized Force showed that different branches· could work together as a 
team,:\ and especially promising was the fact that motorized infantry 
could keep pace with tanks. The War Department created a Mechanized 
Board to study the results. It concluded that·a new mechanized force 
should be created, consisting of· a combined arms team·-of regimental 
size, serving as a laboratory to test weapons and tactics for future 
wars; it would be a separate branch under a general officer. This 
recommendation was a major step forward in the tanks' battle for life. 67 
The United States Army emerged from World War I with a fairly 
efficient tank corps. Several officers recognized that·the internal 
combustion engine had changed warfare and urged the-Army to adapt to 
those changes. However, an unsympathetic Congress and a tradition 
minded War Department refused to maintain a separate tank corps. 
Instead, tanks became the property·of infantry, continuing in that 
relationship until World War II. 
During World War I the tank served as a·· support weapon and the 
infantry intended to maintain it for that purpose~- Suggestions that 
tanks could serve other purposes met a hostile reception. During the 
1920's some small deviations from official policy··oc~urred, causing 
the tank enthusiasts to rejoice and tpe traditionalists to be more 
determined to maintain the tank in its support· role·~ .. A large body of 
primarily theoretical doctrine was est~blished during the 1920's, 
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and an opportunity to test the evolving ideas required that either the 
Infantry Branch or the War Department change its· attitude~ ·· This happen-
ed with the creation of the Experimental Mec-hanized Force··which demon-
strated that tanks could, as the enthusiasts had maintained, do more 
than merely support infantry. 
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CHAPTER III 
CREATING AN IDEA: THE CAVALRY ERA 
Before General Charles P. Summerall, Army Chief of Staff, left 
the War Department in 1930, he issued a memorandum to "assemble that 
mechanized force now, station it at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Make it 
permanent, not temporary." In 1930, Congress authorized $284,000 to 
implement mechanization plans in spite of the Mechanizations Board's 
recommendation for four million dollars over a four year period. 1 
In October, 1930, the new mechanized force began assembling at 
Fort Eustis, Virginia. This location was selected by Summerall to 
prevent it from being taken over by the Justice Department for a new 
federal prison. The force was commanded by Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis 
of the cavalry, and the executive officer was Major Sereno E. Brett. 
It included representatives from all arms and some services. The 
selection of Van Voorhis was desirable in spite of his having no 
mechanical background. He held the conviction that there was a need 
to develop a better cavalry mount. He believed that a mounted soldier 
fought better than a dismounted soldier, especially if the mount 
afforded a good base of fire and was maneuverable. Van Voorhis saw 
his mission as giving the mounted soldier a decisive role on the 
battlefield. Brett was a tank enthusiast from World War I. 2 
The new mechanized force was a self-contained unit designed to 
fulfill particular missions on the battlefield. For reconnaissance 
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it had Troop A, 2d Armored Car Squadron. Its striking element was 
Company A, !st Light Tank Regiment, supported by Battery A, 6th Field 
Artillery. The holding-mopping up element was Company·H, 34th Infantry 
Regiment. Company C, 13th Engineer Regiment would provide engineer 
support, while the 19th Ordnance Company and a quartermaster mobile 
repair shop would keep the vehicles running. A platoon·from Battery E, 
69th Coast Artillery was added for antiaircraft protection. A detach-
ment from the 1st Chemical Warfare Service, equipped with 4.2 inch 
mortars was to provide that support. The force assembled at Fort 
Eustis included 190 officers, 2,900 enlisted men, and 845 vehicles, 
including 230 tanks, 50 self-propelled guns, and mortars, 90 half 
tracks, and 19 armored cars. 3 
While this mechanized force was not a conventional cavalry unit 
but a composite of all branches, Van Voorhis, a tough disciplinarian 
by reputation, instituted a policy traditional to cavalry. Before the 
men left the motor park, the vehicles were maintained, washed, and 
fueled for the next day's training. This became standard procedure 
ten years later in the armored force. 
The unit began its training by taking part in extended maneuvers. 
Many times the main body marched seventy-five miles a day while the 
reconnaissance elements often went 200 miles ahead~ Night marches 
and maneuvers were conducted without lights and used all vehicles. The 
unit Iearned to fight under all conditions, and the tactics emphasized 
mobility, which was not unusual considering its commander's background.4 
While training in field maneuvers, command post exercises, and road 
marches, officers soon realized that the primary use for· such an organi-
zation would be offensive in nature. Its main value was mobility; 
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success would depend on shock gained by speed, armor, and fire power 
from its large numbers of automatic weapons. Training stressed opera-
tions against entrenched infantry or other mechanized forces. Attacks 
included wide turning movements, seizures of crucial terrain features, 
acting as the covering force for larger units, counterattacks, exploita-
tion of breakthroughs and flank and rear guards: all traditional 
cavalry-type missions.5 
While undergoing field training, the mechanized force was being 
studied closely by the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry. Rumors began 
circulating about the possibility of the mechanized force becoming a 
separate arm; this alarmed the infantry, which feared· that the cavalry 
was attempting to break the infantry's tank monopoly. Infantry's 
greatest dread was that the mechanized force was trying to acquire 
infantrymen; this the infantry branch would not tolerate. 6 
In late 1931, the money to operate the experimental force ran 
out and it was disbanded. Some troops returned to their parent units, 
while the headquarters, armored car troops, ordnance:, quartermaster 
unit, and signal corps elements went to Fort Knox:, Kentucky to create 
the cadre for a mechanized cavalry regiment. In spite of complaints 
about obsolete equipment, members of the force made sound and valid 
recommendations that would be heeded in the future. Major Robert W. 
Grow, later the first G-3 of the 2d Armored Division, noted in his 
diary that members of the command had to begin thinking in minutes, 
not miles, and that each vehicle should have an antiaircraft weapon; 
the .50 caliber machine gun was such a weapon.7 Grow talked with 
Captain George C. Kenney, Army Air Corps, who recommended that the 
vehicles should be spread seventy-five to one hundred yards apart on 
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road marches. The consolidated report that Grow helped write emphasized 
that a mechanized force was for the execution of mobile warfare. He 
stated that the present force was not suitably organized, equipped, or 
of adequate strength to carry out the War Department's-directive that 
all arms were to mechanize. A mechanized force· ·needed· all its components 
if it were to train and develop the tacti:cs· neeessa:ry for- success on the 
battlefield. The report concluded with·the-recommendation that a 
mechanized brigade be organized. 
During the period 1929 to 1931, the Army,·which has always 
enjoyed a jargon all its own, got involved with semantics, some of 
which involved hair splitting distinctions. One such distinction however, 
was essential if any other branch was to work with tanks. General 
Summerall, in his 1929 Annual Report, urged the Army to mechanize and 
motorize. Mechanization was the application of mechanics to combat 
soldiers on the battlefield with a view to increasing their mobility, 
protection, and striking power. Motorization was the replacement of 
animal-·drawn vehicles by motor-powered vehicles, and the use of motor 
trucks for rapid movement of large bodies of troops from one part of 
a theater of operations to another. These definitions suggested that 
mechanization was of tactical value while motorization was·of strategic 
importance.a 
In 1931, Army Chief of Staff General Douglas·MacArthur, ordered 
all arms and services to adapt mechanization to their traditional roles. 
For cavalry this meant substituting vehicles for horses. The Chief of 
Staff recognized that the first step would be to mechanize one regiment. 
He also realized there might be a need to keep some horse units. But he 
felt that modern weapons had eliminated the horse as a source of power, 
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and except for infantry, the horse was the slowest means of transporta-
tion. He visualized that in the future, columns of mechanized cavalry, 
units from the Tank Corps, and motorized infantry,all moving at a 
uniform speed and all supported by artillery. 9 Either he failed 
to realize that tanks could traverse the same type terrain as horses 
could or he was making concessions- to eavalry, or perhaps both. 
In laying down guidelines formechanization,-MacArthur recognized 
that tanks had improved mechanically and therefore-could be given 
missions beyond the normal infantry support role-. - Cavalry was to deve-
lop combat vehicles capable of performing reconnaissance, counter 
reconnaissance, flank actions, pursuit, and similar operations. At 
the same time infantry was to develop tanks to increase their striking 
power against strongly held positions. He recognized that tanks 
were assault weapons and would probably be used only a short time 
during any action. In developing tanks, stress had to be placed on 
strategic mobility even though their primary use would be as a tactical 
weapon. With increased performance, tanks would probably be assigned 
to the corps or to the Army and used where needed. To evade the 
provisions of the 1920 National Defense Act, and recognizing that 
infantry and cavalry would probably develop similar-type vehicles, 
MacArthur said that "Tanks" would be the term applied to infantry 
vehicles, while "Combat Cars" would be the term used when talking about 
cavalry vehicles. 10 
MacArthur recommended that the army mechanize a cavalry brigade; 
two infantry tank regiments; seven separate armored car troops, three 
for the Regular Army, four for the National Guard; thirteen scout car 
platoons for regular cavalry regiments; and seven tank companies for 
43 
use with regular infantry divisions. Though a· b-it visionary for the 
time, it was a step towards developing a mechanized force. The cavalry 
phase was assigned to Major General Guy V. Henr)T-'t Chief of Cavalry. 
Henry acted slowly for reasons not entirelyhis·fault: budget, 
reluctance of ordnance to accept ideas from the automotive industry, 
and the protracted debate over mechanization. This slowness only added 
to the belief of Van Voorhis and Adna Chaffee that·mechanization would 
not make much progress unless it was a separate branch·or under the 
War Department itself.ll 
The War Department assigned the mechanized force to the cavalry 
in 1931, with directions to organize a cavalry regiment in order to 
develop the organization and equipment necessary to perform cavalry 
missions. That same year, 15 officers and 159 enlisted men were sent 
to Camp Knox, Kentucky (which became Fort Knox in 1934), forming the 
cadre for the mechanized cavalry regiment. In 1933, the 1st Cavalry 
Regiment, minus its horses, was transferred to Camp Knox to become the 
1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized). In developing the·unit, the first 
objective was always the question of organization and equipment. New 
developments were the result of constant experimentation, using a 
wide range of thoughts and ideas. 12 
The main mission of the Cavalry, like the Army·, was and is the 
defeat of the enemy in battle. Traditionally, Cavalry had been the 
branch of mobility and shock. While retaining both the· strategic and 
tactical mobility, firepower gradually took the place of shock. 
Once horse cavalry attacked mounted, but following World War I, it 
maneuvered mounted and attacked dismounted. Gradually the fixed 
defensive doctrine adoped by the Army during World War I began to 
change and the new trend was to restore movement to the battle~ 
field. Mechanized cavalry was a natural response to this 
required mobility, since it could attack sensitive enemy positions 
some distance from the front, especially if roads were available. 
This new breed of cavalry could make maximum use of the firepower of 
the fast light tanks or combat cars. 13 
In February 1932, Van Voorhis, Chaffee, -Grow and Brigadier General 
Julian R. Lindsey, the commanding General of Camp Knox, discussed the 
organization of a mechanized regiment and brigade, along with the 
necessary attachments--artillery, chemical, ordnance, and quartermaster. 
Grow was ordered to draw up a table of organization for a mechanized 
brigade. He was not optimistic, for such a proposal had been turned 
down before, and the Chief of Cavalry imposed a restriction that cavalry 
officers had to be thoroughly indoctrinated in horse cavalry before 
being assigned to the mechanized regiment. 14 
In the early phase, the cadre for the mechanized cavalry regiment 
conducted motor maintenance schools which all·memherswere required to 
attend, and later there were specialty schools. During the sunnner it 
gave demonstrations for the Officer Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers 
Training Corps, the Citizens Military Training Camps, and the National 
Guard. These demonstrations provided another means to test principles 
and techniques. It required a salesmen's job to sell mechanization, 
but the end result was to make the officers and enlisted men try harder. 
During the demonstrations, good and bad points about the equipment 
appeared. One proposal that emerged was to substitute the .50 caliber 
machine gun for the .30 caliber weapon. After thedemonstrations, the 
units began range fir~ng and it was discovered that the telescopic 
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sight for the 37 mm main tank gun was not adequate when the vehicle 
was moving, While trying to evolve tactics and techniques, the cavalry 
school published a memorandum on the employment of mechanized cavalry. 
Grow noted that it proposed to break up the mechanized· regiment and use 
the parts to assist horse troops forward. At the same time Van Voorhis 
complained about people writing regulations who-knew nothing about 
their content. 15 
In attempting to determine equipment and organization, Van Voorhis 
thought that the regiment should have fewer but bigger tanks, while 
Grow held the opposite view. Grow maintained that in Combat, tank life 
would be short and therefore large reserves would be needed. Organiza-
tionally it was thought necessary to have a separate armored car troop 
under the regimental commander for reconnaissance·purposes. A service 
troop should assume control of the supply vehicles from the combat 
troops. The regiment was to have a striking squadron and a holding 
squadron; a carryover from the mechanized force. On 1 July 1932, the 
name of the unit was changed from Detachment for·Mechanized Cavalry 
Regiment to Detachment, 1st Cavalry (Mechanized). It meant that the 
Army was converting an existent regiment from horses to combat cars. 16 
The 1st Cavalry Regiment was stationed at Fort D~ A. Russell, 
Marfa, Texas. Van Voorhis left Camp Knox on 17 December 1932, making 
the round trip of 3,240 miles in 31 days. Considering the trip was 
made on icy roads, through much snow, and in below freezing weather, 
and with the loss of only one vehicle, it was a success. No officer 
of the 1st Cavalry Regiment was.to stay with the regiment, but Grow 
noted that in his conversations with officers at Fort D. A. Russell, 
many realized that cavalry had reached a turning point. When the men 
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arrived at Camp Knox on 16 January 1933, they became the 1st Cavalry 
Regiment (Mechanized), a force of 52 officers and 749 enlisted men. 
This first mechanized regiment in the American Army was commanded by 
Colonel Bruce Palmer; assisting the regimental commander was Major 
Robert W. Grow, executive officer and acting S-3, and First Lieutenant 
I. D. White, aide to Brigadier General Julian Lindsey·. -- The regiment 
had two combat car squadrons of two troops each, a headquarters troop 
and a platoon of six mortars, a service troop, a machine gun troop, and 
an armored car troop. 17 Each combat vehicle carried three or four 
machine guns. and radios for communications. 
Once the 1st Cavalry Regiment had been mechanized, training 
resumed in earnest in progressive steps. After the men were introduced 
to the equipment and learned to handle it, they began tactical training. 
During the firing and maneuvering exercises, problems emerged. Grow 
noted that combat cars had a tendency- to stop in exposed positions to 
fire rather than continuing to move forward, firing at targets as they 
appeared. If the vehicle had to stop, it should do·so in a defilade 
position, or at least under cover to lessen its chances·of being des-
troyed by antitank guns. Map reading was stressed, for on· one maneuver 
the advanced guard became lost. Other problems which had to be solved 
were segregating baggage trucks from the combat elements, adjusting 
the distance between the advanced guard and·themain body, having 
the kitchens carry mor.e food, maintaining outposts and guards, and 
improving radios. 18 
Some problems were apparently solved, for in 1934 the 1st Cavalry 
Regiment (Mechanized) marched to Fort Riley,·Kansas; to participate in 
maneuv~rs ~gainst horse cavalry units. Prior to the exercises, there 
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seemed to be two prevailing thoughts about the·cavalry: the horse 
and mechanized units could work together·,·· or· they- should not be mixed 
or work together. At this time, most cavalrymen were of the first 
opinion. The primary purpose of the· maneuvers' was- to··determine the 
progress of the cavalry in mechanization-, motorization;- and the intro-
duction of new weapons. This·was also the-first·time horse·and mechan'."" 
ized regiments maneuvered against .. each other. 19 
In the maneuvers the mechanized· regiment usua-11:"ly -ran circles 
around the horse units. In one instance·a·· destroy· ed ·bridge\· the 1st ' ''-' 
Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) moved to another location, cd,'ssed and 
attacked the flank and rear of the horsemen. In·another instance, the 
horsemen delivered a night attack and bested the·mechanized men. The 
general attitude was that tanks were here to stay·and that horses were 
on the way out, though it would be 1942 before the horses were finally 
. 20 turned out to pasture. 
The major conclusion was that mechanized cavalry units were sensi-
tive to terrain. Rough, broken ground or water obstacles delayed or 
detoured the mechanized force. Demolitions, it·was thought, would 
assume a greater and more important role in warfare.· Supply routes 
over extended distances had to be planned and protecte_d~ One of the 
most important lessons learned was that mechanized forces would need 
infantry support for protection at night or wouid·have·to pull back 
from its advanced positions. Another lesson learned was that the "iron 
horse" could perform cavalry missions. Grow thought that the problems 
were honestly drawn so as not to favor the horse or combat car. Some 
weaknesses appeared, but overall, all but the most shortsighted 
horsemen were convinced.that the future of the cavalry lay in mechani-
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zation, Grow was convinced that as a result of the maneuvers, mec~an-
ized cavalry established itself as a -permanent:'·:part.·~Q;f. th~t1 1\rmy in 
1934. 21 
The most innnediate result of the maneuvers-was a training direct-
ive published by the War Department entitled nDe·f·ense Against Mechanized 
Units." As a result of this directive,· the eava·irr started issuing • 50 
caliber machine guns and 37 nnn antitank guns to its horse units. 
During the demonstrations of its weapons, the mechanized cavalrymen 
fired their .50 caliber machine guns at armor plate, penetrating one-
half inch at 1,100 yards and three-quarter inch at &00 yards. Since 
no known vehicle carried more than one-half inch of armor, the .50 
caliber machine gun could destroy any known vehicle. The directive 
instructed artillery to be used in an antitank role·along with antitank 
guns of the infantry or cavalry regiments. Tanks 0 ·would be kept 
concentrated for an attack or for use in a counteratta:ck. 22· Apparently 
no one in the War Department foresaw using a tank·or combat car in an 
antitank role. 
The antitank weapons debate broke into the literature and added 
one more problem for the mechanized force. Mechanized warfare was seen 
as a struggle between tanks and tanks or between tanks and antitank 
guns. Strictly speaking, an antitank gun is a defensive weapon, while 
the tank is offensive in character. To develop antitank weapons, the 
army had two possible choices. The first was to make the weapons 
tactically mobile, as heavily armed as the tank, and then by superior 
• 
training and skill attempt to obtain first round disabling hits. The 
second was to make the weapon a stationary gun platform, usin$ conceal-
23 
ment and extreme accuracy to give an edge to the antitank gun. The 
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army, however, chose to do both, using the-tank as ·an additional 
antitank weapon. 
The 13th Cavalry Regiment, commanded-by·Co·l:'onel··Char1:es L. Scott, 
later the first commanding general of ··the 2d··ATMO't"ed Division, 
arrived at Fort Knox on 5 September 1936 ... ·· It j'oined · with the 1st 
Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) to form the 7th Cavalry Brigade 
(Mechanized), a force of 150 officers, 2, 500 enlisted·· men,· and more than 
500 vehicles. Composed of two mechanized cavalry· regiments·, - an artillery 
battalion of sixteen guns, an engineer troop, a maintenance troop, a 
medical troop, and the 12th Observation Squadron, it was a modest 
mechanized force. Besides being a laboratory to develop new equipment 
and doctrine, it was a tactical unit that could take· the field if 
24 necessary. While radio was the primary means of· communications, 
the force did have 109 motorcycle troopers to serve as messengers. 
It was the second step in cavalry mechanization, and the next to last 
step in creating the Armored Force. 
In discussing the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), Brigadier 
General Van Voorhis stated that it retained cavaiTy·type missions, 
while rejecting the use of large antitank weapons·and increasing armor 
thicknesses because the added weight would decrease mobility. It 
also resisted introducing a holding force (infantry) because the 
mission of cavalry was not to hold objectives. ·If the· brigade was 
given such an assignment, infantry could be attached by General Head-
quarters. Looking to the future, he stated that if the mechanized 
force expanded, his brigade would provide the basis for that growth. 
One question concerning expansion was the number of figllting vehicles 
that a single commander could control. Based on Van Voorhis' 
experience, he thought the number was between 500· and 600, or two 
regiments. Any larger number would strain the ability of the command-
25 er. 
In 1936 Colonel Bruce Palmer, the commanding officer of the 7th 
Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), led his men into the Second Army 
maneuvers. Attached to the 7th Cavalry Brigade was· the 12th Infan·t-ry 
Brigade composed of the 2d and 6th Infantry Regiments; the 6th was 
minus one battalion. Also attached were artillery and observation 
aircraft. Combined, these forces did an excellent job, and it was 
demonstrated that the force could be adjusted to meet different situa-
tions. The flexibility demonstrated later became the hallmark of 
armor. 26 
so 
Preparing for the maneuvers, Palmer conducted·active and simulated 
exercises, using both real and theoretical unit attachments. The 
purpose was to determine how best to use such augmentations as 
infantry, horse cavalry, motorized artillery, and observation aircraft 
and to determine their mission. These preparations had four goals: 
to develop the men's professional skills, to make· the 7th Cavalry 
Brigade an efficient combat force, to develop the tactics best suited 
to the brigade, and to build a smooth functional staff and·connnunications 
system. Combined, these were to conserve manpower and to·bring vehicles 
and equipment to the maximum state of efficiency. To achieve the 
greatest surprise, night marches were thought to be the rule and not 
the exception. Using speed and surprise, Palmer hoped to avoid pre-
pared enemy defenses. This training was conducted under the supervision 
of the brigade's S-3, Lieutenant Colonel Willis D.Crittenberger, later 
commanding general, 2d Armored Brigade, and commanding general 2d 
Armored Division. 27 
Palmer viewed the mechanized unit as just another part of the 
Army team. It was a tool which could only be appreciated and under-
stood if it trained with other team members. During the maneuvers, 
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the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) operated against forces several 
times its size. By attacking flanks and rears, it caused disruptions. 
To reach these attack positions, it had to make long night marches, 
which it did successfully, justifying its previous training. Tactically 
the brigade tried to place its elements in such positions as to allow 
several choices of action against the enemy. Repeatedly the. brigade 
showed that its speed of action and its ability to move to the place 
needed at the proper time confirmed the.belief that these were two of 
the most important principles of mechanized warfare. 28 
The combat cars had shown that they could perform under trying 
conditions, but the attached units impressed the 7th Cavalry Brigade 
(Mechanized) commander and observers even more. The artillery had 
visitors shaking their heads in amazement with its ability to bring 
fire onto a target. This was achieved by attaching artillery forward 
observers to all elements of the brigade and by using Air Corps and 
observation aircraft. In addition to firing high explosive shells, the 
artillery and mortars in the mortar platoon of regimental headquarters 
fired more.smoke shells in attempting to neutralize antitank guns. 
The thought, proved valid during World War II, was that if the antitank 
guns' aim could be disrupted the advance would be easier. In maneuvers, 
no attack was initiated without first firing or simulating a smoke. 
screen. Several valuable lessons, later implemented, came from the use 
of indirect fire weapons. Artillery and mortars should be organic parts 
of a mechanized force. Ideally a battalion of artillery should be 
attached to each mechanized regiment; and a mortar platoon should be 
in the regimental headquarters company. 29 
Infantry had been attached to the brigade. For two years Fort 
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Knox had been experimenting with and urging adoption of the concept of 
making infantry an organic part of the mechanized force. The brigade 
had a definite need for infantry to protect artillery once it was in 
position, for patrolling and outpost duty, to relieve mechanized forces 
once they had seized a position, to delay attacking enemy infantry, 
and to take part in coordinated combat car-infantry attack. A rifle 
troop could be combined with the machine gun troop to create a fire 
support squadron. Colonel Palmer was of the opinion that motorized 
infantry was useful, placing only two restrictions on its use. First, 
infantry should be able to move into position wi·thout· special protection; 
second, the infantry's truck column should not interfere with the 
mechanized elements' tactical mobility. Maneuvers showed that combat 
cars and infantry could move and attack over unknown terrain. More 
importantly, tank and infantry coordination was excellent. 30 
The maneuvers were successful from the mechanized cavalry point 
of view. Usually the mechanized regiment operated as part of a larger 
force, but, it could also 0perate independently as a rapidly moving 
strike force. The maneuvers were a real test for the light tanks or 
combat cars. Attacks were made over unreconnoitered, rugged ground 
which would have previously been considered unsuitable tank terrain. 
Long sustained operations showed that the light tank was mechanically 
sound and could take rough, prolonged usage. One article summed up the 
feeling of the mechanized force in the assertion that "Dobbin is making 
his last stand. 31 
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While the United States was experimenting wit.h mechanization, 
force compositidn, and conducting non-firing maneuvers, real tests 
were being carried out in Ethiopia and Spain. For example, the ingenious 
Ethiopians set fire to dry brush in front of the Italian tanks. The 
tankers were hesitant to move through the fire, fearing that the gaso-
line or ammunition 01; beth would catch fire or explode. In the Spanish 
Civil War, defenders would wait until the tank had· passed their posi-
tions, then jump aboard, spray gasolineinside t:he"vehicle, and set 
it afire. When the hatch was opened, hand·grenades were dropped inside. 
This caused several crews to wreck their tanks so that they would not 
have to go into combat. More realistic antitank defenses revealed 
that the 75mm gun could only stop tanks under thirty tons. The German 
37mm gun could easily penetrate the heavy Russian tank, while machine 
gun bullets could penetrate the light German tank. The land mine, a 
new device of five pounds of TNT, could easily put any weight tank out 
of action. What the wars really revealed was that the tank was no 
miracle weapon and that no quick decisions were +ikely. Several 
articles appeared expressing jubilation about tp.e fank problems, but 
the negative effects were minimal. The brigade·continued to train 
and experiment, realizing that speed, maneuver,•and team work were . . i 
essential to overcome antitank defenses. 32 
One result of the 1936 maneuvers was the·recc,mmendation that 
observation aircraft be attached to the brigade. fhe following year, 
the 12th Observation Squadron was attached to the 7thCavalry Brigade 
(Mechanized). During training exercises, techniques and communications 
problems were solved, enabling the aircraft· to support ground troops 
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both in reconnaissance and combat. This was the beginning of close air-
ground coordination that typified combat in Europe during World War II. 33 
The War Department took a special interest·in·mechanization. In 
1938 it published "Policies Governing Mechanization; and·the Tactical 
Employment of Mechanized Units." Mechanization was-viewed not as a 
new arm but as a new weapon to enable the combat·arms· todo their job. 
Combined arms infantry, artillery, and cavalry were·essential to success. 
The basic considerations for combat were movement,· surprise, and the 
objective. The attacking force was to be supported-by artillery, 
aviation, and antitank weapons. Mechanized cavalry could take an 
objective, but could not hold it for a- prolonged period-without support 
from infantry or horse cavalry. 34 
The War Department directive divided mechanized employment into 
cavalry and infantry sections. Cavalry mechanization developed along 
the lines that increased mobility, firepower, radius of operation, and 
strategia. mobility beyond that of horse·c-avaley·;-·The-·great value of 
mechanized cavalry, as seen by the War Department, was its ability to 
conduct distant reconnaissance and create initial·successes which could 
form the basis for further action by higher commands. It could have 
a special role in pursuit and delaying actions because of·its mobility 
and firepower. The mechanized cavalry was especially adapted for use 
in envelopment, turning movements, or exploiting breakthroughs. To 
execute these missions, the cavalry needed to be a self contained force 
capable of independent action. Its scout and combat cars formed the 
main mechanized elements. Some limitations were placed on the mechan-
ized force which was thought to be sensitive to obstacles, terrain, 
enemy air attacks, and antitank defenses. To overcome·these-limitations, 
there was a need for complete ground· reconnai·ssance·, a· fact already 
known to the mechanized force.35 
For infantry, mechanization moved along· lines·that·would increase 
the foot soldier's ability to overcome s·trongly- organized resistance. 
Infantry tanks were not to be committed to·action·until a clearly 
defined objective had been located. Most tanks were to be used at 
that portion of the front where the decisive· ef'fort·was· to be made. 
While tanks would not normally operate beyond the effective range of 
artillery, they would not necessarily be ti-ed · to- the· speed of foot 
troops. This was the first major change in official policy, and from 
infantry's main desire to keep the tank as a close support weapon. 
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The infantry believed that attacks would be in succeeding waves. The 
first wave of medium tanks would closely follow the artillery barrage, 
hopefully eliminating antitank defenses. The second wave, light tanks, 
would then move forward to eliminate the machine guns. 36 
In neither case, however, were tanks given a separate and equal 
role with cavalry or infantry. Their use was restrictively defined and 
subjected to control by higher headquarters. In hoth cases-, and perhaps 
accidently, the War Department stressed that combat cars and tanks might 
need support from artillery, aviation,,and engineers,·which officially 
stated the combat team concept, even though cavalrymen-had stressed 
that idea since 1928. One bright spot that emerged was that if the 
opportunity presented itself, then mechanized cavalry could pursue, 
subject to some limitations. 
In 1938, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) moved to· Fort Riley, 
Kansas to take part in maneuvers. In the force were 100 officers, 
2,000 enlisted men and 638 vehicles. Each night on the march, it took 
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seventeen refueling vehicles with a capacity of 300 to 1,200 gallons 
each, approximately two and one-half hours to fuel the command. The 
700 mile march, which covered three days and· two nights, - required forty-
one hours, including halts. The force averaged· 17.07 miles per hour, 
considerably faster than horse cavalry or- infantry. - It arrived ready 
f . h . "d . . 37 or action, t e most important consi eration 1nany troop movement. 
In these maneuvers, and later, Brigadier General Van Voorhis 
commanded the brigade from the air. He used radio-communications 
and dropped messages to his two regiments directing them to be at the 
proper place at the appointed time. While on a road··march to Georgia, 
the force again showed its resourcefulness. Previous reconnaissance 
showed that the bridge over the Cumberland River at Burnside, Kentucky, 
would carry the weight of a combat car. When the 13th Cavalry Regiment 
(Mechanized) arrived, it was told that it could not use the bridge. 
Telephone calls to state and local officials were to no avail. 
Discovering a ferry nearby, Colonel Scott loaded his combat car on it 
and crossed the 280 foot wide river. The regiment followed. Thus 
a major terrain feature could delay mechanized cavalry, but by using 
the ferry, the force was able to continue its march. 38 
Certain cavalry officers began to assert the belief that the 
mechanized force should be expanded to a divi'Bion and·that it should 
be considered as equal to cavalry and infantry~ ·For the cavalry in 
1938, however, an unsurmountable stone wall was erected: Major 
General John K. Herr became the Chief of Cavalry. Herr was a devoted 
horseman and continued to be one until his death. The last Chief of 
Cavalry adopted a policy that he would accept mechanization, but "not 
at the expense of converting any horse units. 1139 By taking such a 
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position, Herr assured the· ii.mitation- of-m:eehani·zed···cavalry. Congress 
established the size of the Army· at an average enlisted strength of 
165,000 and 14,659 officers in fiscal year 1938.· Du·e to budgetary 
limitations, officer strength was limited-to 12,250·while enlisted 
strength averaged about 162, 000. 40 Thus· -Herr was safe· in insisting that 
any increase in the mechanized force had to be raised,- but not from 
existing units. 
Major General Herr spoke to the ·students at· the··Army War College 
on the subject of the historical evolution and·use-of cavalry. 
When he discussed mechanization, he stated that the cavalry had adopted 
mechanization, had developed it tactically and technically, and had 
learned to appreciate its value with relationship- to·the horse. Combat 
cars had been kept light and fast to enable them to carry· out cavalry 
missions, and not to compete with infantry tanks. Mechanized cavalry 
was faster than horse units over favorable terrain; it had a greater 
volume of firepower, but was difficult to control on the battlefield. 
That, to Herr, was "a real problem." Because of·supply and maintenance 
problems, it did not have the capacity for sustained· operations, or 
the flexibility of horse cavalry. Herr desired a·mechanized cavalry 
division and eventually a cavalry corps of three horse and one mechan-
ized division. He saw the possibility of a future war and thought it 
might be one of movement. If he were correct then·there would be 
extensive use of cavalry. He concluded by urging·the students to study 
history and watch cavalry in maneuvers (strangely he· omitted Europe 
and its problems). Ironically, his final comment was that "there are 
none so blind as those who will not see. 1141 Herr·adopted a position, 
maintained it against advice, and earned the distinction of being the 
58 
biggest obstacle to mechanized cavalry expansion. 
In 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Grow visited Fort Knox. 
During conversations Brigadier General Chaffee toldGrow-that he (Chaffee) 
was going to have a division, even if the men had·to·come from horse 
units. He intended to have General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff 
designate, visit Fort Knox after the Plattsburg maneuvers in August 
1939 and "go to the mat with him." On 29·September· 1939, Chaffee, 
addressing the students of the Army War College, stated that the concept 
of infantry tanks to support the infantry and mechanized cavalry to aid 
the cavalry was sound and should be continued. While studying and 
using armored vehicles, the mechanized force had evolved·a fundamental 
principle, that tanks should not be used independently. They were 
noisy, blind, and unable to undertake a prolonged defense, but they 
could serve as the backbone of a mobile force.42 
In terms which probably made the Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry 
furious, he stated that "mechanized cavalry was·the newest fighting 
service in the Army." He argued that the brigade was not the largest 
force that one person could control. It could be increased without 
increasing the size of the supply and support echelons. He made 
recoillillendations to create a brigade reconnaissance· force,· to add infantry 
to the brigade, to increase the artillery from sixteen to twenty-four 
guns per mechanized regiment, to increase the mechanized regiment from 
two to three squadrons each, and to add an engineer unit to the brigade. 
While making these recommendations, he noted that the brigade had never 
waited for men or equipment, but trained and fitted replacements into 
the organization when they arrived. 43 
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Chaffee reached the major portion of his speech~ To this point 
he had detailed the history, organization, and·tactical usage of 
mechanized cavalry without transgres·sing ·traditional· lines. He advo-
cated the creation of four mechanized·divisions;·an·expansion of the 
mechanized force by 800 percent.·· To get men; he··struck the most 
sensitive nerve in the conflict. He wanted cavalry and field artillery 
officers who had demonstrated command ability to· b·e· reassigned from 
existing units. These vacancies could··be·filled·by·reserve officers 
on extended active duty. He recognized ·that·some--officers·and enlisted 
personnel would have to be supplied at the expense of the horse 
cavalry and possibly infantry, especially if the-increase could not be 
gained by enlarging the regular Army. 44 Such a position was the highest 
heresy, but traditionally speeches to the·Army Wa~ College have been 
expressions of individual views, to stimulate student thinking, not 
Army policy. 
Comparing the use of the German Panzer Division to the proposed 
mechanized cavalry division, Chaffee noted that there were sixty medium 
tanks.in each German division. He said they protected the artillery 
and supported the division's infantry components~ The medium tanks, he 
concluded, might well be considered part of the supporting echelon. 
Based on the German experience in Poland, he·said,·well-trained, boldly 
led mechanized forces demonstrated their efficiency· and left no doubt as 
to their value in a war of movement. · Such· forces could· not be defeated 
by infantry or horse cavalry no matter how gallantly the defenders 
fought. The best defense against mechanized· cavalry· was mechanized 
cavalry. 45 In spite of continual urging since 1936, the·activation or 
creation of a mechanized division or a similar force would not occur until 
1940. 
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The question of who influenced whom in ·tank development and usage 
has been and will continue to be debated-;. Two schools of·thought emerged 
during the 1920 1 s and 1930's. The first proposed·that tanks were a 
close support weapon for infantry. The second utilized fast armored 
cars and light tanks to extend the role of cavalry. Britain and France 
chose the first; Major General Charles L. Scott of·the United States 
Army was of the opinion that Germany and the United States chose the 
second. Germany's concept was to use large masses of tanks under a 
single conunander to penetrate deep into enemy rear areas. Scott, 
however, overstated the American position; instead of adopting the 
second concept, until the creation of the Armored Force, the United 
States clung to both uses, and continued to do so even during World War 
II. General Headquarters Tank Battalions were attached to infantry 
divisions to be their armor support. 46 
During the 1930's several groups of German officers visited Fort 
Knox. Major Philips on his visit revealed that in philosophy the 
United States and Germany were similar. A second··visit by Major Hans 
von Greiffenberg revealed the same thinking. On the second visit the 
Germans were shown the equipment, except the .50 caliber machine guns, 
and were given rides. Major Robert W. Grow concluded then, and later 
events confirmed, that United States thinking ·was ··ahead of Germany's 
with respect to the employment of·mechanized forces. However, Germany 
was ahead in vehicular development, a conclusion verified by the 2d 
Armored Division's study titled "German versus American Equipment. 1147 
In the summer of 1937, Colonel Adolph ·von Schnell, who was in 
charge of German auto, truck, and tank production during·World War II, 
visited Fort Knox to study American mechanized doctrine and equipment. 
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He told the Americans that he· had-ridden- in·tanks-··-of-··each European 
country, and was of the opinion t:hat .. the- cavaiey .. c·ombat car· (light tank) 
had more speed, power, and rode easier than- any-- in·· Europ·e·~ · · He considered 
it the equal to any European light tank. During conversa·tions Scott, 
Chaffee, and Schnell discussed the basis· ·of German· armor development. 
The Germans believed that an armored· divisionhad·to use the combint:1d 
arms concept in battle; tanks had to be·used in mass .. to achieve sustained 
driving power. The vehicles had to be simple;·· rugged;·· and mass produce-
able; all elements of the division had to be mobile, which permitted 
unity of action in all phases of the operation.···· There ·had to be 100 
percent replacement of tanks and crews during long periods of operation. 
All these beliefs, later incorporated into United States armor doctrine, 
had already been expounded by Van Voorhis and Chaffee. ·As one mechanized 
cavalryman, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander D. Surles, stated in actual 
performance, Europe was ahead of the United States. In theory and 
partial use the United States was five years ahead of Britain by putting 
light tanks in the cavalry. Scott said that· German and American Armor 
developed along similar lines, "but I wish to point out·that we haven't 
blindly copied the German set up." The United States·had been busy with 
its own development for several years, and Germany's success in Poland 
proved, to Scott, the soundness of American ideas. 48 
Starting about 1936, the Cavalry Journal began condensing articles 
and news reports about foreign tank design and usage. ·Americans were 
as aware of foreign activities as Europe and Asia were of American 
advancements. Thus, if there were any influence,·it·was probably 
circular; Europe may have been influencing American actions and at the 
same time American thought and actions were influencing others in the 
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field. It would be impossible to state categorically who had the most 
or least influence. 
At Plattsburg, New York, in 1939, during the·FirstArmy maneuvers, 
a team of German observers paid close attention·,to· the· equipment and 
its use. · For some unknown reason, the German offi·cers~ ·quic.k:ly departed, 
but in a few days the·reason was·apparent: Germany·invaded Poland. 
During the first phase of the maneuvers, the 7th Cavalry Brigade 
(Mechanized) was split into fragments, assigned to guard·the flanks and 
rears of various infantry brigades, which left only a small part of the 
mechanized cavalry to function as it should. Later the brigade was 
consolidated and used as a whole unit~ It cut supply and communication 
lines, and raised havoc with the infantry units. Two invaluaple 
lessons emerged. First, the mechanized brigade was a·special weapon, 
and troops supporting it had to be·thoroughly familiar with· its tactics, 
strengths, and limitations. The only way to acquire this'·-was by constant 
training. Second, the brigade should· be kept complete as a unit. It 
was a mistake to use the regiments separately,·but·a bigger mistake 
to subdivide the regiments into task forces. The·· brigade should be 
given missions that were deemed most important, and used to execute 
that assignment. 49 
Major General Edward Croft, Cbie.f of Infantry, had transferred the 
Tank School to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1934, placing it directly under 
the Infantry School commandant. Tank School·support troops were trans-
ferred to Benning and renamed. The 1st Tank Regiment became the 66th 
Infantry Regiment (Light Tanks), while the 2d Tank Regiment became the 
67th Infantry Regiment (Medium Tanks). In 1940 t;:}:iose two regiments 
became part of the 2d Armored Divi~ion. 
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The following year the Army Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, 
issued a directive which said that recent· developnrents ·· in motorization 
and mechanization may have created a need·for .. new·thinking·in infantry, 
especially about organization and· tactics. ·He·further· stated that 
study groups might consider keeping horses·· for· artiliery-; ... ·· The assistant 
commandant appointed a board of off icer-s, -· headed· by- Li.eotenan t Colonel 
Alvin C. Gillem, to study infantry and·mechaniz-ation, and to make 
recommendations as to how infantry·could improveitself·and fight in a 
mechanized war. Gillem and his fellow board ·-members, Maj ors Earl 
Landreth, John N. Robinson, and Captain Floyd L. Parks,·issued their 
report titled "Reorganization of the Brigade, Division, and Higher 
Units of the Army" on 6 December 1935. It reconnnended eliminating all 
horses in infantry units and substituting motor transports. It 
recognized and urged that infantry divisions be trained to defend 
against wide envelopments, because part of the enveloping force might 
include mechanized units. It further urged that·the division's light 
tank company be eliminated and a regiment of light· tanks· be·concentrated 
at corps level. If needed, a battalion of· light·tanks ·could then be 
available to each of the corps' infantry divisions. The corps would 
also have a mechanized unit for offensive·or·defensive combat. 50 
At the field Army level, the board recommended eliminating one 
horse cavalry regiment and replacing it with a mechanized brigade. 
A mechanized force was thought to be of great value operating against 
enemy flanks and rears, lines of communications, exploiting breakthroughs, 
pursuits, and seizing critical terrain features. The board recommended 
keeping one horse division for close-in protection and because some 
terrain mi~ht be unsuitable for a mechanized force. The mechanized 
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brigade would have two mechanized· cavalrrregiments;,.a·-field artillery 
battalion, three battalions of 75 mm guns, ·an·engineer·troop, a mainten-
ance troop, and mechanized medical· troop~Sl... Probab1y--theArmy made very 
little, if any, use of the board's report·. · .. Whether· it helped to 
influence- the two regiments concept·· for··tne-·o/1=h~·,eavairy-Briga.de (Mechan-
ized) is doubtful, except·the·second·regiment·(the..,,l3tM·did not join 
the brigade until nine months after the· report·· was submitted. 
By 1939 and 1940, cavalry had made giant··strides·tn·mechanization, 
but infantry had changed very little, if any.· Lieutenant Colonel 
Bradford G. Chynoweth, after completing military·attache duties in 
England, was assigned to the First Battalion, 66th·Infantry Regiment 
(Light Tanks), stationed at Fort Benning. He remembered that his 
brother-in-law, Major General George A. Lynch, Chief of Infantry, was 
determined to keep tanks in their proper place as·· close· support weapons 
for the foot soldier. If any infantryman tried to·talk cavalry tactics, 
or deviated from accepted doctrine, he was penalized for it. Chynoweth 
stressed mobility in exercises. He gaye orders while moving and worked 
out hand signals for various maneuvers; meanwhile he received cold, 
icy stares from his superiors. He finally reaii.zed·the tanks would 
continue to be infantry support weapons until·somebody changed the 
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Probably unknown to· anyone except" the War· Department, the change 
so long awaited was about to occur. In the summer of-1940, the War 
Department decided to use the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and a 
provisional tank brigade of infantry tanks.from·Fort Benning, in the 
Louisiana maneuvers of that year. These maneuvers were to test both 
horse anq mechanized cavalry, mobile concepts of war, and the new 
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triangular infantry divisions· (three·regiments·0instead·· of· f·our regiments 
in two brigades as in the older square division)~ In-addition, observers 
would get a close look at command, supply·, admini-stration·, ··maintenance, 
and the use of aviation over a prolonged period of time. 53 
Preparing for the maneuvers, Brigadier· Genera·!· Chaffee used his 
influence to have attachments made to the·mechanized·brigade, including 
an engineer troop, a medical troop, but most· important·,·· the·· -6th Infantry 
Regiment (Motorized). For· the· infantry·'s part·;·· a· pr·ovisional tank 
brigade was created from the 66th and 68thTnfantry-Regiments (light 
tanks) and a battalion of the 67th Infantry· Regiment· (me·dium tanks), 
commanded by Brigadier General Bruce Magruder, the· first commanding 
general of the 1st Armored Division. Several times during the maneuvers, 
the mechanized and tank brigades were brought together· to act as a 
provisional division; it impressed the observers·. ·· The Chief· of Cavalry~ 
Major General John K. Herr, said that as a result·of this experiment 
two mechanized cavalry regiments, the 1st and the 13th, were lost to 
cavalry. 54 
Historians of armor stress that in the two decades following World 
War I, petty branch jealousies, and conservative·, almost reactionary 
leadership in infantry and cavalry prevented the· creation of a mechanizeq 
or armored force prior to 1940. They argue further,· that military 
leadership continued to think in terms that won the·previous war, 
creating a rigid mentality and a reluctance·to·change·philosophy or 
means. All this is true, but they fail to consider·that·men in positions 
of responsibility are men. They have all the strengths·, weaknesses, and 
inability to foretell the future that everyone else posse~ses. They 
we:r:e exercising their best judgment at the time, consider:i:qf their 
biases, prejudices, experience, and the·conflicting·advice they 
received. What most historians have· failed· to· see·· (one reason is 
their concentration on the negative aspect of·· the·· period) is that 
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during those two decades armor tactics·and--techniques were· being evolved; 
more importantly, the armored force leaders· were ··being trained. 
Often the men chose tanks at personal sacrifices·to themselves 
and their careers. Lieutenant General Willis·n~·Crittenberger said 
that he asked to go to the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) in 1935, 
and was told that if he did he could no longer expect·any·help from the 
Chief of Cavalry's office. Chynoweth was·assigned·to an infantry 
regiment to get him awav from tanks, and as a result spent the war in 
a Japanese prisoner of war camp. 55 The· American experience·· was success:-
ful; General I. D. White said, "The 7th CavalryBrigade (Mechanized) 
served as a model for the Germans to copy. The soundness of American 
tactical doctrine was proven in Poland, theLow·Countries, and France. 
As a result the Germans got ahead in technical development of armored 
vehicles, but never surpassed Americans in tactics.u56 This was a 
statement by an early pioneer in mechanized cavalry whose·World War II 
experience included connnanding a reconnaissance-battalion, a tank 
regiment, a c·ombat connnand, and finally the 2d Armored Division during 
its race to Berlin in April 1945. The 7th Cavalry Brigade-and infantry 
tanks served as a laboratory for evolving those tactics; techniques, and 
fo_r training men to assume leadership positions·· in· the Louisiana 
maneuvers during the summer of 1940. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE FORT BENNING· ERA:··· ACTIVATING AN 
ARMORED DIVISION 
General George C. Marshall, · the Anny· Chi·ef- of· Staff, testifying 
before the House Military Affairs Committee··on--·23-February- 1940, indi-
cated that the War Department was considering expanding·the 7th Cavalry 
Brigade (Mechanized) into a division,·and increasingthe infantry 
tank strength to two light tank regiments and·one·medium regiment. 
The Protective Mobilization Plan called for a force of 734 light tanks 
and 194 medium tanks, while the Army currently had only 648 light and 
144 medium tanks. The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) was to gain 
two combat car squadrons, giving it two regiments of three squadrons 
each. A reconnaissance and support squadron were to be added. In the 
latter would be a scout car troop, a motorcycle· troop, -- and a machine 
gun troop. The artillery strength· would be·· increased from sixteen to 
twenty-four guns and a two battalion·regiment·of-infantry would be 
added. In effect the 7th·Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) would be a 
small division. 1 
The Chief of Cavalry, Major General John K. Herr, testified 
before a sub-committee of the House·Appropriations·eommittee on 11 
March 1940. He attempted to show that the cavalry had adopted mechan-
ization, including giving eighty hours of instruction·in the regular 
r 
and basic courses at the Cavalry School. In addition, there was a 
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four and one-half month advanced motor maintenance course. He wanted 
a larger training area in the southwest,·around·Fort-Bliss, Texas, so 
horse and mechanized units could work and evolve the tactics necessary 
for the employment of both types of units. He wanted-a·cavalry corps 
of two horse divisions and a mechanized division, probably the first 
time that this latter had been mentioned. · ·While·· recognizing the value 
of mechanized units, he argued- that·-an·armored-·vehicle-·could not go 
certain places and did not have the· flexibility of a horse, a convic-
tion which he carried until his death. 2 
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While Congress was considering the-military-appropriations for 
fiscal 1941, the ~rmy gathered almost all of its·armored vehicles to 
take part in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1940. The maneuvers, as always, 
revealed definite needs. For example, infantry had to·keep pace with 
tanks, since they were mutually dependent upon each other, and artillery 
needed to be self-propelled, not horse or vehicular towed, especially 
if it was to be part of a tank or mechanized-force~ ·The-most important 
lesson learned was that there existed a need for·an armored force. 
On 25 May 1940, immediately prior to the final critique of the 
Louisiana maneuvers, infantry and cavalry tank-minded officers had met 
with Brigadier General Frank M. Andrews, Assistant-Chief of Staff, 
G-3, in the basement of the Alexandria, Louisiana-High School. This 
group, including Brigadier Generals· Adna-·R, ··Chaffee-and· Bruce Magruder, 
and Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., concluded that-an-armored force 
was needed at once. The discussion pointed out· that·the-pr~sent infantry-
caval~y mechanization concepts· were·· inadequate, - that·· time· to correct the 
situation was short, and that tankers had so far received·second-class 
treatment, in relation to the ~embers of the traqitional branch. The 
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unanimous opinion of the 11basement-group 11-was,·that·if-the Army would 
have an Armored Force it would have·to·be·taken·oot·of-the·hands of the 
Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry. It was decided-that·Brigadier Generals 
Chaffee and Andrews should take that·message·to·Washington for consider-
ation. The group recommended··that·two-armored divisions be activated, 
using the .7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized)· and·tfaFinfantry Provisional 
Tank Brigade as a basis, with one·division·stationed-at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky, and one stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia. 
Chaffee and Andrews went to Washington. Chaffee saw Herr and 
presented the plans and recommendations of·the "basement group". 
Chaffee argued that mechanization was a cavalry·assignment and urged 
Herr to mechanize other cavalry regiments, to form the nucleus for the 
armored force. Herr, who had been in Louisiana for··the maneuvers, but 
not present for the "basement meeting," replied that he would be willing 
to accept armor as part of cavalry, but he would not give up one horse 
to create an armored force. Major General Robert W. Grow noted that 
because Herr procrastinated and was not willing to·sacrifice horses 
for tanks, "he lost mechanization for the cavalry and; •• cavalry ••. lost 
a prestige that it can never regain. 113 
General Marshall was more receptive to the recommendations of 
the armor advocates. Brigadier General Andrews·presentedwritten plans 
for the organization of two armored divisions,·which·included a number 
of important points. He argued that the·levelof-mechanization was 
inadequate and a considerable increase was desirab:le; the·current policy 
of developing branch needs required revision, as· did·the-current infantry-
cavalry organizations, especially when viewed in-the light·of the German 
experience; while a definite requirement existed for a large mechanized 
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echelon (division) as well as for separate·tank·elements· (battalions) 
to be in General Headquarters reserve. Andrews further stated that the 
basic armored combat unit should be a division formed-from·a combination 
of various arms and services to insure the most efficient usage of 
weapons and equipment and formations in· combat~··· In conclusion, 
Andrews pointed out that current·Army pians·for-e~pansion·provided for 
enlarging the mechanized units with·personne1.·and~equipment; the 
"basement group" believed that the first step·should·beto determine the 
composition of an armored division.4 
Andrews and his section evolved several principles·that were to 
be followed in organizing the armored divisions. These would not 
constitute a new arm or corps, for any such action would be the 
function of the General Staff. The development of·materials and 
tactical doctrine for the·armored divisions and·separate armored 
battalions would be supervised by a Field Forces··Commander, Armored 
Corps. The divisions, one·to be stationed at·Fort Knox, and the 
other at Fort Benning would be exempt from corps·area control except 
for routine supply, discipline, and court martial jurisdiction. In 
organizing the initial two divisions, maximum use would be made of 
existent units: the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and the 66th, 67th, 
and 68th Infantry Regiments (Tanks).· ·The War Department would 
authorize the transfer of personnel and equipment·if necessary. 
Separate medium and heavy tank battalions would·beassigned to General 
Headquarters reserve and attached to infantry-units:when needed.S 
While Andrews denied that the armored force was a· separate armor branch, 
it would have an independent status not enjoyed·-by· other a,I'tlls. The 
Field Forces Commander, Armored Corps,·while not recognized as an 
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equal with the other chiefs of branches,·was·given·the· same responsi-
bilities, with an additional duty, to be the lst·Armored Corps Commander, 
a command not given to other service chiefs. 
Tactically the armored division ·would· be most··effectively employed 
when conditions permitted maximum use· of· speed·;· fi:repower·, · and mobility. 
It should be supported by aviation and followed··quickly· by· other troops. 
The basic concept, probably influenced·by·the· Y.th·Cavalry Brigade 
(Mechanized), was to use the proposed division·as the·brigade had been 
used. It was to lead·· offensive··spearheading drives·· to take strategic 
objectives and nerve centers. It could exploit breakthroughs, be used 
to pursue or delay enemy advancements,function as· a· long rang·e reconnais-
sance force, protect less mobile forces while they·advanced, and serve 
as a mobile reserve. 6 
In planning the organization, the G-3 s·ect·ion· thought that the 
division should be a small, fast-moving·, hard-hitting maneuverable 
unit of 8,000 to 11,000 men with 350 to 450 tanks·, .. the division's 
basic weapon. All other elements were to be·used in support. Proper 
grouping would be essential to maneuverability·, ·taet·icai· emp·loyment, and 
maintenance. Such a force was seen as·too large for one·column, thus 
necessitating thinking in terms of multiple columns·and combat teams. 
The large number of vehicles would probably cause control, mobility, 
and maintenance problems; and take up excessive road space. One 
maintenance solution would be to keep the types of vehicles to a 
minimum. The first table of organization had a division of 511 officers 
and 8,380 enlisted men, 416 tanks, 85 cars, 24 howitzers, 3,116 machine 
guns, 464 antitank guns (37mm), and 80 antitank machine guns. The 
division would be composed of five echelons. In the command echelon 
would be the division headquarters;· a· signal· comp·any, a headquarters 
company, a military police company, and an observation ··squadron. The 
reconnaissance echelon had·a three company reconnaissance battalion. 
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An ordnance company, a medical battalion,-· and- a· quartermaster battalion 
would co~stitute the supply and service·echelon-;-"Themain combat 
elements were to be in two brigades, a shock·echelon·composed of two 
tank regiments of two battalions, each having two·medium·companies and 
one light tank company. The ground holding echelon· had .. a·· reconnaissance 
company, an antitank battalion, an engineer battalion;·an artillery 
regiment, and an infantry regiment of two rifle·battalions and an 
antitank company.7 
For organization purposes, Andrews and his section had ·counted 
noses and tanks. He said that there were 2,868 mechanized cavalrymen 
at Forts Riley and Knox, along with 2,677 personnel· in: infantry tank 
units at Forts Benning, Meade, and Lewis. These units had 328 combat 
cars and light tanks, 133 scout cars, and an estimated 18 medium 
tanks. Men and material would have to be transferred, ending with a 
force at Fort Knox estimated at· 2,9i8 personnel;-i66·light tanks, 9 
medium tanks, and 68 scout cars. Fort Benning·would get 2,623 men, 
162 light tanks, 9 medium tanks, and 65 scout cars;··· With· these troops, 
and others that would be attached, there were an·estimated 7,986 men 
available to begin creating two divisions·, ·with· an·es·timated 9,500 men 
still needed to organize two divisions of 8,743·men each. Such 
strength, acceptable for peacetime, would be inadequate for combat use. 8 
After submission to Marshall, the plan was presented to other 
staff sections and to the service chiefs for their comments; Lieutenant 
Colonel Jonathan W. Anderson, of the War Plans Division, agreed with the 
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armored concept, but considering the European situation, suggested 
that one division be completely organized fraur -the 7·th ·°Csvalry Brigade, 
and a second be started from units not need0ed· -by the first. The 
advantage would be to get one d·ivision ready quickly, but the disadvan-
tage was the slower organization of two armored ·d'ivisions. Major 
General Julian L. Schley, the Chief of Engineers,· argued that the 
engineer battalion should be increased from· 2s,1·· me'fr···to· approximately 
400 to 500 men. He thought that the War Department had f·ailed to heed 
the Developments in the European War. For example', the Germans used 
engineers in their attack forces to clear mi:nef-iel.ds, to reduce 
fortifications, and to bridge streams. Germany's· en:gine·er battalion, 
he pointed out, had almost three times the proposed United States 
strength. He and his branch wanted to·be part'of an armored division 
and thought their contributions would be greater if their battalion 
9 were enlarged. 
Major objections to the proposed-force came·fromthe· Chief of In-
fantry, Major General George A. Lynch, and the Chief of" Cavalry, Major 
General John K. Herr. Lynch concurred in principle to the plan, but his 
objections to key provisions negated his concurrence. He tried to re-
fute the idea that there were any1· deficiencies in infantry tanks or 
organization, stating that with some improvements they were equal to 
any in the world. He said that although the basic plan denied that armor 
would be a separate branch or arm, two sections of·the plan certainly 
implied that. Lynch thought that it would be dangerous for national 
defense to take the expertise away from· one agency and gi'1'e it to others 
who "lack both the specialized background and the organization to 
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general, I Armored Corps, should not be given-the powers proposed in 
respect to research and development, particularly to infantry tanks, 
their organization, and doctrine development should remain a duty of 
the Chief of Infantry. The final major point, Lynch stated, was that 
combat cars and light tanks should not be mixed. Each had distinct 
tactical usages~ The light tank was superior in assaulting power and 
the ability to withstand punishment, but lacked_ the mobility or range 
of combat cars. He concluded that if the proposed plan was to increase 
expansion and create an armored branch with a chief who had all the 
duties of branch chiefs, then he would have no objection, but he said, 
"t'his proposal under consideration does not and offers nothing over 
10 the present means of control." 
The most bitter statement against the creation of an armored force 
came from Major General Herr. He said there was no need for a separate 
organization, and proceeded to launch a bitter, caustic, vitriolic 
attack on the background and creation of the proposed force. He 
correctly assumed that the decision to create an armored force was 
arrived at in Louisiana at a meeting that neither he nor Lynch was 
invited to attend. Andrews, according to Herr, invited a "few officers 
of more or less experience in tank battalions and·in·the mechanized 
brigade. 1111 He complained that at a planning conference called in 
Washington, Lieutenant Colonel Sereno E. Brett told·persons at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, that he was going to·Washington to advocate the 
creation of a separate armored force. At the meeting;· the discussion 
was open and wide-ranging, except on one issue; Marshall·had already 
decided that two armored divisions would be activated from infantry 
and mechanized elements. One division was to be stationed at Fort 
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Benning, Georgia; the other at Fort Knox, Kentucky. , ,~err failed to see 
the need for such a force, arguing that the same results could be 
attained under the Chief of Cavalry. 12 
The Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry· emphasized· that perhaps an 
armored force was needed, but they denied that a· separate force was 
the solution. Both felt that the same results·could be attained if 
left to their respective branches. What both failed to· see, perhaps 
because they were traditionalists, was that little progress had been 
made under their jurisdictions over the last twenty years. Both viewed 
tanks much like a foster child which had been pushed on their branch. 
They might be responsible for tanks, but they·certainly would not 
obtain a place of preeminence in either branch.· If tanks were to achieve 
equality with infantry and cavalry, attitudes would have to be changed 
and concessions made. Herr and Lynch were reluctantly willing to alter 
their previous positions only because of the threat of losing the tanks 
to a separate arm. The twenty years of procrastination by the branch 
13 
chiefs lost mechanization for cavalry and probably for infantry. 
Word began to leak from the War Department that changes were in 
the immediate future. Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Grow and his family 
arrived in San Francisco preparatory to sailing for duty in the Philip-
pines. Because of ship problems, his departure was delayed a few days. 
On 26 June 1940 he sent telegrams to the Adjutant·General's office and 
to Major Gilbert Z. Cheves to explain the situation.· In his reply the 
same afternoon, Cheves told Grow that he would'probabiy·be reassigned 
to mechanization headquarters at Fort Knox or Fort Benning. He added, 
"very confidential, [it] looks like the Mech[anization] Force boys have 
won the day. 1114 When Grow and his f~ily returned to Fort Knox and 
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found that he was to be the G-3 of the division stationed at Fort 
Benning, he started studying organizational charts, concluding that the 
most difficult part of his job would be to "get the push into infantry 
tank regiments but that will be largely (Colonel)·George Patton's job. 1115 
From the last of June until mid-,July, the War Department set a rapid 
pace. On 30 June 1940, it selected Brigadier General Charles L. 
Scott, a cavalryman, to command the 2d Armored· Division, at Fort 
Benning; Brigadier General Bruce Magruder, an infantryman, was to 
command the 1st Armored Division at Fort Knox; and Brigadier General 
Adna R. Chaffee was to command the I Armored Corps headquartered at 
16 Fort Knox. The stationing of Scott and Magruder at their posts was 
apparently an attempt to alleviate hard branch feelings. 
On 28 June 1940, the War Department had issued a directive recommend-
ing the initial composition of the general and special staff. One 
week later this recommendation was approved, listing specifically one 
commanding general, his aide, five general staff officers, a signal 
officer, an Air Corps officer, two adjutant generals (orte regular and 
one reserve officer), an inspector general, a division quartermaster, 
an ordnance officer, a judge advocate, a finance officer, and one 
chaplain. 17 In its next directive, "Organization of Armored•·Fbrce," 
issued 10 July 1940, the War Department stated that for the purpose of 
service testing, an armored force was created and would include all 
armored corps, division, and General Headquarters Reserve tank units. 
Brigadier General Chaffee was given two assignments: commanding 
general of the I Armored Corps (a tactical assignment) and Chief of 
the Armored Force (an administrative role). 18 The use of experimental 
armored force phraseology was in fact a successful effort to circumvent 
82 
the 1920 National Defense Act, which gave tanks to infantry, but failed 
to mention "mechanization", a phrase MacArthur used in 1930, or "armor", 
the phrase used in 1940. Thus the War Department by employing semantics, 
was able to create an Armored Force in the absence·of Congressional 
action. Afterwards, perhaps by way of giving· tacit approval, there was 
no action by Congress to do away with the·Armored Force. 
The American armored divisions· were· similar- to those· of Germany, 
but not a copy. In the German division was division headquarters, 
a reconnaissance battalion, a tank brigade of two·regiments of about 
450 tanks, an infantry brigade of two regiments, a motorized artillery 
regiment, an antitank battalion, a motorized signal battalion, and 
various service elements. The American division had a headquarters, an 
armored brigade of two light and one medium tank regiments, one armored 
infantry regiment, an armored field artillery regiment, one armored 
field artillery battalion, an armored engineer battalion, a signal 
company, and service units. 19 
The 2d Armored Division was activated on 15 July· 1940 at Fort Benning, 
Georgia. At the first formation, there were about 99 officers and 
2,202 enlisted men, mostly from the 66th Armored Regiment (Light) and 
a few cadremen of other divisional units! That same day Scott issued 
General Order Number One, assuming command of the division. Since the 
division at full strength was to have 530 officers and 9,329 enlisted 
personnel, this initial formation represented only a skeleton force. 20 
Organizationally, the 2d Armored Division was to have a headquarters 
and headquarters company, the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored), 
the 2d Armored Brigade (made up of the 66th and 68th Armored Regiments 
(Light) and the 67th Armored Regiment (Medium) and the 14th Field 
Artillery Regiment (Armored), the 78th Field Artillery Battalion 
(Armored), the 17th Engineer Battalion (Armored), the 41st Infantry 
Regiment (Armored), the 48th· Signal Company (Armored)',· the 17th Ord-
nance Company (Armored), the 14th Quartermaster Battalion (Armored) 
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and the 48th Medical Battalion (Armored), The Chief of Cavalry was 
ordered to provide officers for the reconnaissance·battalion, while the 
Chief of Infantry was to provide officers· for· ·the three· tank regiments, 
the infantry regiment, and the headquarters of both the division and 
brigade. The Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry also were to assign offi-
cers who had either tank or mechanized cavalry experience.· When the 
officers reported for duty they were not reporting for duty in a 
particular branch. The tank section of the infantry school would 
be used to teach the officers and enlisted men of the Armored Force, 
and Chaffee was authorized to move the school to Fort Knox, Kentucky 
if he thought it proper, which he did later. 21 
The two light tank regiments, the 66th and 68th, which traced 
their lineage and continuous active duty to the World War I Tank 
Corps and Tank Service, were organized into three-battalions, a machine 
gun company, a reconnaissance company, a service· company, and head-
quarters and headquarters company. There were to be 91 officers, 
1,405 enlisted men, 82 scout cars, and 136 light tanks per regiment. 
The force began assembling. The First Battalion, 66th Armored stationed 
at Fort Meade, Maryland, was moved to Fort Benning and became the 
Second Battalion of the 68th Armored, It was to leave twenty of its 
tanks at Fort Meade to equip the 70th Tank Battalion (Medium). The 
Third Battalion, 66th Armored, had been moved from'Fort Devens, 
Massachusetts to Fort Benning in January 1940. At this time (July 1940), 
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part of the Second Battalion, 68th Armored, which began leaving Fort 
Lewis Washington, left its tanks and equipment at Fort Knox, while the 
personnel moved on to Fort Benning. By the end of July, most of the 
light tank regimental cadre had either arrived or were enroute to 
F B . 22 ort en~ing. 
Originally, the medium tank regiment, stationed· at-Fort Meade, 
Maryland, was to be the 70th Tank Regiment~-· Because of a pencilled 
change in the War Department directive, the· 70th Tank Regiment became 
the General Headquarters Tank Battalion-and·the·6¥th•Tank Regiment, 
already stationed at Fort Benning, became the 2d Armored Division's 
medium tank regiment. The regiment was to have a·headquarters and 
headquarters company, and two tank battalions of three companies each, 
with 64 officers, 1,047 enlisted personnel, 9 scout cars, and 110 medium 
tanks. The third battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment was to be 
sent to Fort Knox to become the 69th Armored Regiment of the 1st 
Armored Division. When the battalion transferred, near the end of 
July, it left the 2d Armored Division with only eight medium tanks 
with which to train. Grow hit upon the idea of substituting light 
tanks for use in driver and maintenance training. 23 
The infantry regiment, the 4lst Infantry Regiment (Armored), 
was reactivated after being inactive since 1921. · It had 63 officers 
and 1,526 enlisted men forming a headquarters and headquarters company, 
a service company, an antitank company, and two infantry battalions 
with three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. The War 
Department directed that the Second Battalion, 6th·Infantry Regiment, 
would be transferred to Fort Knox, to become the 1st Armored Division's 
infantry regiment. The men and equipment would be sent to Fort 
Benning to create the 41st Infantry Regiment (Armored). By the latter 
part of August 1940, the men began to arrive at Fort Benning, moving 
into tents because of the lack of permanent type buildings. 24 
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The artillery components, a regiment and a battalion, were rede-
signated from existing organizations. The 14th Field Artillery (Regiment) 
(75mm guns, horse drawn) was renamed the 14th Field Artillery (Armored), 
while the 78th Field Artillery (75mm guns, truck drawn) was redesignated 
the 78th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored). Personnel and· 2 batteries 
of the 68th Field Artillery Regiment· (Armored)·of- the 1st Armored 
Division, were transferred to Fort Benning to form the nucleus of the 
14th Field Artillery (Armored). The 14th Field Artillery had 37 
officers, 822 enlisted men, and four firing batteries of six guns 
each (75mm howitzers). The 78th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored) 
had 28 officers, 659 enlisted men, three, six gun batteries armed with 
105mm howitzers and an antitank gun battery with eight 75mm antitank 
guns. On 24 July 1940, about 650 men arrived at Fort Benning to form 
the cadre of the 14th Field Artillery (Armored), as well as the 
reconnaissance battalion, quartermaster, signal and engineer units. On 
the same day that the Third Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment left for 
Fort Knox, 165 men arrived to man the 78th Field Artillery Battalion 
(Armored). 25 
The 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored) was·a new··unit, acti-
vated on 15 July 1940. It was to have 29 officers and 554 enlisted men 
in two reconnaissance companies, an infantry company, and a light tank 
company. The 13th Armored Regiment (Light) of the·lst·Armored Division 
was to transfer a machine gun platoon and reconnaissance platoon to 
Fort Benning~ On 24 July 1940 the first 89 men arrived and the cadre, 
coming from the 2d, 3d, 11th, and'i4th·GavalryRegiments (Horse) was 
completed on 11 August 1940.26 
The Department of the Army withdrew"the·l7th·Engineer Battalion 
(Heavy Pontoon) from II Corps, renamed it the 17th Engineer Battalion 
(Armored), and stationed it at Fort Benningas,a·component of the 2d 
Armored Division. The battalion was to have, 20 officers and 463 
enlisted men in its battalion headquarters, headquarters company, and 
three line companies. An important element was its reconnaissance 
platoon which some other components of the division did not have. 
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The primary reason for this unit was that the engineers would be well 
forward in the columns and would need to know enemy strength, location, 
and disposition, as well as terrain and obstacles that could delay the 
division's advance. 27 
The remainder of the division's elements were service units whose 
main purpose was not to engage in combat but to support the division. 
The 48th Signal Company (Armored) was brought on to active duty 15 
July 1940. During the first week it was in existence, it cleared its 
area, raised its tents, built messing and sanitation facilities, and 
put in a switchboard which linked division headquarters with all the 
component elements. This signal company showed early in, its existence 
that it would rely primarily on radio, rather than· telephone or tele-
graph, as the primary means of communication. The reason was obvious, 
the division was 100 percent mobile and its communications had to be 
consistent with its speed. 28 
The 17th Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) was renamed the 
17th Ordnance Company (Heavy Maintenance) (Armored) and made a part of 
the 2d Armored Division. In November 1940 it was raised to battalion 
level and redesignated as the i7th' Ordmmee -Battalion (Armored). It 
was to have a strength of 8 officers and 194 enlisted men. The 14th 
Quartermaster Battalion (Armored) and 48th Medical Battalion (Armored) 
were newly activated units for the armored force~ The quartermaster 
had 9 officers and 251 enlisted men, while the medical unit had 20 
officers and 289 enlisted men. Six chaplains were to be attached to 
the medical battalion. 29 
The 2d Armored Division and its components were grouped into 
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five echelons according to functions. Command·rested with the division 
commander, his staff, and special staff. Reconnai-ssance was the duty 
of the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored) which was to move in front 
of the division, gaining information about the enemy and terrain. 
Working with the ground reconnaissance force were to be observation 
aircraft. The battalion was armored and could fight, if necessary, to 
gain information. The third echelon was the strike force built around 
the 2d Armored Brigade, the three tank regiments, and the artillery 
regiment. Assisting this group was the support echelon made up of the 
infantry regiment (referred to as the division trouble shooters), the 
engineers, and artillery battalion. Last was the service echelon, 
whose duty it was to keep the men and machines repaired, supplied, and 
in good health. To carry out this scheme, the division had about 700 
armored vehicles, over 300 guns and howitzers, and more than 6,500 
automatic and semi-automatic weapons. When moving, the Armored Brigade 
took up more than forty-one miles of road space, necessitating multiple 
columns. This may well have been a factor in creating combat teams. 30 
A pressing problem for the 2d Armored Division was finding 
quarters for the men. Fort Benning was the home of the Infantry School, 
its support units, and the home post forthe-4th·Infantry Division. 
Permanent buildings were at a premium because of the Army's rapid 
expansion. The 2d Armored's headquarters was initially located in 
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a former red brick mess hall which had been condemned several years 
before; its roof was falling in and had to be propped up. Elements of 
the division, living in tents, were scattered from Harmony Church to 
Lawson Field, a distance of about eight miles. While looking over 
possible tent sites for the various units, Grow picked a likely canton-
ment area where permanent buildings would be built. One unit, the 68th 
Armored Regiment, was located near Harmony Cemetary. Grow noted that 
new problems were.arising all the time, but some progress was being 
made. It would take some time to make the division a fighting force. 31 
The most serious problem facing the division--training, was compli-
cated by many factors beyond anyone's control. The division was short 
of personnel, equipment, clothing, quarters, and maintenance areas. 
A directive from the Commanding General of I Armored Corps, stated 
that the division would be ready for battle, with such men and equipment 
as it had, by 1 October 1940; a mere three and one-half months to 
convert an untried organization into a combat-ready force. To help 
solve part of the problem, the two armored divisions were removed from 
corps area control and enjoyed a semi-autonomous status, responsible to 
the Chief of the Armored Force, who being also the Armored Corps 
Commander, could deal directly with General Marshall and the War 
Department. 32 
Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., arrived at Fort Benning on 27 July 
1940 to command the 2d Armored Brigade. As far as the division G-3 
was concerned, Patton was responsible for brigade training. The problem 
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which faced the brigade commander was inadequate morale and material. 
The troops were neither highly motivated, nor accustomed to Patton's 
views on discipline. Some officers looked on their assignments as 
chores to be endured and not as challenges to be overcome.· These early 
days tested the ingenuity and patience of both the officers and the men. 
There were few precedents for organizing an armored·division, little 
equipment, and insufficient time to learn by trial and error. 
Scott told Chaffee that it was impossible to train properly 
because of equipment shortages. Citing individual weapons, he reported 
that the division was short 4,297 pistols, 495 M-1 rifles, and 1,381 
sub-machine guns. Revolvers of commercial manufacture could be substi-
tuted for pistols, but no proper substitutes could be found for the 
other weapons. In the crew-served weapons category, the division 
needed 120 machine gun mounts for the scout cars, but they had none; 
they also required eighty .30 caliber machine guns and had only twenty-
two; they needed forty .SO caliber machine guns, but had only seventeen. 
Since the 120 machine guns were to go in the scout cars which had no 
gun mounts, the machine guns on hand were of limited use. Finally, 
Scott said he needed ninety-eight 37mm guns for the M2A4 (light) tanks, 
but had only eighty-six. In the early phase the division trained 
. 34 
with wooden guns. 
In spite of shortages in material and lack of permanent housing, 
recruits, mostly from the southern states, began arriving in August 
1940 and training began in earnest. The armored division also drew 
visitors to see the progress made. General George C. Marshall 
arrived on 14 August• refusing to say if any more armored divisions 
would be activated. Two days later, Major General Adna R. Chaffee, 
Chief of the Armored Force, received the first formal escort, by 
elements of the 66th Armored Regiment, which the division conducted. 
Chaffee was optimistic that the division would have its equipment by 
fall, except for medium tanks, which would probablybe·available some 
time in 1941. He noted that recruiting parties were reporting that 
interest was high because the armored divisionsoffered·opportunities 
for specialized training. The officers·of-·the·2d-Armored Division 
reported to Chaffee that the recruits were easy to train and quick to 
learn. 35 
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Trying to get materials, housing, training manuals, and weapons 
ranges was extremely difficult and caused a constant flow of letters 
between Fort Benning and Fort Knox. About three weeks after activation, 
Scott received six technical manuals on marching, advance guard, 
combat car drill, doctrine for small elements, and schools. Clothing 
created other problems. Originally the men were issued four shirts 
and three pairs of trousers each, but that had to·be reduced to two 
shirts and two pairs of trousers. They were forced to use overalls 
in almost all their work because of the clothing shortage. Scott 
informed Chaffee that this situation, if it continued, could cause 
problems, because the men would not have uniforms to go on pass. 
Also at this time, Scott was trying to get $570,000 to build eighty-
two maintenance shops, pave roads, and build parking sheds for his 
vehicles, especially those with radios. In October 1940, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ernest N. Harmon, Armored Force G-4, and a future commander of 
the 2d Armored Division, told Scott that he had approval to spend 
$32,000 to build arms and radio storage buildings at Fort Benning. 
The division also needed ranges and was able to arrange priorities 
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with the post headquarters, ·Scott told· the Commandant of the Infantry 
School that he would need the following kinds of ranges: a moving vehicle 
range, moving target range, tank combat range, infantry combat range, 
d . . f 36 an an antiaircra t range. 
Another problem faced by the division was the· temporary loan of 
personnel to attend the Armor School at Fort Knox. In October the div~ 
ision sent 100 vehicles and 773 men to Fort Knox for three months of 
schooling in radio maintenance, gunnery, and automotive maintenance. 
These men represented a cross section of recruits and veterans. Since 
they drove to Fort Knox, the trip was used to give the drivers exper-
ience in convoy operations and as a test of the equipment. In mid-
February 1941, the division had to supply seventy-two enlisted men to 
be instructors at the Armor School; at the same time it sent 176 more 
students there for training. In January 1941, thirty lieutenants had 
returned from a four week gunnery school where they had learned to use 
all the weapons of the division. Now their mission was to train their 
units. On February 21, the officers began their attendance at a three 
week aerial observer school, an indication of the importance the division 
placed on aerial observation. 37 
The decision to activate an armored force of two divisions, while 
the product of the European war, was influenced by those who had 
been actively involved with infantry tanks and the mechanized units. 
The directives published by the War Department reflected the theory and 
doctrine which had evolved during the previous two decades. 
The Army originally had had its armored troops scattered in 
company or battalion size units in many different locations. The 
various elements had to be brought together and fitted into a smoothly 
functioning whole, a task that could cause considerable difficulty. 
The organizational problems were partially eased by assigning officers 
and enlisted personnel to the new force who had served in either the 
old tank units or the old mechanized force. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE BENNING ERA: TRAINING AN ARMORED DIVISION 
Brigadier General Scott expressed his concept of armored warfare 
to Brigadier General Robert C. Foy. An armored division, he said, was 
similar to a cavalry division, except·that the men rode in armored 
vehicles instead of on horses. In an orientation address to new 
officers in the division, Scott built on the theme. An armored division 
attempts to find weak spots in enemy defenses, penetrates to the rear, 
and then spreads out to cut communications and supply lines. It endea-
vors to drive the adversary into a holding force for destruction. 
Tanks are helped through enemy opposition by support units which quickly 
follow, taking advantage of the shock generated by the tank attack. 
A standing operating procedure, attempting to cover every situation that 
an enemy or terrain could present, should not be developed. To do so, 
Scott thought, would result in mental rigidity. Cooperation between 
tanks and all other divisional units would overcome enemy opposition; 
teamwork had to be practiced on all occasions. Coordination between 
the assault and support groups was paramount to success. 1 
An armored division, Scott maintained was an offensive, aggressive 
weapon. Its most valuable attribute--surprise--was achieved by speed, 
direction of attack, and continual forward movement. It used mobility 
to choose the best direction to attack and to reach the enemy's rear 
areas. All combat elements of the division had one common factor: 
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when meeting the enemy, a base or pivot of fire was to be established 
of the adversary's position·. The ma:n:eu~er' 'couid.,··'lre'""r"Single or double 
envelopment or penetration,· depending· ori the· en:emy."'arrt:r·trb:e· ·terrain, but 
fire superierity was to be estab:l·:i;sb:-ed···wheti:·'t:he"'amra,:re,e0 ·-gua-rd was unable 
2 to move forward. The procedure Scott··des'Cribed·,, pivot of · fire and 
maneuver, is the' same that Pat·ton called· "grabbi.ng' the enemy by the nose 
and kicking him in the pants. 113 Thi'S is thesame'situation variously 
depicted in every grade B Western movie. The· "good guys.1" have the villan 
pinned down in the rocks or a barn. One·good guy says to the other, "keep 
him busy and I'll slip around behind him." The bad guy has one of three 
choices: he can fight, usually getting killed, he can surrender, usually 
offered, or he can run. Any enemy force had the same options and the 
same results. Repeatedly, during Werld War II, the 2dArmored Division 
employed this device successfully. 
The division accepted Major- General Chaffee's idea that·an emergency 
existed. Scott and Patton stressed unit training and divisional maneuvers. 
The men received squad, platoon, company, and battalion training, and were 
required to display their skills in regimental, brigade, and divisional 
exercises. The soldiers, receiving simultaneous training·at both small 
and large unit level, hopefully would learn their assignments in a mini-
mum of time. Scott instituted a division officers school where tactics, 
methods, strengths, and limitations of each unit were discussed. In addi-
tion, it served as a forum for the division and·hrigadecommanders to ex-
press their views about dress, military· courtesy ,··ca:re of··men, and social 
diseases. In November 1940, about·the time that·"Patton·assumed command of 
the division, the officers school was changed to a tactical school for 
unit commanders and their staffs.4 
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As the division started- trai.n·ing", its first major ·objective was 
to examine and eliminate mistakes made in the 1940 Louis·iana maneuvers. 
Apparently reconnaissance and scout cars had· beeiFus·ed· as· tanks. This 
was a mistake, as these vehicles had only· a·minimtmr·of·armor and should 
fight only when forced to do so·. Patton· cautioned· the·reconnaissance 
elements to use binoculars to scout ahead, and"' before'·crossing a ridge 
or moving around a curve, a foot reconnaissance should be conducted to 
see if any enemy was present. The foot scoutshouid·be·protected by 
the weapons of the reconnaissance force. · When app-r·oaching cross roads, 
they were to stop the vehicles on the friendly sid·e and proceed on foot. 
This could prevent the enemy from cutting an escape route if it were 
needed. Every element should put out flank guards' when halted; some 
units had not done this in Louisiana and had been surprised. If a 
column was attacked by aircraft-, it should fire back; if not seen, it 
should hide and keep quiet. When any part of the command was hiding, 
it should be well off the road, with glass, such as windshields and 
lights, covered, and use fresh camouflage materials~ Vehicles should 
be refueled at every opportunity or each halt. 5 
The first driving lesson, especially for tanks, was to familiar-
ize the driver with the controls and let the student drive the vehicle. 
In the second lesson, the student had to drive the tank with the ports 
closed, in tank terminology, he had to drive it "buttcmed up." After 
the third lesson, the driver had to be able to maneuver in platoon 
formation, obeying flag signals. The tankers fired all vehicular 
weapons during the first month of training. To instill a fire and 
maneuver spirit, the men were taught that they fired to be able 
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to move, and not that they fired or moved. On all marches'and maneuvers, 
combat vehicles were to move in battle order,·with ail weapons and 
ammunition racks mounted and all pistol ports closed. 6 
Patton began to stamp his personality on the 2d Armored Brigade. 
He told his subordinates to "remember that your command is not only 
yours, but it is you." Training Memorandum Number 7 detailed the tacti-
cal training program and the objectives. The division was to be ready 
to take the field by 1 October 1940, and at the same time it was to 
train a 25 percent increase of personnel by the same date. The 1st 
and 2d Armored Divisions were to provide cadres for the projected 
activation of the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions. Training would be 
concurrent, it would conform to existing field manuals, and there would 
be frequent tactical exercises, in which all available personnel, 
equipment, and vehicles would participate. Tactical training was to 
include antiaircraft defenses, offensive and defensive operations 
against other armored forces, night operations, defenses of bivouac 
areas, and protection of the supply and maintenance columns. Also 
included was reconnaissance and security; communications, both by 
radio and motorcycle messenger; and maintenance and camouflage training. 
The teaching was designed to instill a will to fight·into·the command. 7 
The first division exercise was simple, designed to acquaint all 
personnel with the size of the division. The problem scenario envision-
ed a mythical enemy attacking Fort Benning. The 2d Armored Division 
was to move to assembly areas preparatory to attacking the adversary. 
The move, led by Major I. D. White's 2d Reconnaissance Battalion 
(Armored), was followed by the three armored regiments, supported by 
the 17th Engineer Battalion (Armored) and the 14th Field Artillery 
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Regiment (Armored). The 41st Infantry Regiment (Armored) and the 78th 
Field Artillery Battalion (Armored) were to follow the tank regiments 
and consolidate the captured positions. The division moved out and 
halted on three roads so that Scott could·inspect·their formations 
and dispositions. After inspection; the troops moved to and established 
their assembly areas, which were also inspected;·then; without launching 
an attack, they returned to the post. 8 
The exercise, which had included about 350 vehicles (200 were tanks), 
was considered a success overall. Especially pleasing to Lieutenant 
Colonel Grow was the ·performance of the 66th Armored-Regiment (Light) 
and the two artillery units, but he felt that the 41st Infantry Regi-
ment (Armored) had the poorest march disposition and discipline. There 
was only one major problem, the division headquarters' radio failed. 
Patton was pleased with his brigade's overall appearance and remarked 
that the deficiencies noted were "conspicuous due to rarity." His 
complaints concerned the following: officers and men sitting in 
vehicles in an unsoldierly manner, some with their feet outside the 
vehicle; some men had been smoking in the vehicles; some vehicles 
did not have their tops down; and the distances between vehicles 
(50 yards) as well as the interval between companies and battalions 
(150 years) was not always maintained. 9 
On 18 September 1940, when the division conducted its first 
dismounted review with about 8,000 men assembled, it was the first 
time the division had been together as a whole. Patton commanded 
the parade, while Scott, the reviewing officer, trooped the line 
in a scout car. The Columbus Ledger called it a "spectacular scene." 
Grow observed that the uniforms looked better than expected, and that 
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the units in cavalry boots looked better tha:n those· without boots. 
Scott reported later to Chaffee that while the units looked and marched 
well, the 2d Armored Division was still not receiving sufficient 
clothing. Clothing and a soldierly appearance,were also concerns of 
Colonel Patton. In a training memorandum, unusual because it was over 
Patton's signature, not the Brigade S-3's, he stated that many soldiers 
had been seen in downtown Columbus, wearing dirty'uniforms, drunk, 
hitchhiking, or in the colored people's part of town. While none of 
these persons were members of the 2d Armored Brigade, he pointed out 
that an "ignorant recruit could cause problems." He then stated what 
was to become one of the division's hallmarks: "the foundation of the 
state of military perfection we propose to attain rests in soldierly 
pride in dress, and behavior on the part of every officer and man. 
Once this state of mind is secured, organizational excellence follows 
naturally and easily." The meaning was clear and did not need to 
10 
be repeated. 
Early in September, the division was alerted to receive some 
foreign delegations the following month and to be prepared to conduct 
a demonstration of an armored division attack. The division's solution 
was to draw up a problem, Combat Exercise A, which became the standard 
demonstration exercise for all visiting dignitaries. The exercise, 
built in successive stages, began with artillery concentrations on the 
initial objectives, followed by machine gun, mortar, and bombing 
attacks. With the initial objective under fire, the reconnaissance 
battalion was to advance, followed by the three tank regiments, then 
the supporting infantry was to follow to mop up and consolidate the 
positions. On 1 October, when the division conducted three practice 
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sessions, it concluded that· the a-res· wa"S','eoo small for all units to 
be properly deployed, but satisfactory considering the number of men 
d h f . 11 an t e amount o equipment. 
An extremely busy day for the division occurred· on 3 October. 
In the morning there was a hastily called ceremony with salute guns to 
congratulate Scott and Patton on their promotions~·. ·. Scott received 
his second star and Patton his first. According to division legend, 
Scot-t turned to Patton and said, "Well,- George, they just promoted 
h f . h A 1112 t e two most pro,ane·men int e rmy. Neither·had too much time 
to consider their promotions, for their twenty Sou·th American visitors 
were to arrive that afternoon. For this group, the division staged a 
review of two light tank battalions, a medium tank'company, two field 
artillery batteries, two infantry companies, and a-motorcycle platoon, 
followed by a reception at the officer's club. The next•day the divi-
sion went through Combat Exercise A. While to the'untrained eye all 
went well, the commanders noted that the tanks were sluggish, failing 
to perform as combat cars, but the infantry, engineers, and artillery 
did a good job. 13 
Two weeks later, on 17 October, the divisionagainwent through 
its exercises for more foreign visitors, and the· tariks made a better 
showing. A month later, giving·the demonstration for Secretary of 
War Henry L. Stimson and retired Major Generals Paul B. Malone and 
Harold B. B. Fike, the timing was-off and the tanks-attacked before 
the bombers flew over. Later in the same month, at·a demonstration 
for newsmen, it rained, grounding-the bombers, but the other elements 
of the division gave an excellent demonstration.· In December and 
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January, more demonstrations for a National Guard General Officers 
Class were conducted. The December exercise was an-excellent show, 
but the January one was superior because of improved communications 
with the 27th Bomb Group. Lieutenant Colonel Grow probably echoed the 
thoughts of other cavalrymen in saying that"the"more-he-saw of Combat 
Exercise A the more it appeared "that this division has a cavalry 
14 role and we should be cavalry, not a separate arm'i" · While the 
demonstrations permitted the division to show its collective skill~, 
impressing the inexperienced eye, unit training·continued in order to 
smooth out the rough spots. 
On 10 October the 2d Armored Division had conducted its first 
overnight problem. The primary goal was to establish bivouacs and post 
security guards, and while the men did well overall, a lot of routine 
problems arose which would have to be solved; for example, some units 
were slow, and one seemed to want everything done for it. 15 
While the desire to have the division, or the available elements, 
combat ready by 1 October 1940 was a worthy goal, it was*hardly real-
istic. Colonel Alvin C. Gillem, commanding officer of the 66th Armored 
Regiment, conducted a regimental officers conference on 17 October. 
Discussing the organization of the Armored Brigade, he showed that the 
66th Armored had a regimental headquarters company and three light 
tank battalions; the 68th Armored Regiment had two battalions organized 
from individual companies and platoons, and the 67th Armored Regiment 
had a headquarters company and two medium tank companies. Neither the 
67th nor 68th had any personnel allocated for headquarters; the 66th had 
six tank battalions, but they had no maintenance or service companies 
to support them. The 66th regimental headquarters had become the 
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provisional brigade headquarters and was working directly with the 
hat talions. 
Colonel Gillem was convinced that tank regiments should have the 
same strength in war or peace. He stated that the division's training 
was hurt by a lack of training directives from· the-War· Department, with 
the guidance for training coming from Patton's brigade·headquarters. 
Later the Armored Force learned that· the-War Department· had· deliberate-
ly done this, forcing the people· on the spot to·-think· and act for 
themselve~. Gillem pointed out· that·when·probiems·had·arisen, solutions 
had been found. A means had been found to pass tanks through ground 
troops and to use supporting fire while other tanks-or infantry attacked. 
The concept of having tank and other units·training together was espe-
cially valuable. All men were to be skilled in-reconnaissance, combat, 
intelligence, map and aerial photo reading, driving, shop and field 
maintenance, radio and basic tank communications,·gas training, 
camouflage, tank tactics, and platoon, company, and battalion day and 
night operations. Gillem was stres~ing another trademark of the 
division: every man in a unit was trained to do the job of anyone 
else. The insistence placed on that ideal was to·have immeasurable 
1 d . b 16 resu ts uring com at. 
To the regimental commander of the 66th Armored Regiment, main-
tenance was •a serious problem. The division hoped to have· one type of 
light tank by 1 January 1941, but actually had three. In addition, 
there were seven types of engines, both gasoline and diesel, six types 
of generators, five different types of---starters, and three different 
voltage regulators. The tanks were prime candidates for the junkyard; 
repair parts were unavailable through normal supply channels. An 
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unconfirmed but often repeated story' is that Patton heard·· a- soldier say 
that back home, when needing some repair part, he ordered it from 
Sears, Roebuck, and Company. The commander is supposed to have 
ordered the needed parts and paid for them himself. 17 
In December 1940, after Scott became Commanding General of the 
I Armored Corps, and Patton had assumed command of· the division, he 
told Patton that he had just stopped a news s·tory' to the effect that 
American tanks were junk, that ordnance·was not trying to solve the 
maintenance problem, and that the Armored Force was the Army's step 
child. Some of the allegations, Scott said, were half truths, while 
others were totally false. In the future, he warned, the I Armored 
Corps Commander would be the spokesman for armor, and anyone else who 
was critical would be disciplined. The officers of the Armored Force 
were to accept the issued equipment, learn to use it properly, teach 
their men to have confidence in it, or "we become a rabble. 1118 
Patton began his tenure as division commander with plans to take 
the division on a 600 mile road march to either Panama City, Florida 
or Valparaiso, Florida, in December. Lieutenant Colonel George L. 
King, assistant G-3, and Major Redding F. Perry, division-G-4, made 
an inspection trip and recommended that Panama City be the site. It 
offered better facilities such as water,· fuel, food, re.creational 
activities, and easier accessibility. 19 
King recommended that the march be undertaken· 12 to· 17 December, 
regardless of limitations and shortages. He felt that the advantages 
of marching, camping, and resupply far outweighed the disadvantages; 
it would provide a nucleus around which to build. He estimated that 
22 officers and 1,035 enlisted men would be left behind because of 
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schools and other duties'.-' Patten· approved· the· plan .. and sent a convoy 
to Fort Knox to return some trucks that had just taken students to 
the Armored School. Alerting the division for the· march, priorities 
for personnel were established. Emphasis waspiaced·on officers who 
had not made such a march, .noncommissioned officers, prospective non-
commissioned officers, drivers, maintenance,·and communications 
specialists. To make room for the· maximum number·-of· troops, personal 
baggage was to be limited; the men could·haveonly three blankets 
apiece. 20 
Training Memorandum Number 37, issued·on·6·Decemher 1940, stated 
that the purpose of the march was -te··perf-eet·march-dis"C·ipline, forma-
tions and procedures; bivouacs; ground and air reconnai'ssance; march 
security, control, and communications;· and· -supply,·and· field maintenance. 
To do this, the division was to move in two columns of approximately 
equal strength, with tanks in both columns. The 2d Reconnaissance 
Battalion (Armored) and the 16th Observation Squadron of the Air 
i 
Corps were to furnish route reconnaissance. Gasoline was to be supplied 
by Standard Oil of Kentucky and the Gulf Oil Company, while Texaco was 
to furnish the diesel fuei.21 
Two days before the march began, the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion 
(Armored) conducted an initial route reconnaissance to determine the 
suitability of the bridges on the routes. They reported that one 300 
foot wooden bridge between Eufaula and Abbeville·,· Alabama, had wooden 
pilings with a 6" x 12" floor; they recommended that not more than one 
vehicle be on the bridge at a time. The remainder of the Alabama 
(west) route was judged acceptable. The Georgia (east) route had 
several places that the reconnaissance battalion considered unsafe 
for tanks. One stretch of Route -41' between'' Wes-ton· and· Shellman was 
thought to be safe for reconnaissance vehicles only. 22 
The division's first public appearance was 12 December 1940 in 
its march from Fort Benning, Georgia toPanama City, Florida. In 
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the convoys were 392 officers, 6,079 enlisted men, 101 light and 74 
medium tanks, and approximately 1,000 othervehicles.· The march started 
smoothly, with only a few minor problems, until·about·l500 when it start-
ed to rain. This gave the men the opportunity·to·learnto stay dry in 
the field. One plane crashed and the division had to provide a 
guard and rush the pilot back to Fort Benning for medical treatment. 
Apparently no other problem was encountered as the division pulled 
into Abbeville and Blakely to refuel and spend the night. The 2d 
Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored) scouted ahead to determine if the 
route was possible. One road, Marianna to Clarksville, was impossible 
because of a washed-out bridge. Route 6, Clarksville to Kinard, was 
considered to also be impossible. The bridge west of Steam Mill had 
but a 4,000 pound weight capacity, limiting it to reconnaissance scout 
cars use. In Florida, Route 159 (Grand Ridge to the junction of 
Highway 126) was unsuitable for medium tanks, and the entire Route 159 
road was thought to be suitable only for reconnaissance vehicles. 23 
The east column resumed moving at 0600, the west at 0700, and had 
no difficulty reaching Panama City that evening, after travelling 114 
and 156 miles respectively .. Grow passed the column several times, 
checking march discipline, which he judged to be excellent. Patton 
was pleased with the appearance of the soldiers and the discipline 
displayed on the march. The division spent two days at Panama City, 
resting, maintaining vehicles, and preparing to return on 16 December. 24 
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On the return trip the Armored Brigade, the engineer and ordnance 
battalions, and detachments of the quartermaster and medical battalions 
constituted the west (Alabama) column·. ·· The· east 0 ·-(Georgia) column had 
primarily wheeled vehicles, which could traverse'··lighter bridges. 
The columns left Panama City for Blakely-, Georgia·, and Abbeville, 
Alabama, at 0600 and in pouring rain, arrivinglate·that afternoon. 
Grow expected Patton to order a surprise night·march,·andas a good G-3 
should, he planned ahead, and started drafting orders for such a move, 
25 in case they were needed. 
The division commander did indeed order a night march. The call 
to arms came at midnight, with the advance guard to leave at 0135, while 
the main column (east) was to move out at 0200 and the brigade (west) 
at 0745. Th~ division could possibly have made· twenty-four miles per 
hour in full moonlight without vehicle lights. Moving the final eighty-
three miles in three hours and forty-five minutes, the division con-
eluded its march with an attack on Fort Benning. Scott told Chaffee 
that the division had an exceptionally good march and that the main-
tenance was extremely pleasing, because they had·to tow·only one tank 
. . 26 into Fort Benning. 
The final report on the Panama City march was issued in late 
January 1941. It restated the purposes of the exercise: to give the men 
training in march discipline and field dutiesand·to·establish standard 
procedures for such movements. The units displayed very high standards 
in individual and unit training. While the weather had prevented 
extensive use of aircraft, each column was attacked, giving the men 
training in warning and the actions to be taken in such attacks. The 
reconnaissance battalion and regimental reconnaissance companies 
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received extensive training in scouting·routes·iu-·unknown·territory and 
reporting that information to headquarters. ·While each column used 
security detachments and practiced control,·it was apparent that more 
drill was necessary. All elements of·the divi:s·ion·had·received valuable 
training in supply and maintenance, with theengineer·battalion getting 
training in strengthening bridges. It waslearned·that·a·night march, 
using vehicle lights, could cover about·the same·distance as daylight 
marching. The division also found that·it could not rely on commercial 
agencies to supply gasoline, but rather that the quartermaster battalion 
should have that assignment. It was decided that tanksneeded to carry 
enough gasoline to cover 130 miles, while other vehicles should carry 
enough to cover 150 miles. 27 
Discipline had been excellent on the march. In·Panama City, 
about seventy-five men were returned to their units by the Military 
Police, but no charges were filed against them. Only four serious cases 
arose: a reported radio theft from a radio station; a·citizen reported 
a robbery of $24.00; a knife assault case; and one· stolen bicycle, which 
resulted when a drunken soldier rode off on a-child's bicycle. Only 
two of the incidents resulted in court martial charges being filed. 28 
Before and after the Panama City march·; each ty.pe of platoon in 
the division conducted demonstrations showing its capability. These 
were not to be school solutions, but a merns of stimulating discussion 
and solution finding. The 41st Infantry Regiment (Armored)'s "platoon 
problem A" was an assault against prepared defenses. Mortars, assault 
guns, and machine guns would begin firing on the objective, attempting 
to keep the defenders in their foxholes, and then the mortars would 
fire smoke to blind the defenders. The indirect fire weapons would 
continue their shelling until the· infantry··· platoon· leaders requested 
that the fire be lifted, and then the platoon would launch its final 
assault to capture the objective~·· The· i7th-·Engine-er- Battalion 
(Armored) 's demonstration involved obstacles···that··could· stop tanks. 
Grow thought that railroad rails driven··deeply··into··the· ground wouJ.d 
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be effective. The tanks were· also· us·ed··1:o· .. show·'tharwhen· rolling over 
prepared positions such as· foxholes· and machine···gun- nests·; the occupant 
could escape injury if he stayed >down,-·even·' when·· the· machine gun 
nests were seven feet in diameter.29 
Company exercises were conducted at·the·same time. The first series 
of exercises was designed to teach the menhow·to react to certain 
situations. Each company was to make a blind approach to the enemy. 
The men were to be brought under antitank fire to learn what to do to 
avoid it an~ the actions necessary to suppress antitank weapons. Once 
the enemy h$d been located, the company was to make an approach using 
covering tank fire to help them reach the objective. Once on the 
objective, the men had to consolidate it, prepare·for counterattacks, 
and be ready to resume their own attack.30 
The reconnaissance and machine guncompanies were"togive similar 
demonstrations. The regimental reconnaissance companies were to show 
how they moved when not in close proximity to the enemy,·and its actions 
when it learned the enemy was nearby. Finally, u·was to demonstrate 
how to overcome a defended roadblock that could hold up the 
column's advance. The machine gun company was to be part of the 
advance guard and show how it would react if the ·advance guard had to 
be deployed. It had to show how the machine guns would be used to cover 
a tank battalion attack, how it would give supporting fire, how to 
protect an assembly area, and how to consolidate and hold a captured 
position. 31 
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The units began to train utilizing the capabilities of other 
divisional elements. River crossings, perhaps one of the most diffi-
cult exercises, involved getting a protective fore·e--to· the opposite 
bank, enlarging the bridgehead, building a ferry to get·light tanks 
across, and then building a bridge·so the·wholedivision could cross. 
The reconnaissance company, 4ist Infantry· Regiment· (Armored), devised 
a means to get its light vehicles across; it·used0 the canvas of a 
large truck, made a raft, and pushed the vehicle-across the river. In 
December the infantry and engineer units gave a "splendid demonstration" 
of an assault crossing of the Uaptoi River. Grow later noted, while 
watching an infantry tank team serving as the advanceguard, that it 
was odd to see infantry acting like mechanized cavalry, and rated the 
41st Armored Infantry Regiment as a good outfit. 32 
Colonel Paul W. Newgarden and Major Sidney R. Hinds, commander 
and S-3, respectively, of the 41st Infantry·Regiment (Armored), were 
long-time tankers who realized that the armored infantrymen had to be 
in peak physical condition. They created a physical training program 
more rigorous than today's airborne requirements. Before the regiment 
would classify anyone as a soldier, officers and enlisted men alike had 
to be able to drop to a prone position and fire an aimed shot in less 
than three seconds. Within eight seconds, he had to rush forty yards 
and drop to a prone position. The infantrymen had to be able to chin 
himself six times, or three times with his rifle slunijjOver his 
shoulder. He had to jump an eight foot ditch and march five miles 
within an hour. 33 
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Late in October 1940, the 2d Armored Division was informed that it 
was to receive about 2,100 recruits and give them basic training. Then 
the recruits would be sent to the qualification ranges and learn to 
drive all the vehicles of the Armored Brigade. In addition, the 
division was to receive 133 newly commissioned and or reserve officers 
called to active duty, and would have to run a replacement depot for 
them. Scott told Chaffee that he would need to quarter the officers 
in tents, but he did not think it advisable to put the trainees in 
tents, especially when he found that the men were not to arrive until 
January 1941. He also said that he would need $3];500 to establish 
the replacement center. 34 
The first groups of trainees--draftees under provision of the 
Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940--arrived from Chicago. They went to the 
2d Armored Division's replacement center, where they were clothed, 
fed, and assigned to barracks. They were to get twelve weeks of 
training; the first six would involve intensive basic; the second six, 
intensive training according to their job assignment. ·After twelve 
weeks, the men were to be assigned to training companies for intensive 
individual and small unit (squad, platoon, and company) tactical trainin~. 
In one platoon at the replacement center, there were men from nine 
countries, the United States, Britain, Germany, Puerto Rico, Mexico, 
Italy, Czechoslavakia, Armenia, and the city of Danzig. Included in 
this group was a former officer in the Italian army and one soldier of 
fortune. A newspaperman, John P. McDermott who had a regular column 
"Inside the Outpost at Fort Benning," wrote an interesting, but 
humorous item, about recruiting for the division. It seemed that at 
an interview, a potential recruit admitted that he had no special skills 
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or abilities for any unit in the army: "Officer· (unnamed) - What was 
your occupation? Recruit - I was a merry-go-round operator. Officer -
Fine. You're just the kind of man we want. You'll feel right at home 
with the Second Armored Division. 1135 
Representative James Wadsworth, Republican of New York and co-
sponsor of the Burke-Wadsworth Act of 1940, who visited· the 2d Armored 
Division's replacement center, found the food to be excellent. He 
also observed the division training with its 270 tanks and awaiting the 
delivery of others. He noted the good humor of the men, and that 
housing, clothing, training, and most important, morale, were high. 
An indicator of morale, social diseases, he found to be low. The 
men were even laughing at odd moments. 36 
The two existing armored divisions, the 1st and 2d became the 
parents of the Armored Force by providing trained cadres for the 
activation of the Third and Fourth Armored Divisions. During the 
training period, estimates varied as to how many officers and men 
would be lost with numbers varying from 600 to 900 officers and 
from 3,000 to 4,000 enlisted men. In April 1941, Brigadier General 
Alvin C. Gillem, with 687 officers and 4,875 enlisted men, went to 
Fort Polk, Louisiana, to activate the 3d Armored Division. 37 
Patton protested the loss of men. He pointed out to Scott that 
cadres for the replacement centers were taking a heavy toll of potential 
noncommissioned officer material and he foresaw·making corporals of 
men with less than five months of service. Patton wanted to know the 
ratio of officers to noncommissioned officers that would be put into 
the cadre for the 3d Armored Division; he recommended SO·to 70 percent. 
If it were 50-50, then he thought the combat effectiveness of the 2d 
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Armored would suffer without making- a "Justifiabie··advantage" for the 
3d. 38 
Scott, in a blistering reply to Patton's inquiry, stated that he 
was familiar with the problems. He knewthe 2d Armored had lost men 
to create new units, and that the commanders had surplus qualified 
persons when compared to the World War I situation. The War Department, 
according to the I Armored Corps commander, wanted to expand the Armored 
Force as quickly as possible, by training as many men as it could. 
These objectives could not be attained if all the trained personnel 
were kept in one unit, leaving the newer ones with nothing. It was 
absurd, he reasoned, to think that division commanders could have 
fully trained units and expand at the same time. He then hit Patton 
sharply by asking, "how many experienced·men did you have in your tank 
center overseas?"39 
To help solve potential noncommissioned officer problems, Scott 
recommended that incoming personnel be screened to determine if any had 
had Citizens Military Training Camp or military school experience, 
some of which might be better noncommissioned officer material than 
persons serving their second or third enlistments. Reserve officers, 
he thought, were better than their World War I counterparts and in 
"many instances are better than some of the old crocks that have been 
floating around the Regular Army for the past 25-30 years." Scott was 
insistent that the newer divisions get their fair share of trained 
personnel. The I Armored Corps commander was considering moving the 
old division, brigade, and regimental commanders to the new divisions 
and turning the older units over to newer appointees. He declined to 
do that, but ordered Patton and Magruder, 1st Armored Division commander, 
to pick the cadremen as if they were to command the new divisions 
themselves. 40 
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In January 1941 the 2d Armored Division-began intensive range and 
combat firing, combat exercises, and·reconnaissance training. The 
2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored)·and the"reeonnaissance companies 
in the armored infantry regiment and the engineer battalion were to 
coordinate their efforts. 41 
Patton directed Major I. D. White, connnand·ing officer 2d Re-
connaissance Battalion (Armored) to devise and·conduct tests for all 
the reconnaissance companies. The purpose was to test their reaction 
to conditions that they might encounter on the battlefield. It 
involved the reconnaissance of towns, routes, defiles, fords, bridges, 
terrain for use by combat elements, observation of hostile units, 
hostile encounters, establishing bridgeheads, guiding troops, self 
maintenance when operating alone, and above all reporting the informa-
tion back so that it could be used. The test was to cover twenty-four 
hours, need gasoline for 150 miles, and have twelve phases from the 
reception of the warning order to the execution of the mission. 42 
The tests revealed what many had thought; all·personnel needed 
more training in scouting and patrolling. Foot patrolling, vital at 
times, slowed down the units, but speed could be made up between criti-
cal areas. Proper reconnaissance could only be done if the reconnais-
sance unit were given a sufficient lead time. It could not be done 
from fast moving vehicles. All men had to be completely informed 
about a mission. During the test, one platoon leader, First Lieuten-
ant John Tyler of the 66th Armored Regiment, was injured and could 
not continue. His platoon sergeant assumed command of the platoon, 
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finished the test, and scored the highest of any unit tested. 43 
Shortly after the division was activated, Scott noted that the 
ground and air force needed coordinated training with·both observa-
tion and combat aircraft. He recommended that observation aircraft 
be attached to the division for use'by -the·eommanding·general and the 
brigade commander and their staffs. In Feb-r0:ary· -1941, the 4th 
Infantry Division (Motorized); the 501st Parachute· -Battalion and the 
2d Armored Division tried to work out the problems: of minimimum 
boinb distances, minimum altitude for attacks,·-commtm'ieations, means 
to signal the end of an air attack, means to call-for an air attack, 
and how to give proper target designations. Some method had to be 
found to identify friendly troops and aircraft from those of the enemy. 
How could the two coordinate an air-ground attack and what kind of 
targets would be proper for an air attack? How much lead time was 
needed, and who would control the aircraft, all were questions that 
d d . 44 nee e answering. 
The first test in February 1941, had the 2d Armored Brigade 
attacking the 41st Infantry Regiment (Armored). The bomb group that 
was to support the brigade was stationed in Atlanta. The infantry 
regiment stopped the tanks, who in turn sent out· a call for··air support, 
The bombers were in the air in ten minutes and attacked fifty minutes 
after getting the call. The communications between the ground and the 
airplanes worked beautifully, but the airmen hit·the wrong target. 
However, they did hit the enemy artillery about two miles away. Later 
the bombers accurately attacked a second target and needed only five 
minutes. The moral of this as Grow saw it was that these procedures 
needed practice: "you can't do them by theory." 
45 
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Air control 'W'as a problem; recognized as such, and both the Air 
Corps and the ground forces were working to find·the·solution. Scott 
told Patton that both had a lot to learn and probably they would not 
get very far until theAir Corps'worked·with·the·ground'troops every 
' 
day. The best answer had apparently not· oecured'·to either branc;h. 
Hinds recalled that air-ground work improved when·the·Air Corps put 
a pilot into a tank and he went into combat ·with,· the· ground forces 
in 1944. 46 
Patton wanted another exercise stressing'·that··an ·armored division 
did not attack strong points, if it could find a weak spot or get on 
the enemy's flank. The operational theory behind an armored division 
was changing; instead of being a weapon for the reduction of strong 
points, it now avoided strongly held positions if possible. The 
armored division was nota·great·rushing·mass of· tanks but a spear 
thrust through weak spots, then fanning out behind the enemy, trying to 
cut supply and communications lines, and attacking reserve areas and 
command posts. It operated in conjunction with other forces or alone. 
The armored division was a powerful instrument, but had limitations, for 
it was thought to be sensitive to terrain, and its utility could be 
reduced in mountains and in marshy areas; also, it was weak in holding 
power. 47 
The division began extensive field work in April and May 1941, 
preparing for the summer and fall maneuvers of that year. The first 
of a long series of problems was held on 2-3 April when the division 
went on a march to a concealed bivouac, and practiced supply and servic-
ing under blackout conditions. The march out was ragged and sloppy 
because of so many new men, but the bivouac and resupply problem went 
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well. The next morning after breakfast the division rolled into post 
for a mounted review, which was held in a driving rain. Patton 
told the assembled division, about 14,000-men in· 2,500 vehicles, that 
"armored and air warfare makes higher demands on courage and discipline 
than have ever before been experienced·by the fighting men of our race." 
The review went fairly well, except when passing the reviewing stand 
the columns were ragged and a traffic jam occured-because people did 
not do what they were told to do. 48 
Later in April, the division put· ·on ·the same- probiem for Maj or 
General Chaffee. Grow, while checking the columns·from the air, had 
to drop messages to them because hi:s· radio· ·faii'ed-; - - After' the exercise, 
Chaffee addressed the officers, pointing out that the vehicles were not 
displaying the proper identification panels for·aircraft, and that 
some drivers were going around corners too fast. He cautioned the 
officers to expect war soon. Division headquarters was aware that it 
had to solve some serious problems: the improper or sometimes the nonuse 
of liaison officers, and the vexation of brigade·attachments. These 
questions had to be solved before the division participated in large 
scale maneuvers.49 
In May, Patton issued a memorandum stressing that training would 
be progressive, from small unit to division. The division would move 
to the field in multiple columns while the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion 
(Armored) was to practice locating the division and if possible delay 
its movement. Regimental reconnaissance companies were to cover the 
movement to the maneuvers area. During the training;" co·nstant practice 
against ground and air attack was to be carried out, with alarms 
being sounded and antiaircraft weapons beingmanned·and bivouacs 
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blacked out. The commanders were cautioned about overcommanding, and 
instructed to maximize radio usage; no written orders were to be given, 
but rather oral commands or fragmentary orders in conference were to 
so 
be used. 
The troops marched out on the afternoon of 6·May, to go into 
night bivouacs and to prepare for apredawn assault·river crossing. 
During the night, rain started. Patton had instructed the men that 
three long blasts of an air horn meant an air raid attack. The men 
were just beginning to fall asleep when the quiet was shattered by a 
long blast of a horn, followed by another, the~a short blast. It 
was not an air raid warning, so the men attempted to go back to sleep, 
only to have the procedure repeated. The antiaircraft weapons were 
manned and ready for use when the horn sounded again. It turned out 
not to be a signal, but a horn on a scout car which had shorted. Its 
wires were disconnected and the men slept. The next morning the 4lst 
Infantry Regiment (Armored), supported by the artillery, seized a 
bridgehead over the Uaptoi River, the engineers built the bridge, 
and the division crossed to continue its attack. 51 
The week of 19-26 May was spent in the field following the direc-
tives Patton had given two weeks earlier. The division moved out in 
multiple columns and the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Armored) was 
again given the aggressor role to try to delay part or all of the 
columns. The 66th Armored Regiment (Light) was delayed but reached 
. 
its bivouac area. The next day the division practiced platoon and 
company problems. Major General Scott and Lieutenant Colonels Hugh 
J. Gaffey, Allan F. Kingman, and John M. Devine, all future commanders 
of the 2d Armored Division were pleased when they viewed the problems 
and saw how the units functioned~ ·· The battalion-·-problems went well, 
and the men prepared for the combined 2d·Armored·and 4th Infantry 
Division (Motorized) exercises. 52 
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The 2d Armored Division helped to devise'·the tests for the 4th 
Infantry Division (Motorized). In the finalproblem·the-4th Infantry 
was to relieve the armored troops, who were·to .. pull·back, regroup, 
and attack through the infantry division~· ·There·had been some good-
natured rivalry displayed between the two divisions and the 4th 
Infantry supposedly was of the opinion that "Now, we'll show those 
high and mighty bastards something. 1153 The 2d Armored made a night 
march to its assembly area and attacked at 1000,·only to have the 
attack stopped by the officials for a critique at 1145. The division 
returned to its post and haq a showdown inspection on the review field. 
Scott said that it was the first time he had seen a showdown inspection 
and he believed it to be the first time ever at the end of maneuvers. 
Many items were in short supply, but he believed the division could 
fight if it had to. 54 
During the maneuvers, much of the publicitr·centered around the 
2d Armored Division because it was a ·new type··division, and tanks were 
drawing much print about their use in Europe. A messenger, Private 
Ralph C. Radtke, Headquarters Company, 2d Armored Division, was given 
a mission to take news releases to post headquarters for distribution. 
Radtke took a short cut and was captured by·men of B Company, lOlst 
Anti-Tank Battalion. The battalion adjutant, Captain KeithF. Driseale, 
wrote a note to accompany Radtke, explaining how he··had been captured, 
and had the private marched into post headquarters under guard. 55 
In the critique, Major General Lesley J. McNair, commanding 
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general, Army Ground Forces, stated·that·the··2d·AT1ll:ored·and the 4th 
Infantry Divisions were among the· most ready· for battle.·· He cautioned 
the officers that he did not say theywere·ready·but·"that you are 
more ready than the rest." Patton observed·that all the maneuvers 
had demonstrated that an armored· division- must be- given· "an assignment 
of mission rather than a definite assignment of method. 1156 Patton 
was arguing for the basic tenet of armored warfar"e, · and··one that would 
be demonstrated repeatedly in Europe. When given an-assignment of 
method, armored divisions were usually slowed·down and suffered 
casualties far in excess of those suffered when executing the assign-
ment of mission-type orders. 
Scott noted that the division was ready for field duty, and 
referring to the forthcoming Tennessee maneuvers, warned the men that 
they had to get the most from the maneuvers because "who knows. It 
may be the last chance you have to practice. 1157 A few days later, 
Scott told Lieutenant Colonel Ernest N. Harmon that the division was 
in fine shape and that the small units were exceedingly well trained. 
Scott was very pleased at the way the companies ·and reinforced battalions 
worked against antitank guns and roadblocks. 58 
While at Fort Benning, the division started two traditions which 
are still in existence. General Order Number 7 specified how and when 
the division patch was to be worn. All men would wear it over the 
left breast on the field jacket, and officers would wear it over the 
left breast on their. coveralls. · Today every member ·of the division wears. 
the patch over the left breast on field jackets and fatigue uniforms. 
The divisional motto "Hell on Wheels" came into existence at Fort 
Benning, and was applied to the 2d Armored prior to the Tennessee 
.. 
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maneuvers, where division legend has· ·the phrase originating. The 
Columbus Ledger on 6 April 194lstated-that the man who first used the 
phrase 11Hell·on Wheels'' must have foreseen-·Ameriean··-armored divisions. 
Two weeks later the paper carried a picture of the··patch, saying that 
"it means Hell on Wheels." ·Between -6 April-·a-nd· 23 May,· the Columbus 
Ledger used that phrase no less than nine different·times when referring 
to the 2d Armored Division. ·on May 2, a· columnist,-Alien Thomason, 
who replaced McDermott as the author of "Inside the Outpost at Benning," 
wrote of activities of four officers·from the "Second Armored 'Hell 
on Wheels' Division." By the time of the·Tennessee maneuvers, the 
phrase clearly meant 2d Armored Division; the Tennessee maneuvers 
only verified its application to the division. 59 
The 2d Armored Division's training was primarily the work of 
Major General Patton, his staff, and the unit commanders. While they 
had some ekperienced personnel from the infantry, tank, and mechanized 
cavalry units, the men were primarily new enlistees. The armor method, 
to give basic training and then simultaneous large and small unit 
training, was designed to teach the tankers their·assignments in the 
shortest possible time. The older armored divisions trained the 
cadres for future organizations, and in doing so became the father of 
the armored divisions that fought so well in World War II. 
The units demonstrated their competence in many maneuvers against 
other elements of the division and other units stationed at Fort Benning. 
In eleven months, the various components of men and tanks had been 
transformed from a collection of individual units to a unified and 
disciplined fighting force that was preparing to make its debut in 
large-scale maneuvers. 
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CHAP~ER VI 
THE TENNESSEE MANEUVERS 
The Armored F0rce was left undisturbed to develop its doctrines. 
After a year of training, the 2d Armored Division was to take part.in 
large-scale field maneuvers. Plans to·use the division were first 
announced in February 1941, when Major General Scott, Commander of I 
Armored Corps, informed the War Department that he wanted to use the Fort 
Benning tankers twice in corps training and twice in Army training ex-
ercises. His rationale was that participating troops would receive in~ 
valuable training in the modern.concepts.of employment and defense 
against armored unit~. 1 Soon it was announced that Patton's division 
would be inclu9ed in the Secc;md Army maneuvers of 16 to 18 June 1941. 
Reorganization of the 2d Armored Dfvision, and its major componep.ts 
had been considered almost simultane0us~y with its activation. The 
I 
division organization had been hastily drawn; in late·1940 Chaffee and 
others were reconsidering the organization. The main argument was that 
the brigade was too ponderous and unwieldly; the divisicn commander 
needed several combat teams, not one brigade. In September 1940, I 
Armored Corps called the division G-3's together, suggesting a reorgan-
ization to include two brigades, on~ made up of the light tank regiments, 
and the other composed of the medium tank and infantry regiments. This 
was apparently turned down. Finally, in May 1941, Scott told the 2d 
A.rmore4 officers that he wanted them to experiment with organizational 
12}· 
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Figure 2. The Tennessee Marrewet·ey-, 1941. 
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changes in Tennessee. He.wanted three battalions in the infantry regi-
ment, three battalions in the,medium tank regiment, three artillery 
battalions commanded by a division artillery commander, and an addition-
al bridge company in the engineer battalion. The division reorganized 
into four artillery battalions under a division artillery commander. 
The 41st Infantry Regiment had three battalions, and a reconnaissance 
company was formed for the medium tank regiment. The remainder of the 
division conformed to existing tables of organization. 2 
In March 1941, the War Department had selected the Camp Forrest, 
rennessee, area for the Second Army maneuvers. The location is in 
south central Tennessee, between the Duck River and the Tennessee Cum-
berland divide. The main terrain features are the Duck River, which is 
twenty to fifty yards wide; and the Tennessee Cumberland divide. There 
were concrete and light load carrying bridges, the river banks were. 
usually steep and the bottoms rocky, but there were vehicle fords. The 
area was mountainous and forested, and thought to be unsuitable for tank 
3 warfare. 
A series of opening i;naneuvers started, which some members of the 
2d Armored Div-isien theugh.,t were., de,sig;i;ied to limit or perhaps embarrass 
the division and its performance. The first exchange concerned the 
amount of time the division would.spend in Tennessee. Army General 
Headqu~rters, commanded by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, made the 
division available for the entire maneuver period from 2 to 28 June 
1941. The Second Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Ben "Yoo Hoo" 
Lear, want't!d the division for only part 0f that time, to which Army 
General Headquarters agreed. The division Chief of Staff, Li~utenant 
C0lonel Geoffrey Keyes, told Lieutenant Colonel Ernest N. Harmon that 
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hopefully the situation would be settled to everyone's satisfaction.4 
The second problem arose with regard to the division's using the 
87th Engineer Battalion (Heavy Pontoon). The Second Army had author-
ized the use of the complete battalion, but General Headquarters changed 
the authorization, using the excuse of inadequate motor transportation, 
and would permit using only one company. Two weeks prior to the man-
euvers, another change.occurred, and the Second Army granted its consent 
to use the entire battalion.S· The division needed the Engineers, and 
Patton told Scott that he had driven around the Camp Forrest area, and 
in his opinion, any divisional.success might depend on its ability to 
make bridgeheads and force river.crossings. 
The· most severe blow came when the division was told that it would 
have to furnish fifty-one umpires for the maneuvers. Scott wrote 
Chaffee, bitterly protesting because the 2d Armored Division needed its 
officers to make a good showing, and he recommended that the umpires 
be taken from the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions. Scott.saw advantages 
to all three divisions this way, The 2d Armored had recently furnished 
the cadre for the 3d Armored and was short of experienced officers and 
men. If the other divisions could furnish umpires, the 2d Armored 
officers could stay with their units, and the division would not have 
to use noncommissioned officers to command units normally commanded by 
officers. To accomplish this, however, would require additional funds. 
Scott.was able to persuade Chaffee to make forty officers available 
from other armored divisions. 6 
Administrative plans were made also. Blank ammunition was to be 
furnished from the Second Army depot, and two heavy maintenance ord-
nance companies, the 30th and 31st, were to accompany and support the 
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Armored Force in Tennessee. The 30th was attached for field maintenance, 
while the 31st was stationed at the Murfreesboro Army Depot for those 
repairs that could not be made in the field. The Armored Force would 
furnish ordnance spare parts, while quartermaster parts would be avail-
able at the Army depot. The Army would attempt to supply gas and oil 
at designated locations and in the quantities needed on six hours notice. 
The gasoline for the ground troops would be furnished in tank cars to 
be broken down into ten gallon cans. Aviation fuel would be delivered 
to the landing fields.7 
Scott assembled and addressed the umpires for the maneuvers. He 
pointed out to them that both the Se,cond Army and Army General Head-
quarters wanted to stress the proper usage of small units. The umpires 
were to see that small units received proper credit for their good per-
formances as well as having their errors made known to them. He 
cautioned the umpires that they had neither command or instructional 
functions, and should avoid revealing information gained through umpire 
activities. They could, and were required, on the other hand, to make 
known those things normally seen, heard, or known in battle. Lastly, 
in situations not covered by the umpire's manual, they were to use 
common sense. The higher unit umpires working on the battalion, regi-
ment, brigade, and division levels were responsible for informing the 
lower level umpires of situations and for moving them to the proper 
places so that they could be~t umpire the critical points and situa-
tions.8 
Apparently, the m@st anticipated time in the maneuvers was the 
entry of the 2d Armored Division and its colorful commander, Major 
General Patton. Rice Yahner, a correspondent for the Memphis Commercial 
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Appeal, noted that Tennessee would be the.first "battle..,.array exhibition" 
of an armored division, Patton would be trying to get his division into 
the maneuver area undetected, however, while,the VII Army Corps Comman-
der, Major General Frederic H. Smith, was det~rmined to find the "Hell 
on Wheels" division. To add a little spice to the determination of both. 
sides, Smith offered a $25.00 reward to the man-who captured Patton. 
Not, to be outdone, Patton placed a $50.00 ·bounty atl Smith's head. The 
maneuvers opened on a.note of high expectation. 9 
The division left Fort Benning at 0500 on 14 July 1941 in two 
columns, each about.sixty miles long. - The west column made good time, 
the only complaint being that the 4lst Armored Infantry Reigment was 
ragged in their marching. The west column was held up by some road 
construction and by excessive caution at the Chattahoochee bridge north-
west of Newman, Georgia. All units were in the bivouac area by 1800 on 
the evening of 15 June, The next morning, the division moved to con-
cealed bivouac areas, unloaded their tanks and half tracks that had been 
sent by rail, and prepared to enter the exercise. Patton had been 
instructed t4at the problem opened tactically when he met ~jor General 
Joseph M. Cummins, the commanding general, 5th Infantry Division. 
Patton was to be permitted to use reconnaissance units to go anywhere 
to gain information while the remainder of the division. protected the 
detraining point. Scott thought that the enemy VII Army Corps might 
10 attempt to disrupt the unloading, 
The first problem was relatively simple. A Blue enemy force (27th 
and 30th Infantry Divisions) was-atteanpting to push the friendly Red 
force out of the area, The Red 5th Infantry Division and 153rd Infantry 
Regiment was- to hold a defensive line until it cquld be reinforced by 
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the 2d Armored Division. Then it was to attack and push the Blue troops 
to positions west of Bell Buckle, Tennessee. The opening move was to 
be a practical demonstration of the "nose and seat.of the pants theory." 
The 2d Armored Brigade was to attack the rear (west) of the Blue forces, 
while the 41st Infantry (minus a battalion) was to attack on the north 
flank. A composite force, resembling the tank-infantry teams of World 
War II, led by Lieutenant Colonel Sidney R. Hinds, attacked on the 
south flank. The holding job was to·be handled by the 5th Infantry 
Division. While the Blue force was preoccupied on its flanks the 67th 
Armored Regiment was to deliver the.knockout blow from the east. 11 
The plans were made, the columns were organized, and the division 
moved to its attack positions without lights, and under radio silence, 
beginning at 2000 on 16 June. By 0400 the next morning the division 
was in position to launch the attack after its columns had moved from 
70 to 130 miles. The attack was to be coordinated by the column.com-
manders, as the line of departure was not defined. 
The 2d Armored Division entered the battle about 0600 on 17 June. 
The enemy VII Army Corps (Blue) was forced to abandon its offensive and 
to assume a defensive posture. The tankers launched a swarming type 
attack, hitting the enemy force from four directions. The 68tb Armored 
and the 41st Armored Infantry Regiments captured Hoover's Gap about two 
and one-half hours after the exercise opened. The 2d Armored Brigade, 
principally the 67th Armored Regiment, attacking astride Highway 41, 
met strong antitank defenses and was slowed down. The crossroads were 
defended by machine guns and 75 mm antitank guns. Every time a tank 
exposed itself, it was fired on. The main;problem was the lack of in-
fantry to eliminate the guns and tm facilitate the tanks' advance. 12 
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The commanding officer, 2d Battalion, .67th Armored Regiment, Major 
John P. Kidwell, led his thirty-one tanks over one mountain trail "that 
would vex a mule"--"where a Tennessee farmer would not take a wagon." 
He then sent Private Francis Cutrupi to scout ahead, but he was captured. 
Kidweil's tank was knocked out, but he was.not a casualty. He returned 
with more tanks to challenge the 37 mm antitank guns, only to have the 
umpires rule that he suffered three more losses. His battalion could 
not break through the antitank gun defertses. 13 
In spite of the tenacious antitank defense, the 2d Armored Division 
drove.the Blue forces to positions west.of Bell Buckle, surrounded and 
cut them off. The empires terminated the exercise at 1140 on 17 June, 
about. five and one-half hours after Patton and the tanks had entered the 
battle. The Blue forces were not destroyed even t4ough they were de-
feated. The 2d Armored Division was in position to deliver the.final 
attack, even though Blue tanks threatened the flank of one column. The 
umpires ruled that the "Hell on Wheels" men.lost approximately 135 tanks, 
many other vehicles, and many men. In the end, both sides claimed 
victory. 14 
Both at least learned from the experience. Major General Samuel T. 
Lawton, commanding general, 33d Infantry Division, had arranged his 
antitank guns into a new type battalion, had dug them in, and had them 
on the flanks and in the rear. As he explained t@ the Nashville Banner, 
"Arinored troops don't attack on a broad front. as the old system of anti-
tank defense offered. They pick a weak spot and hit fast. You've got 
to get your defense into those weak spots before the.tanks arrive. 1115 
In a news conference Patt~n told rep0rters that "fear of the unknown.was 
the greatest force that the armored division could wield. 1116 He meant 
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that the opposition did not.know where the division was or where it would 
strike. An armored division was."the most.powerful striking force the 
mind of man ever evolved. 1117 As the exercise had unfolded, it was not 
uncommon for Blue soldiers to lay their weapons aside and grab their 
cameras as the tanks approached, for they were still an object of 
curiosity. A former correspondent for the Memphis Commercial Appeal 
noted that the great Confederate cavalryman, Nathan Bedford Forrest, di4 
not.believe in attackipg enemy strong points and neither did the 2d 
Armored Division. Forrest's lesser known motto, "Get 'em skeered and 
keep 'eµi skeered E sic] , Ii correctly described the "Hell on Wheels" 
division,18 
The 2d Armored Division personnel had confidence in themselves and 
felt.that they could defeat anyone in simulated or real battles. This 
first test showed that they may.have been over confident.· The Blue 
force channelized their attack, denied them freedom of movement, and 
blunted their offense by a strong antitank defense. There was also a 
lack of coordination between the ~d Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions, 
in spite of Second Army's directive to establish radio nets and liason 
officers with the infantry division. As Lieutenant Colonel Grow noted 
in his diary, "In general we won the war. 1119 
The second exercise, C-8, had the 2d Armored Division becoming part 
of the Blue army at midnight 19-20 June. Patton was permitted to start 
planning with the VII Corps prior to that time, and the corps ordered 
him to send the division's reconnaissance elements out at 0500 on 19 
June to attempt to locate·the Red Army's positions. Grow flew to 
Lynchburg to talk with Major I. D, White., On the return flight, when 
the pfan~ was about fifty feet off the ground, it crashed. However, 
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neither Grow or the pilot was injured, When Grow returned to the di-
vision headquarters, he had to change the attack orders because of the 
conference between Patton and Smith. Patton had agreed to exploiting a 
breakthrough to be made by the 27th and 30th Infantry Divisions. The 
67th Armored Regiment, at Smith's insistence, was detached from the 
division and in effect became a General Headquarters Tank Battalion, to 
be used at the discretion of the corps commander,20 
By dusk on 19 June, the Blue forces, minus the 2d Armored Division, 
had made small gains, but at 0700 on 20 June, the 2d Armored added its 
weight to the assault. The 67th Armored Regiment attacked through the 
30th Infantry Division along Highway 41, and, after breaking through 
the Red positions, was two miles from its objective, Manchester, by 
0845. Meanwhile, the bulk of the division was advancing in three prongs 
toward Manchester from Lynchburg. Patton was out front fighting with 
his scout car and leading the division in his traditional manner. They 
had to cross many fords and had some close fights with the enemy. The 
division commander was in the midst of the action, cursing people out, 
and urging them on to Manchester. About 0900, three members of the 67th 
Armored Regiment had observed an airplane drop a message near their 
location, and correctly reasoned that a headquarters lay nearby. The 
tankers attacked the infantrymen,and captured Brigadier General 
Cortlandt Parker, commanding general, 5th Infantry Division, and his 
staff, For their initiative, a 2d Armored hallmark, the men received 
$25.00 from a jubilant Patton. At 1100, four hours after the 2d 
Armored Division entered the battle, the umpires ended the exercise. 21 
In the after-exercise critique, the chief umpire stated that the 
action of the 2d Armored Division was not as decisive as it might have 
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been. He felt that better results could have been obtained if the 
division had attacked en masse, and if infantry had been used to over-
come. the antitank guns. The reconnaissance units were critictzed for 
stopping to harass installations and for taking prisoners not:needed for 
identification purposes. Such remarks caused some veterans to believe 
that attempts were being made to discredit either the division, its 
commanders or_bothi One of Patton's biographers noted that Lieutenant 
General Leslie J. Mc~air ordered the umpires to stifle Patton and that 
every decision went .. against him. The Memphis Commercial Appeal noted 
that the encircling attack was led by spotter aircraft and it seemed 
"cool and calculating, efficient, and deadly." Regardless of what the 
umpires said or did, including the ruling that Patton was a casualty 
when his scout.car went through a simulated artillery barrage, the.prob-
lem was terminated twelve hours earlyt because the division had taken too 
I 
many objectives. 22 
In the third problem, Exercise C-9, the 2d Armored Division was 
still part of the Blue force. The 5th Infantry Division (Red) was 
occupying a defensive line from Tullahoma to Hillsboro. The Blue force 
mission was to rout the enemy to-prevent him from linking up with 
additional Red forces to the northeast. The division was planning to 
use the nose and seat of the pants idea again. As events transpired, 
the posterior elements were in position and doing their jobs before the 
frontal units got. started. 
The 66th Armored Regiment, supported by the First Battalion, 78th 
Armored Artillery, a company of engineers, and the 41st Infantry Regi-
ment (less two battalions), was to attack the Red's east flank at 1100. 
The ~th ~ombardment Squadron.was ordered to bomb Prairie Plains, St~ 
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Infantry Division headquarters. The attack took place at 1115, just in 
front of leading 66th Armored Regiment elements. The attack was so 
successful that·the 66th Armored Regiment reached the Elk River, the. 
restraining line, by 1215. The second flanking element was a composite. 
force of the 82d Reconnaissance·Battalion; 3d Battalion, 41st Armored 
Infantry Regiment; Second Battalion, 78th Artillery, and a company of 
engineers. This force reached Winchester by 1000, proceeded to block 
the crossings of the Elk River, and attacked-the Red force in the rear. 
The·bulkof the 2d Armored Brigade constituted the "nose" force, The 
brigade was.ordered to attack the center of the Red line at 1330; it 
did, passed through, and started exploiting its success towards the 
Elk River. The attacks were so successful that the exercise waster-
minated at 1410, or forty minutes aftsr the bulk of the 2d Armored 
Division entered the attack. 23 
Critics had only praise for the tankers. For a problem thought to 
require twenty-four hours to carry out -- the 2d Armored Division had 
needed only three. The division used a "trick play." A message was 
:dr©pped to an. armored car, later captured, which said the main effort 
would be made from the west at 1330. Instead, it came from the north-
east at 1300. A second factor may have been press reports concerning 
the two earlier exercises, which indicated that the tankers were pulling 
their punches. In this third exercise, t~.e tankers roared through 
forests and over fences and fields. The vehicles before had largely 
stayed on the roads, causing little damage; even if th~t·damage was 
paid for. One humorous escapade occurred: Captain Harry B. Koon, Sr., 
Chaplain of the105th Quartermaster Regiment, 30th Infantry Division, 
was on his way to pick up that units mail. His vehicle was not flying 
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the white administrative flag, so it was fair game, and the vehicle and 
its occupants were captured~ 
-f 
Private Harry B. Koon, Jr.,Ja 
\_ 
Their captor was- the chaplain's son. 
member of the 2d Armored Division. 24 
In the final exercise, the 2d Armored Divisien rejoined the 5th 
Infantry Division to constitute the Red force. The Blue forces were 
defending the area between the Duck and Elk Rivers. Red's mission was 
to push the Blue forces back and capture Tullahoma, with the problem to 
begin at 0500 on 26 June 1941. The division started moving about 0300 
to envelop the north flank of the Blue forces, while the 5th Infantry 
Division held the Blue forces in the line and enveloped the south flank. 
By 0700 the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion had secured two crossings over 
the Duck River and turned them over to the 4lst Armored Infantry Regi-
ment to defend. The main body started crossing the river, anq by 1230 
it had reached its assembly areas, regrouped, and was launching attacks 
against T1.1llahoma. The problem ended about 1320 with the capture of the 
town and the destruction of the enemy force - six and one-half hours 
after the 2d Armored Division had entered the fight. One,Cub airplane 
being tested as an artillery observer and liaison aircraft signaled the 
· end of the exercise, but when the plane's signal was not understood, it 
landed, taxied down the road and overtook one tank to give its occu-
pants the word. 25 
The chief umpire noted that the 2d Armored Division's actions were 
rapid, coordinated, and decisively effective. However, the division was 
criticized fCilr inadequate reconnaissance, which resulted in unnecessar-
ily high tank losses. The 4lst Armored Infantry Regiment was credited 
with superior action. Self-criticism is probably the most valid: 
Lieutenant Colonel Grow noted that about half of the tanks of the 2d 
140 
Armored Division were late getting across the Duck River, everything 
was commited piecemeal, and as a result. the units were scrambled. The 
main reason for the debacle, according to.Grow, was that the "command 
and staff functioning was very poor." He thought that division head-
quarters was terrible and control was non-existent because of personal-
ity differences. Grow observed that the men of the division were fine, 
but the units got progressively worse as they moved up the organization-
al ladder. 26 
The division returned to Fort Benning and began preparing for the 
Louisiana maneuvers, about six weeks in the future. As Patton told 
reporters, the division no longer charged an opponent, but probed for 
weak points, and then penetrated those weak areas to attack the flanks 
and rear. The Tennessee maneuvers tested the division's theory and 
training. Patton led his men on swift long-distance marches; pontoon 
bridges were put over rivers and streams, rapid raids were carried out, 
and enemy strongpoints were attacked. During the exercises, the 
division ran roughshod over its opposition. 27 
On 7 July, 2d Armored Division headquarters issued General Order 
28, which was congratulatory and advisory in tone. The present state 
of training had been attained despite shortages of equipment and losses 
of experienced personnel to other units. Since equipment had begun 
arriving and personnel losses were due to slow down, the division was 
now to concentrate on training. The next day the division assembled and 
Patton conducted a critique of the recently held maneuvers. He noted 
the·division's mistakes, saying, "if there were not.mistakes, there 
would be no need for maneuvers. 11 28 He complimented the.men on their 
courtesy, dress, and the favorable impressions they had made on senior 
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commanders and the Secretary of War. He observed that if the men would 
continue improving, "you will make your shoulder patch something that 
will cause as much dread to the enemies of your country as it causes 
pride among your friends. 1129 
The division commander thought that the men had carried out every 
mission with efficiency and timeliness. The division had earned a 
favorable reputation because of its performance and high standards, To 
continue to lead, the division could not be content with its accomplish-
ments, but would have to continue to improve, retaining the good and 
avoiding errors such as those committed in Tennessee. 30 
Turning to the mistakes, Patton stated that tanks were vulnerable 
to antitank fire. It.was folly to think of charging antitank guns with 
the intention of "a:~hing [them] beneath our tracks," as the tank was 
only a squad with a large amount of firepower. Once through antit~nk 
defenses, their armor: and speed permitted them to attack rear area 
positions with a larg~ degree of safety because rear area soldiers were 
without antitank de:f~Jl~es. To help overcome antitank guns, new sets 
I 
of formations would soon be given to companies and battalions. Since 
antitank guns were towed and had to stay on or near roads, Patton or-
dered the tankers to get off the road when they came to within 1,000 
yards of an antitank gun. Since antitank guns were almost always at 
crossroads, the men were to flank them from one or both sides. In 
addition, if the force had artillery or mortars, these should be fired 
at the antitanks guns or their suspected position. 31 
Patton said that the division, especially the reconnaissance ele-
ments, was suffering a disease associated with the motorized age--"waffle 
ass." It occurred because people sat too much. Getting to specifics, 
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he told the reconnaissance elements that when approaching points that 
might contain mines and antitank guns to get off the road and walk or 
crawl, using binoculars to investigate. This would be hard work, but 
it was better than getting killed. Death would result if reconnaissance 
elements did not take the proper precautions. After securing informa-
tion, they were to send it back to headquarters in the most expeditious 
manner possible, so that it could be used.32 
Teamwork was vital for success in an armored division. Patton 
thought that there was still too much of a tendency for each type of 
unit to be a "one-handed puncher. The rifleman wants to shoot, the 
fellow with the mortar to burp, and so on." This was not the way to win 
a war. Each type weapon, as each type instrument in an orchestra, must 
support the other. He told the "musicians of Mars" not to wait for the 
leader to signal when to enter the battle, but to use their own initia-
tive and to be at the proper place at the proper time. Initiative was 
another topic of instruction. Patton told of an unnamed reconnaissance 
sergeant and crew who were the survivors from a platoon. When an umpire 
asked the man what he was doing, the sergeant told him the mission, 
what had been accomplished, and what remained to be done. He then pro-
ceeded to complete the mission, That sergeant earned the congratula-
tions of his division Gommander. But, Patton noted, since almost all 
members of the division had been in schools for about a year, the divi-. 
sion had acquired what he called the "student complex--a tendency to 
wait for instructions." That malady was particularly manifest in 
~ieutenants, captains, and noncommissioned officers. To overcome this, 
he suggested that a very safe rule to follow is, that in case of doubt, 
"push on just a little further and then keep on pushing. 1132 
143 
The maneuvers were successful for the 2d Armored Division. The 
army was introduced to "blitzkrieg" tactics. Maximum pressure was 
brought to bear on crucial or weak points, and breaks were made per-
mitting tan~s to penetrate to weakly held rear areas. This method was. 
made possible by the airplane and the tank. The second aspect of 
mobile warfare displayed was to avoid strong points wherever possible 
and to go around them. Another lesson learned was that the way to stop 
tank attacks was with an active defense--in reality, a counterattack by 
planes and tanks, Passive measures, such as antitank ditches, mines, 
and antitank guns, delay, but do not stop armor attacks. 34 
The division was a victim of its own successes and the Army's ig-
norance about armor warfare. It received little or no credit for its 
performance. In three attacks the division surrounded the enemy and 
was in position to destroy him, but the umpires and maneuver directors 
ruled against the division. In the third.exercise, the division pene-
trated the enemy line, but the enemy escaped. Yet this was considered 
a major victory for the 2d Armored Division. This situation pointed 
out that major commanders must know armor tactics.35 
The 2d Armored Division changed the tempo of battle. Each exercise 
ended the same day that the division entered it; usually twelve to 
twenty-four hours before the problem was scheduled to end. The maneuvers 
demonstrated that a fundamental change in philosophy had to occur. 
Instead of pushing the enemy back, emphasis should be placed on destroy-
ing him in-place; such destruction could be complete and rapid. 36 
Major General Charles L. Scott, Commander of the I Armored Corps, 
and an observer at the maneuvers, told M?jor General Adna Chaffee, Chief 
of the Armored Force, that the 2d Armored Division did an excellent job 
•' 
144 
in Tennessee in spite of shortages. He noted that the division had less 
than 60 percent of its combat vehicles, 14 percent of its radio equip-
ment, and that40 percent of its personnel had about four months of duty 
with tanks. 
Scott raised three questions that he considered basic and which 
would require answers. He wanted t9 know if an antitank battalion was 
sent.out.to stop an armored division, what.would keep artillery and in-
fantry from pinning the battlion down, thus permitting the division to 
go around it? Second, if enough antitank guns were available to estab-
lish a perimeter defense, what was to prevent punching a hole in.the 
enemy line, penetrating, and then fanning out behind the guns; thus 
avoiding most.of the antitank guns. Last, he asked, if ·the tan~s 
penetrated enemy lines by either method, what was to protect rear in-
stallations? Adding a bit of humor, anc;l perhaps because of Brigadier 
General Parker's capture, he wanted to know if rear area defenders 
would rush forward with rifles and light:machine guns to try to stop 
the tanks?37 
Channelizing mechanization was a worn out and meaningless phrase. 
Scott cemplained that persons who applied it envisioned using antitank 
guns and antitank battalions in that way, and they failed to rea,lize 
that an armored division's infantry, artillery, engineers, air compon-
ents, and supporting forces not only prevented channelizing but permit-
ted an armored division to attack in any direction it chose. The 
Tennessee maneuvers and six years of experience showed that conventional 
troops as they were presently equipped and organized could easily be 
surrounded, disrupted, and disorganized. The Army must develop new 
means and methods to counter the mechanized threat, 38 
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The Tennessee maneuvers settled nothing; they were an extension of 
the debate of the 1920's and 1930's. Instead of feuding between in-
fantry and cavalry, the debate centered on the role of armor and the 
means of defeating it. The Army was. concerned about armor, especially 
how to protect nonarmored personnel from armor attacks. The exercise 
to them was a test of the antitank gun theory, which needed testing, but 
was unrealistic. Umpires permitted 37 mm gun crews to claim destruction 
of tanks, when in fact, tanks were the only armored vehicle that that 
size gun could not destroy, except by a lucky hit. 
Early in the brigade maneuvers at Fort Benning, the tankers had 
learned that infantry had to support the tanks closely, in fact accom-
pany them, rather than following behind. There was also a need for 
tracked vehicles to carry infantrymen to the objective. 39 The essential 
teamwork that evolved and was demonstrated in Tennessee confirmed the 
theory and training of the armored force. In the Louisiana maneuvers, 
this training and the ingenuity of the men would be put to a more 
severe test. 
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·· · · CHAPTER VII 
- THE·· LOUISIANA-MANEUVERS, 1941 
The Louisiana· maneuvers were- the· seeo-nd-·large· scale exercise in 
which the 2d Armored Division participated·in·i94L·· In June the 
division had effectively demonstrated its· nickname·· '·'Hell on Wheels" 
in the Tennessee maneuvers. 1 During the period from 9 August to 4 
October, the division in Louisiana showed·again that it·deserved that 
title. 
Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair, Commanding General, Army 
Ground Forces, wanted the maneuvers to be realistic, as he wanted a 
crack officer corps. Hopefully, the excercises would reveal the 
officers' strong and weak points. General George·C~ Marshall, Army 
Chief of Staff, was looking for promotable colonels and lieutenant 
colonels. Most of the divisions participating in Louisiana were 
national guard units, and the exercises were to acquaint them with the 
strengths and weaknesses of armor, its tactics and theory. The 
Armored Force would experiment with new concepts. Major General Charles 
L. Scott, Commanding General. I Armored Corps-, told McNair that while 
the Armored Force had not studied the possibility of following 
armored divisions with motorized infantry and support units, the 
Louisiana exercise or the Carolina maneuvers scheduled for November, 
2 
would be a good time to consider it. 
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Figure 3. The Louisiana Maneuvers, 1941. 
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The maneuver area was bounded by Shreveport on the north, by 
Lake Charles on the south, by the Sabine River·on the west, and by 
the Red River on the east, an area which covered about 13,637,416 
acres. It was not considered tank country because it was covered with 
rice fields, stagnant water, swamps,·and thick forests. During the 
maneuvers the division would change the definition·of·tank country to 
anywhere a tank· could go. ·For· the· Louisiana~maneuvers ·· the organiza-
tional structure was altered to that of the Tennessee maneuvers. 
Artillery was organized into four battalions·under·a·division artillery 
commander. The 4lst Armored Infantry and 67th Armored Regiments 
were organized into three battalions each. The 66th Armored Regiment 
received a support battalion by regrouping its reconnaissance company, 
machine gun company, and mortar platoon. These were organized so as 
to give each battalion of the 68th Armored Regiment a support company. 
The infantry company in the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion was reorganized 
to provide a third reconnaissance company. 3 
The 2d Armored Division was still in its wooden gun and outmoded 
vehicle state. One picture in a divisional history shows a tank on 
a flat car ready to be sent to Louisiana and calls·the·reader's atten-
tion to the absence of guns. Lack of equipment continually hampered 
the division during its early existence. 4 The division shipped its 
tanks, half tracks, and artillery by rail, while·most of the men and 
vehicles marched in two columns from Fort Benning, Georgia, on 9 and 10 
August to Grand Cane, Louisiana. The·two columns, more·than seventy 
miles in length, required more than three hours to pass a given point. 
Initially, the division numbered 649 officers and 9,145 enlisted men, 
with 2,543 vehicles. During the maneuvers it gained·l9 officers, 
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4 7 0 enlisted men, and · 148 quarter ton -and-·two· and· one-half ton trucks. 
One important loss to the division was the G-3, Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert W. Grow, who was assigned to the 5th Armored Division. He 
was replaced by Major Howard L. Peckham, commanding·officer of the 
17th Armored Engineer Battalion; ·sixteen··canadian-officers were 
temporarily assigned to the division and·went with them. 5 
The maneuvers were built around the following··seenario: KOTMK 
(Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri, ·and·Kentucky)·was Red, and the 
invaded nation, while ALMAT (Alabama, Louisiana;·Mississippi, Arkansas, 
and Tennessee) was Blue and the aggressor natiom ,. Lieutenant General 
Ben "Yoo-Hoo" Lear commanded the·RedSecondArmy while Lieutenant 
General Walter Krueger commanded the·Blue Third Army. The exercises 
started with four corps problems and a command post exercise lasting 
from 16 August to·l4 September. The two·large-scale·Second versus 
Third Army problems were held 15-28 September. Even during the corps 
problems, the situation of invader and defender dominated the situation. 
The first problem had the Red Army V Corps landing at Lake Charles, 
then moving north to seize the Pleasant Hill-Noble-Mansfield Air 
Field. For this, V Corps had the 32d, 34th, 37th·, and· 38th Infantry 
Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the·lst Tank Group. Defending, 
the Blue VIII Corps had the 2d Armored Division, 2d, 36th and 45th 
Infantry Divisions, 18th Artillery Brigade, and the·56th Cavalry 
Brigade. Its mission was to attack southward,·destroying the enemy 
wherever found, and to push the Red forces back into the Gulf of 
Mexico. 6 
Major General George v.·Strong, Commanding General; VIII Corps, 
made his plans to attack southward, seizing the Peason Ridge area to 
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have a usable road net. · The corps-was ·-then···to' continue southward, 
seizing Leesville~ splitting the Red forces·into--two·groups, which 
would be mopped up by the infantry following·the 2d Armored Division. 
"Hell on Wheels" was to spearhead t:he·VIII Corps·movement. It was to 
move south, break through or envelop ·hostile-r·esistan·ee·; ·· seize Peason 
Ridge, and continue southeast, with an·infantry·division on each flank. 
The armored spearhead was supported by a 15Smm·howitzer·regiment from 
the 18th Field Artillery Brigade. 7 
The 82d · Armored Reconnaissance · Battalion; '·commanded · by Maj or I. D. 
White, assembled the afternoon of 16 August,and·White cautioned his 
battalion that their job was to gain information, to find the 1st 
Cavalry Division, and the 1st Tank Group. They were·not·to worry about 
small groups but to find the bulk of the enemy forces.· He stressed 
the need for'·teamwork:- ''we· are not· going· to·wi-n· the·war ·· all by our-
selves as we did in Tennessee. 118 
The 2d Armored Division was organized into three·columns, each 
having light and medium tanks, artillery, infantry, and engineer 
support, with the reconnaissance battalion reinforced with an engineer 
platoon. The division waited for the order which would send them 
into the exercises. For·control purposes, both corps would attack 
on Third Army's order, which was given at 0200 on 17·August 1941. 9 
The reconnaissance battalion moved out about d400, while the division 
attacked about two hours later. 
The exercise, which started in a rain, soon ran into dust. 
Initial enemy contact was along the Anacoco~Kurthwood~Hornbeck line. 
The reconnaissance battalion was delayed about one and a half hours 
south of Kurthwood by a blown bridge, while the left column was held 
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up for thirty-five minutes by a Red scout·car 0 southof Anacoco. After 
these delays, a platoon of tanks was placed·in the lead·and encountered 
little resistance until they met·the·32d--Infantry Division in a defile 
north of Rosepine. From Kurthwood on to·Leesville, the 82d Reconnais:-
sance Battalion ran into numerous antitankguns of·the·lst Cavalry 
Division and had to scout a,head on foot. They·managed·to work them-
selves around the guns and arrived at Leesvilleat 1600~ They continued 
south to a point two miles north of Pickering, while the leading 
elements of the three columns were at Anacoco, Kurthwood, and Slagle 
by 1630. 10 
North of Pickering, the reconnaissance battalion made contact 
with the 66th Armored Regiment, which was facing stiff opposition. 
White used B Company and the 2d Battalion, 78th Armored Artillery, 
in an attempt to help them. The 66th Armored Regiment attacked 
repeatedly but could not dislodge the enemy· force from the defile 
north of Rosepine, losing an estimated forty to fifty tanks in the 
meantime. Late in the afternoon, the regiment broke contact, made 
a circling move to the east, and got on the flank·of the 32d Infantry 
Division. By 2000 part of the 66th Armored Regiment had managed to 
. . 11 get into Rosepine. The first day ended with the 2d Armored 
Division making good progress. 
The power drive technique used the next two days yielded to 
flanking attacks. VIII Corps ordered the attack resumed at 0500 on 
18 August. The plan was to envelop the enemy right flank and push the 
Red Corps to the southeast. The 2d Armored Division was to make the 
main effort. The west column, 66th Armored Regiment (minus a battalion), 
started moving to the south of Pickering, but it was halted by hostile 
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antitank guns four miles south of the town. It had the 144th Regi-
mental Combat Team attached, but was unable- to overcome the enemy's 
antitank guns. The west column was split and there-was no chance 
of relieving it. The center column, 2d Armored- Brigade; was heavily 
engaged near Slagle, but managed to reach·Sugartown·that night. The 
east column, 68,:h Armored Regiment, cleared Pitkin-, - took Sugartown 
by 1345, and managed to work its way into Rosepine by 1430. Darkness 
found the east column almost entirely surrounded by the 1st Cavalry 
Division and an infantry division. At 1845, VIII Corps ordered the 
division to disengage and to assemble near Cravens, Pitkin, Leander, and 
LaCamp. The next morning it was to attack towards DeRidder, break 
through, and destroy those forces opposing the friendly 2d and 36th 
Infantry Divisions. The major effort was to be made by the 2d Armored 
and 45th Infantry Divisions. There was no hope of relieving the 
west column. It was left in place to attack southward the following 
12 
day. 
The attack resumed at 0500. , The center column made good 
progress below Pitkin; the east column pushed the enemy back and 
made progress toward Craven. The west column had trouble with the 
32d Infantry Division, which slowed the column all day long. In 
an enveloping attack, the 45th Infantry Division surrounded the 1st 
Cavalry Division, and the 2d Armored was almost to DeRidder. The 
reconnaissance battalion moved on south. A company was at Lake 
Charles, while some tanks of the 66th Armored Regiment were moving 
. h 13 into tat area. The exercise ended at 1500, with the-units to bivouac 
in place and to keep all roads open. 
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In the critique, Lieutenant General Krueger pointed out that 
such conferences tended to dwell on mistakes and ignore good work. 
His opinion was that corps versus corps exercises'permitt:ed an oppor-
tunity to eliminate mistakes. Noting that v·corps· (Red)·had accurate-
ly located the 2d Armored Division·in· the·opening·phase··of the battle, 
he pointed out that they could have·determined-the·main battle area 
if such a plan of action·had been·alreadyformulated~ · It·had not been, 
in the Army Commander's mind. The·Blue·force; by us:i:ng .. the 2d Armored 
Division to spearhead its attack, had reduced the need for other 
reconnaissance measures. The continued·pushing·by the·division against 
organized defenses resulted in tank wastage, reduced·the number of 
tanks.available for the final attack, and forced the·piecemeal use 
of armored vehicles. Lieutenant Colonel Grow·observed that the 
division, however, was given credit for a good job. It had not done 
anything startling, but had kept pushing along. 14 
For the second exercise, the 2d Armored Division was assigned to 
V Corps (Red) and moved to assembly areas southeast of DeRidder on 
23 August. While it was on this administrative move, Patton had the 
division practice maintaining tactical distances during marches and 
in bivouac at DeRidder, the division·received·a·message·to 0 be sure that 
the tanks were marked correctly. It appeared·that·in--the·first exer-
cise some tanks were not marked, while others·had·their·organizational 
bands, which were red, while the division was a member of the Blue 
15 
forces. General Krueger wanted this confusion stopped. 
In the theoretical situation, the Red forces had invaded Louisiana 
from the Gulf of Mexico and were trying to capture oil fields in the 
Mansfield area. Blue attacked south and was stopped along the 
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Hemphill-Hornbeck-Kisatchie line. The Red force mission was to drive 
the Blue defenders south of the Many-Robeline line and capture the 
oil fields in the Mansfield area. Lieutenant Colonel Grow formulated 
three plans. One was to make a-wide·envelopment~into·Texas and attack 
the Blue forces from the north (their·rear). · ·He· thought· that whether 
the division got much of its force across the Sabine·· River or not, 
the Red Corps would win the war. 'fhe second·pian·was·to·move a small 
force across the Sabine, as in plan one, while·the bolk·of the divi-
sion awaited an infantry breakthrough. The third plan was to wait 
for an infantry breakthrough, which he thought·wouldcause heavy 
casualties. The first plan was adopted. Field Order 6 ordered the 2d 
Armored Division to cross the Sabine, move north,seize crossings 
over the Sabine between Converse and U. S. Highway 59, cross the 
river, and attack the Mansfield area. 16 In the corps effort, the 
infantry divisions were to be the nose holding elements while the 2d 
Armored kicked the Blue force from the west and the 1st Cavalry 
Division enveloped the east flank and did the same there. 
The 2d Armored Division crossed the Sabine River the afternoon 
of 24 August and established bivouac in the Jasper-Burkeville, Texas 
area. Using three columns, the division moved north, starting about 
0500 on 25 August. The left or west· column, protecting that flank, 
went as far as Lufkin. It turned east, found and·captured a useable 
bridge at Carthage, and Grow, who was with the column, asked Patton 
to put an armored regiment across. Patton failed·to··do so, and the 
2d Armored Brigade had a more difficult experience because of his 
decision. 17 The east and center columns turned northeast. Arriving 
at Logansport, they found the bridge there damaged; but not protected 
158 
by artillery or small arms fire. A heavy pontoo~ engineer battalion 
built 500 feet of bridge, while the 17th Engineer Battalion ~epaired 
the highway bridge. The lighter elements of the·division·began fording 
operations about 1205, while the engineersdid·their·work, and by late 
afternoon, the division was across and behind Blue lines. Major 
General Strong, VIII Corps Commander, noted·thatthe-limited drive by 
the tank brigade was an excellent at.tack and conducted to the satis-
faction of all concerned, exceptheadquarters of-the·l25th Infantry 
Regiment, 36th Infantry Division. It seemed that the·infantrymen were 
18 
"peeved to find tanks running over their mess kits." 
The Blue forces shifted most of its troops northward, intending 
to attack and cut off the 2d Armored Division from its supply trains, 
and to open a route into the Mansfield area. The division resumed 
the attack on 26 August with its mission to advance to the Many-
Robeline line, defeating the enemy wherever met. 19 
The 82d Reconnaissance Battalion moved southward, finding many 
antitank guns and blown bridges. It arrived at Fort Jessup about 1200, 
only to find the town already captured by one of its own units, a 
platoon from B Company. Apparently, the enemy would have liked to 
counterattack, but thought a larger force was in the town than the 
three scout cars actually there. Later in the evening, the enemy 
did attack and the umpires ruled that the reconnaissance·troops would 
have to pull back which was a fair decision, because armored vehicles 
1 bl , h 20 are vu nera eat nig t. 
During the day, most of which was spent detouring blown or 
burned bridges rather than fighting, the tankers showed that they 
were ingenious. As one tank company traveled down a road,·two infantry 
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battalions of the 37th Infantry Division moved out on the road to see 
them. The infantrymen climbed on, and the tankers turned their guns 
on the footsoldiers. Umpires ruled the two battalions outof the battle. 
First Lieutenant·D. A. Kelley gained informationby--renting a boat, 
removing his clothing, and pretending to fish. He rowed·back and forth 
listening to the enemy talk. Returning to his side, he dressed, and 
told his company commander what·· he had· discovered·;· That night, to 
add a little excitement to the war games, a scout section of the 2d 
Armored Division, having only a scoutcar;·smoke pots;, and a rifle, 
decided to set off the smoke pots and fire as fast as possible at the 
Blue forces. The Blue force thought the battle was beginning and 
returned the fire with·all types of weapons, while·messengers rushed 
away carrying the news of the attack, and leading reinforcements to 
the "battle." The results were that the Blue forcesin·that area got 
very little sleep that night. 21 
Orders were issued to continue the attack at 0500 the next 
morning, to complete the destruction of the Blue forces~ During the 
night of 26-27 August, White had sent A and D Companies, 82d 
Reconnaissance Battalion, to block the Blue forces retreat to crossing 
points along the Red River. When these companies linked with the 1st 
Cavalry Division, Lieutenant General Krueger ruled that the last 
escape routes were closed and ended the battle at 0800. 
22 
In the critique, Lieutenant General Krueger praised·the 2d Armored 
Division for moving into Texas to outflank the Blue line,. but he 
thought that in a real war the move would have been a dangerous divi-
sion of forces. After getting behind the Blue force, the 2d Armored 
Division had cut Blue's communications and supply lines. The division 
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then revealed that it had carried food for five days and gasoline for 
400 miles. Krueger was also unhappy about the lights in the division's 
command post and its traffic controL He also pointed-out that road-
blocks or blown bridges were only nuisances·· unless they were defended. 
The rule should be to make the enemrwork·to·remove·or repair obstacles 
to its advance. Major General Strong,· however,·disagreed, noting that 
the Logansport bridge was guarded·· and had a written statement of 
damages. The chief umpire later reestablishedpartial damages, which 
the division had to repair, using lOOman hours~ Strong's remark was, 
"some engineering. 1124 The bridge debate was the crucial issue, because 
by repairing and using the bridge, the 2d Armored Division had been 
able to position itself behind Blue lines. Apparently, Strong felt 
that had the proper damages been observed, he would have been able to 
shift his antitank units to counter the threat. The VIII Corps 
commander ended his remarks with scorn and sarcasm. He extended his 
compliments to the Fort Benning tankers for their new equipment--
Kangaroo Tanks. These vehicles permitted the tankers to go over 
demolitions that were emplaced by engineers, and properly posted and 
flagged, without damage. After being critical of·the 1st Cavalry 
Division, he cautioned that "hell will have an awful stench of the 
burning of hair and flesh when these two divisions·are called to their 
final reward. 1125 
The Red force commander, Major General Edmund L. Daley, however, 
compared the flanking attack favorably to any that had been done in 
Europe. Patton's men kept themselves supplied, kept Daley informed 
of enemy situations, and accomplished their assigned mission, which 
was commensurate with their mobility and firepower. Unaided, the 
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division cut the enemy's routes of communications and escape, and had 
it had following infantry, perhaps the mission could have been done 
more quickly. Lieutenant Colonel Grow·noted that·since the enemy 
failed to defend the Sabine River and knew·that·t:he 2d Armored 
Division was in Texas, it actually sealed·itsewn fate from the 
beginnirtg. 26 
The division was inactive from 28 August:·to·2 September. 
During three of those days, it was alerted for-participation in a 
command post exercise, but it did not move from·its·bivouac areas. 
During the week, it conducted needed .. maintenance, and the men rested 
up for the remaining month of problems. 
Exercises 3 and 4 opened on 5 September, with the two being 
combined into one problem, slated to terminate on·lO September. Rain 
from a hurricane turned the lowland into traps and threatened to take 
the blitz out of the maneuvers. Louisiana was becoming a tough proving 
ground. The exercise was built around two tactical concepts. The 
Red force was to occupy and defend the crossings·over the Calcasieu 
River while the Blue force, of which the 2d Armored was a part, was 
to pursue the enemy and destroy him. The division;·assigned to Third 
Army, initially was in Army reserve, positioned on the flank of 
VIII Corps, to help either VIII or V Corps, or·to execute a wide flank 
movement if .the situation permitted. Patton led his men to bivouac 
areas n_ear Leesville and was ordered to attack the· afternoon of 5 
September. The division moved north in two columns to the Kiastchie-
Kurthwood area, to relieve pressure on VIII Corps' flank. One column 
met strong resistance from the 1st Cavalry Division, while the other 
column met resistance from Red infantry and armor. Plans were made to 
resume the offensive at 0500 the next morning. 27 
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The Red threat against the VII Corps flank-was serious. The 2d 
Armored Division resumed th,e attack, meeting strong, -determined oppo-
sition from the 1st Cavalry Division. Thetankers·captured Brigadier 
General Charles H. · Gerhardt, commanding·. general•;· 2d · Brigade·; 1st Cavalry 
Division, as he led his brigade against· the·Third Army'flank. Pushing 
through the Kisatchie National· Forest in--spite· of-"iand mines, antitank 
guns, and the weather, the division encircl:ed:· the"enemr and was in 
position to start the systematic defeat of the"Red force, when the 
exercise ended at 070o. 28 
The men rested but were alerted to resume their-· attack at dark 
on 7 September. The division was to move in two columns, bridge the 
Red River in the Montgomery area, and cross the river to the Red 
forces on the east blank. Each column was to have rubber assault boats 
to cross the river or streams. The left column,·· commanded by Colonel 
James R. N. Weaver, commanding officer of the 68th Armored Regiment, 
was to feint an attack four miles northeast of Natchitaches to cover 
bridgehead operations west of Montgomery. The right column, led by 
Brigadier General Willis D. Crittenberger, was·to·establish a bridge-
head west of Montgomery and to cover it· by a· feint· five'miles north-
east of Clouterville. 29 
The division marched from its bivouac area·and met·stiff resistance 
from the 1st Cavalry Division. The 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 
leading the 2d Armored Brigade, captured most of the cavalry division's 
service elements. Upon reaching the Red River, the combatorganization 
of the division was modified, but its mission remained unchanged. 
Crittenberger was to cross the Red River on a pontoon bridge to be 
built by the 87th Engineer Battalion, while the 68th Armored 
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group protected the bridgehead·.·, 'l'h-e· 61t:lr-A'!:'Dlcred~··group·, commanded 
by Colonel Douglas T. Greene, was·t-c>·attaek·•and .. desti-'c!,y~ttre 1st Cavalry 
Division and Corps medium artillery, and to help'the 68th Armored in 
bridgehead defense.30 
Bridging operations began the·next morning, but'were delayed 
about an hour by air attacks. While· the 87th' Eng·ineers built the 
pontoon bridge, the 17th Armored Engineer Battalion·began ferrying 
tanks across the Red River. Patton had·ordered·that'the bridge be 
completed by 2100; it was completed with· two·minutes·to spare. The 
first vehicle crossed at 2101. While the tankers were crossing, 
the 1st Armored Division came upon the tail ofthe·2d Armored. A 
realistic fire fight followed, with both sides giving a good account 
of themselves. As the umpir~s were assessing the casualties, the 
1st Armored seemed to have an advantage. Word was then received that 
it was all a mistake; the two divisions were in two different maneuvers 
and had accidently met in Montgomery. The 2d Armored crossed the 
Red River, turned south and entrapped the Red forces. The 67th 
Armored Regiment remained on the west bank repelling attacks by the 
1st Cavalry Division. Finally, Lieutenant General Krueger ended the 
problem, about twenty hours ahead of schedule. 31 
In the critique, Krueger was complimentary about the 2d Armored 
Division's work, saying that it had completed its mission in an 
excellent manner. However, he noted several small infractions that 
could have had deadly consequences in wartime. When crossing the Red 
River, there was severe traffic congestion, which indicated a lack 
of control by responsible officers. An air or artillery attack at 
that time would have caused serious losses. More disturbing to the 
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Army commander was the fact that certain elements were not ready for 
battle. Thirty-one vehicles from the 66th Armored·Reconnaissance 
Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, and 78th·Armored Field Artillery 
had stumbled into an ambush. That itself did not anger Krueger, but 
the lead half-track had had its machine guns·eovered,·aplatoon of 
howitzers was covered, and the men in the vehicles did not have their 
individual weapons or were not wearing their ammunition belts. The 
Th . d Ar d d h" · · d 32 1r my comm.an er wante t 1s··s1tuat1on correcte • 
The last two exercises were to be large scale:· Second Army 
versus Third Army. The first one opened at 0530· on 15 September. 
Krueger's Blue Third Army had invaded southern Louisiana. Its mission 
was to attack up the Mississippi River valley, cutting the United 
States in half. Lieutenant General Ben Lear 1 s·Red· Second Army was 
given the mission of repelling the attackers. 
The 2d Armored Division, part of I Armored Corps, was to move 
during darkness on 14 September, cross the RedRiver·atdaylight, and 
seize the Fort Jessup-Many line extending to the Sabine River. Once 
the line was taken, reconnaissance was to be pushed southward. Because 
of the experience of Patton's men, they were told to be ready to do 
more than the 1st Armored Division. Lear opened the battle by sending 
his armored divisions heading south across the .. Red"River;· The columns 
were strafed by Air Corps and Navy aircraft~· By·early afternoon the 
division had taken its objectives, and held its·position against 
increasing enemy opposition until 18 September~· After preparing his 
defenses, Patton alerted the division to be ready'to attack southward 
in two columns. The 82d Reconnaissance Battalion·extended itself to 
33 
Mt. Carmel in the early afternoon. 
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On the second day of the exercis-es, · a strcmg enemy· force attacked 
Mt. Carmel, forcing the 2d Armored Division·defenders out of the 
village. Five roads joined there, and since armored troops needed 
roads, it was of tactical importance. The 2d Armored counterattack 
was launched amid mass confusion. The men realized that a serious 
fight was about to occur, for many observer·cars,·press cars, commer-
cial radio vehicles, and newsreel cameramen's vehicles were headed 
for the village. The element of surprise was lost because of the 
visitors, and the battalion executive officer wanted to attack in the 
dust of the VIP's. However, the umpires ruled that out of order. 
The first attack was by one tank and one half track, immediately 
ruled to be casualties, but the attack did reveal the positions of 
four antitank guns. Finally the umpires permitted the attack to 
resume, and two companies came out of the woods on· the· south, attacking 
the defenders in the rear. The umpires stopped the attack to assess 
damages and casualties. During the intermission, when aircraft bombed 
the neutral vehicles, both the Red and Blue forces wanted the umpire 
and other vehicles ruled out of action, but "rare is the umpire to rule 
out his own transportation." Later the umpires decided that the 2d 
Armored Division had retaken the town. When attempting to drive the 
Blue force out of positions north of town, the tankers had to stop, 
"ambushed by umpires," because of safety factors. All three sides 
argued as to which combatant had the firepower and forcenecessary to 
win the battle.34 Patton's men won the round. 
Patton was then ordered to attack southward towards the Peason 
area to drive the Blue forces from that position. He warned the men 
that the Third Army had the roads covered by antitank guns. The 
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Blue force raced the 2d Armored Division to the Hornbeck area, won 
the race, and controlled the hard surfaced roads to the Third Army 
area. After the 2d Armored Division lost the race, 0 two infantry 
divisions, the 2d and 45th, threatened to·encirele00the'Red·force tankers, 
cutting them off from their escape routes~ The terrain and antitank 
defenses had stopped the tankers. Morecrueialwas'the threat posed 
by the 1st Cavalry Division to the· division·'s··gasoline· supply dumps 
and supply lines. The division was ordered-to·withdraw during the 
night of 18-19 September and then attack northwestward towards Zwolle 
to assist the 2d Cavalry Division in repelling the enemy 1st Cavalry 
Division. The 1st Cavalry captured the-gasoline supply and earned its 
"moment of glory." Without gas, the tankers could do nothing and the 
exercises ended·, For the· first time,· the 2d Armored· Division was on 
th 1 . .d 35 e osing si e. 
The fight lasted five days and the Second Army had been defeated. 
The Blue forces had turned the Red's flank, destroyed bridges, and 
the terrain was unsuited for armor. The tankers tried to break through 
at various points and some did, but they·were captured or destroyed 
by Third Army's hunter-killer antitank units.· The question 
whether a smaller unit, using tanks (Second Army),could hold off a force 
three times its size which lacked armor, was answered negatively for 
the time being. However, the tankers pointed out that had the maneuvers 
been elsewhere the results would have been different. Patton's men 
grumbled "wait 'till the next time." They felt that they had been 
denied the opportunity to use their speed and power properly and 
36 
were anxious to show what they could do. 
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Third Army was puzzled by the absence of armored stren~th on its 
front. The early mission was commensurate with the mobility and 
firepower of the 2d Armored Division,·but·any-advantage gained was 
lost by the imposed delay. Armor's·· flexibility< had been shown by its 
ability to withdraw from action, regroup, and·then .. attack thirty 
miles in the opposite direction.· The divisionaiso demonstrated 
that it could breech antitank gun defenses and ·mirke advances, but it 
lacked sufficient infantry strength to·hold•open·the gaps. When the 
tanks passed through, the enemy infantry closed inbehind the tankers 
and armored irlfantry, and they had to fight their·way out. Lieutenant 
Colonel Sidney R. Hinds and his Second Battalion, 41st Armored 
Infantry Regiment, had been behind the Blue lines for the whole 
exercise. During the week, he and his men overran enemy positions, 
established ambushes, and generally raised havoc. One morning after 
routing an infantry regimental combat team, Lieutenant General Walter 
Krueger gave Hinds some "personal attention" for being uunrealistic." 
Even though the umpires supported the battalion commander, he had to 
comb the countryside, rounding up the routed enemy. 37 
The final exercise, again Second Army versus-Third Army, was 
the most spectacular, and the· one most often referred to·when mentioning 
the 1941 Louisiana maneuvers or Patton. In this problem, the 2d 
Armored Division was part of Krueger's Third Army. Its mission was 
the advance on and the capture of Shreveport. 
The exercise began in the rain; roads were almost impassable and 
the creeks, bayous, and rivers were flooded. · In addition, Lieutenant 
General McNair wanted the armored attack and the antitanks guns 
to be the focal point of the exercise. The exercise, however, turned 
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out to be the battle of the bridges. Given the terrain and weather, 
every move depended on destroying bridges and building pontoon bridges 
to replace them. Every strategic move hinged on,the Red or Sabine 
Rivers. The advantage rested with the defending Second Army. 38 
The battle for Shreveport opened,on24 September·and'was scheduled 
to end five days later. For this exereise-the·PArmored Crops consisted 
of the 2d Armored Division and the 2d Infantry- Division- (Motorized). 
It was a new type organization and one-with which-Major General Scott 
had indicated a desire to experiment. The infantry divi·sion could now 
keep pace with the tankers. Their mission would·be to find and fix 
the enemy in positions. Then the tankers would·attack through them. 
The 2d Infantry would follow, clearing enemy resistance overlooked 
or bypassed by the armor unit.39 
The division was held in reserve for two days. Given the mission 
to pass through the gap created by the 2d Infantry Division, cross the 
Sabine River, and operate against the enemy's flank and rear, Patton 
issued orders for the envelopment of Shreveport. The division was 
divided into two columns: the west column, composed of wheeled 
vehicles permitted to use their lights, was made up of the 2d 
Battalion, 4lst Armored Infantry Regiment, the 78th Armored Artillery, 
and C and D Companies of the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion; the 
east column, primarily consisting of tanks without lights, consisted 
of the remainder of the division. The reconnaissance elements departed 
at 2030, while the main body of the west column followed at 2200 on 
25 September. Crossing the Sabine at Orange, the west column moved 
through Beaumont, turned north through Woodville, Nacogdoches, Henderson, 
Gladwater, Jefferson, and Belcher, Louisiana, ready to attack Shreveport 
on the 28th~O 
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The east column crossed the· Sabine• at··Merryvii'ie, moved north 
through Jasper, San Augustine, Taneha,· and· Carthage'.' ··If successful, 
the tankers would be in position to launeh·attaeks·against Shreveport 
from the west, southwest, or south'~ 'fhe· tankerS''ene.ountered blown 
and defended bridges. Colonel WilliamH. H. Morris,·commanding officer 
of the 66th Armored Regiment, found a ford; drove·off the defenders 
in a two hour battle (in reality it took' that· iong· to'· get' an umpire to 
the 1:1cene), only to find the river had risen·eight·feet in twenty 
hours. He called for engineers to put in a pontoon bridge. Elements 
of the 68th Armored Regiment had crossed the Sabine and·· had moved to 
about fifteen miles of Shreveport. But the exerciSEf1 s conclusion 
found most of the tanks at or near the river waiting to cross to 
the east bank. 41 
The Shreveport campaign was brought to its termination not by the 
tank threat, but by the wheeled column that came upon Shreveport from 
the rear. The column came under stiff antitank gun fire from units 
that had been shifted to counter the threat. Led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Hinds, the Second Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, 
captured the water works on the city's western edge•and theh proceeded 
to capture the city airport and business district. While this was 
in progress, two platoons of B Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 
captured the operations office at Barksdale·Field,·preventing the 
Air Corps from sending out any more planes-that day.· In'th:i.s maneuver, 
the 2d Armored Division had whiplashed around Lear's flank and attacked 
him from the rear, forcing the Second Army Commander to abandon 
defensive positions. He was preparing to retreat when the exercise end-
ed at 1645 on 28 September, twenty-four hours ahead of schedule. 
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The opinion that Patton had "little more than a nuisance grip" on the 
city hardly seems justified. McNair threw a·bouquet to the tankers 
for their Sabine River crossing near the battle 1 s end, and Hinds and 
his men were called "damn nuisances, 11 which they·considered to be 
their first battle commendation.42 
The destruction of the Bon Weir Bridge caused the 2d Armored 
Division to take a 350 to 400 mile detour, whichwas·completely out 
of the maneuver area. Captured quartermaster records"revealed that 
the division had bought a great quantity of fuel from local dealers, 
with cash, to make the move. This in itself was not·entirely illegal, 
but required a liberal interpretation of a VIII·Corps memorandum for 
its justification. On 11 August, VIII Corps"had issued a memorandum 
stating that gas and oil could be purchased for individual vehicles 
only on courtesy cards issued by the quartermaster of the home station. 
43 It did not permit authorization for motor parts. There was grumbling 
in some circles at the War Department that Patton'did not play the game 
according to the rules of war. The only question, of course, is 
whose rules? In fact, the ferocity of the 2d Armored Division was 
more than play acting. 
The division was hampered by thick forests, swamps, quagmires, 
and yet it specialized in capturing enemy command posts, and in cutting 
supply, communication, and escape routes. Patton, either in a plane or 
in a vehicle, was always up front, urging his men on with the cry of 
"God dam [sic] it, keep moving. 1144 It seemed,that·the division 
commander had an innate sense which directed him•to trouble spots. 
At one crossroad, where vehicles were bunched, he flew low and 
screamed at the personnel to get the vehiclesunder cover, as such a 
congested scene afforded an excellent air or artillery target. 45 
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The maneuvers revealed many difficulties,-- notably··that Louisiana_ 
was not the best tank terrain. There was limited·maneuver space, 
extensive and effective use of demolitions, and mobile antitank 
opposition. Patton stated bluntly that .. catching· infantrr and artillery 
unaware was more difficult as antitank·defense·progressed, and that 
the "honeymoon" armor had enjoyed was coming to a close. At no time, 
however, was the division's forward movement completely stopped or its 
supplies totally disrupted. The division showed·that,·supported by 
motorized infantry, it could make the initial attack and seize key 
points which delayed or prevented the enemy's concentration. It 
could penetrate and exploit a narrow gap when backed by infantry and 
additional artillery fire. By using armor's inherent mobility and 
speed, it could, by surprise, flank and attack the· enemy's rear. 46 
Lieutenant General Krueger wrote Patton to congratulate him and 
the division for their performance. The Third Army commander was 
"constantly impressed by the high morale, technical proficiency 
and devotion to duty by personnel of 2d Armored Division." He 
wanted the men thanked for their "loyal, tireless, cheerful, and 
efficient service. 1147 Several weaknesses, however, had been revealed 
that needed improvement. Major General Devers noted that not all the 
junior officers knew their jobs, and that there was faulty staff work 
at the higher command levels. March-discipline-, bivouacs, maintenance 
and reconnaissance should be stressed in the upcoming Carolina 
maneuvers. 48 
Louisiana was the division's proving ground. In the earlier 
Tennessee maneuvers, Patton and his staff realized the size of an 
armored division. The training at Fort Benning had been regiment 
versus regiment, or tank versus infantry, supported by artillery. 
In Louisiana, together with the Tennessee' experience; the division 
executed almost every type of action that it would·encounter during 
World War II. 
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CHAPTE~ VIII 
THE CAROLIN~ MANEUVERS 
The Carolina maneuvers of November 1941 were·the last large-
scale peacetime exercises in which the 2d Armored-Division partici-
pated. In Tennessee, the division discovered that·it was a large 
organization; while in Louisiana, it was sharpened as·an offensive 
weapon. The Carolina maneuvers honed its skills and·helped the division 
to correct defects noted in both of the earlier-maneuvers; and prepared 
it for a war that it hoped the United States could avoid; The maneuvers 
sought answers to two questions. How could the armored force be 
used to prevent or destroy an enemy invasions, and·what·was the most 
effective means to kill tanks, thus ripping the-vitals out of a panzer 
d ... ?1 1v1s1on. 
The division returned from Louisiana in early October 1941 to 
prepare for the Carolina maneuvers.· That same month, Major General 
Charles L. Scott, comm.anding general, I Armored Corps; addressed the 
officers about defects in training. He opened and concluded his 
rem.arks with the observation that the Armored Force had made excellent 
progress in spite of equipment shortages. Training was·satisfactory 
and improvements were continuing. He also noted·that·the officers 
and men knew how to shoot, drive, and maintain their vehicles. They 
had an abundance of energy and confidence in their ability to complete 
. 2 any assignment. 
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Figure 4. The Carolina Maneuvers, 1941. 
Sandwiched between the laudatory opening and closing remarks 
were a "repetition of errors that should be and·must be corrected 
if we are to be successful in battle," said Scott. 3 He felt that 
column commanders did not use all of their weapons when confronted 
by certain situations. Some officers·displayed-a·lack-of leadership 
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by not being well forward in their columns·· or· at· the- scene· of problems. 
There was failure by some· column·commanders-to·arrange·the various 
elements so that different units could be properly·and·qoickly employed 
1:o their best advantage. He·noted specifically that one officer was 
given a mission to force a river crossing and had his engineers and 
artillery to aid him. Since he had placed these units well to the 
rear of his column, vital time was used bringing them forward, where 
they should have been in the first place. 4 
Scott detailed other problems: armored divisions were too 
roadbound, and they should move cross-country more; reconnaissance, 
route markings, road guides., vehicular control; and the timing of 
the units' arrival at the scene of the action. He attr~buted many 
of the errors to lack of detailed advance planning, failure to esta-
blish standard operating procedures, and the·faiiure to use various 
service schools. "Brilliant plans of the higher·commanders," 
Scott said, "are worthless if the execution isfaulty; ·simple plans 
and simple plays, well executed, are the goals·to be sought. 115 
To eliminate some of the complaints, Patton issued instructions 
that drivers, platoon leaders, and all commanders would check their 
vehicles for defective lights, horns, and brakes, both·at the end of 
the day and prior to the next day's usage. To ke~p the troops informed, 
and to disseminate orders, a point that Scott had also stressed, 
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messengers and couriers were ordered to stop at all command posts and 
to tell the command personnel the situation as the messenger knew it. 
In addition, the Columbus Ledger found that a daily-order was issued, 
stating that sweat shirts were not authorized outer-garments, especially 
the ones lettered "Hell on Wheels. 116 
While preparing for the Carolina maneuvers,-the-division received 
231 replacements for the more than 600 men·who·were·being discharged 
as overage. In addition, equipment·was arriving:, such-as 112 half-
·tracked-personnel carriers·and-artillery·prime movers,·32 M-3 medium 
tanks, and 43 M-3 light tanks. On the eve of the Carolina exercises, 
the men felt that in spite of lacking about 2 percent of their 
equipment, primarily medium tanks, they were "fit· for and capable of 
.. 7 
immediate and decisive combat in the event·of·a national emergen~y." 
The maneuver area would challenge the tankers as·had the Tennessee 
and Louisiana areas. The area was bounded by Columbia,·South Carolina, 
on the southwest and Salisbury-Sanford, North Carolina; on the north-
east. In the area and posing difficulties, were the Broad, Catawba, 
Wateree, Black, Lynches, Great Pee Dee, and Little·Pee Dee Rivers. 
The terrain was covered with thick pine forests, that were dry from 
a lack of rain. 
Movement orders were issued on 27 Octoberl ·the·2d--Armored Division 
was to move in two columns to positions near- Chester; -- South Carolina. 
The vehicles were to carry gasoline for·a200 mile-march-and sufficient 
oil and grease for 400 miles. Column commanderswere instructed to 
constantly check march discipline, including the rate of march and the 
distance between vehicles. The 17th Engineer Battalion was dispatched 
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three days ahead of the division to do some necessary work, while the 
tanks were sent by train. 8 
As in Tennessee and Louisiana, the division·underwent reorganiza-
tion: four artillery battalions under·a·division-artillery commander, 
and three battalions of two compani.es each in -the· 4lst ·· Armored Infantry 
and 67th Armored Regiments. A provisional support-battalion was added 
to the 66th Armored Regiment, while the 68th Armored-Regiment had a 
support company addded to each of its battalions·; - -The·· 82d Reconnais-
sance Battalion changed·its infantry company into·a·reconnaissance 
company, giving it three reconnaissance companies and·a·tank company. 
Initially, 613 offi.cers, 9,111 enlisted personnel, and 2,847 vehicles 
9 
were involved in the exercises. 
In the first exercise, a hostile Blue Army had landed at Savannah, 
Georgia, captured Columbia, South Carolina, and then attacked north-
ward to protect its beachhead area for further landings. The 2d 
Armored Division, part of the Red IV Corps, was to move south from 
Chester and attack and destroy the enemy force wherever found 
between the Broad River and Highway 21. The 31st Infantry Division 
was on the left flank of the tankers and the 4th Infantry Division 
(Motorized) was held in Crops Reserve. The Red Army mission was the 
10 
capture of Columbia, South Carolina, and its communications facilities. 
The 2d Armored Division was organized into three columns and moved 
to the restraining lines during the evening of 4·November. The 
Reconnaissance Battalion and the advance guards moved·further south, 
protecting the roads into the division's bivouac area. Preparations 
were made to attack anytime after 0600 on 5 November, and when the 
attack order was received at 0630 the men started moving-south immed-
. 1 11 1.ate y. 
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Initially, the division made satisfactory progress, destroying 
most of the 3d Cavalry Regiment. The center and east columns were 
slowed by enemy artillery, infantry, cavalry, and antitank weapons. 
The west column continued to make excellent progress, and was in 
position to deliver a strong flanking·attack the-following day to 
assist the advance of the center column;·· Company- C, 82d Reconnaissance 
' Battalion, captured the 179th Field Artillery Regiment (155mm howitzers) 
while they were moving down a road. 
12 
After the attack resumed on 6 November, the 2d Armored Brigade 
reported capturing thirty truck loads of infantrymen of the 112th 
Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, while Company D, 82d 
Reconnaissance Battalion, captured the First Battalion, 103d Infantry 
Regiment, 43d Infantry Division. Headquarters IV Corps decided to 
commit the 4th Infantry Division (Motorized) to·the battle on the 
2d Armored Division's right flank, between the Broad River and 
U.S. Highway 215. This required that the 2d Armored shift the axis 
of its attack eastward. 
Patton halted the division for the evening, and resumed the 
offensive at 0600 the following morning. With the 4th Infantry 
Division (Motorized) attacking southwest, the 2d Armored Division was 
to attack southeast and east, hopefully-capturing-Columbia and trapping 
the enemy troops east of the city. The center column advanced so 
quickly and with such surprise, that it captured the commanding 
general of the 85th Infantry Brigade, along with 1,041 other officers 
and men. Meanwhile elements of the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion 
reached Columbia about 0900. The roads leading into the city were 
clear of enemy opposition and the 2d Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions 
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were ready to launch their attack on the objective when the exercise 
was halted at 0900. 13 The first exercise was a partial repeat of the 
Tennessee and· Louisiana maneuvers. The· tankers·· had ·moved quickly 
through a zone, then had their attack·corridor·held open by an 
infantry division on each flank. The introduction·of-the 4th Infantry 
Division permitted the tankers to swing wide around-the east flank 
of the city, rendering once again the nose and seat of the pants 
operation. The terrain was ideal for tanks, justifying their 
prophesy in Louisiana of waiting until the next maneuvers. 
The second corps exercise matched the I-Armored Corps (Blue) 
against the IV Corps (Red). This was to be the first time that 
the two trained armored divisions would participate in a maneuver 
together. As the scenario·was written, the Red·and Blue Armies 
were fighting in northwestern Carolina. Both had large forces east 
of the Broad River, attempting to envelop the flank·of the other. 
Movement west of the Broad River was permitted. A neutral state 
existed east of the Catawba River and both belligerents were to 
t "t 1· 14 respec 1 s neutra ity. 
The I Armored Corps camped north of Columbia, South Carolina, 
was to attack, seizing Chester, its railroad and railroad facilities, 
and then prepare to attack the rear of the Red Army. To accomplish 
this mission, Major General Scott decided to attack with three divisions 
abreast--the 1st Armored on the east, the 2d Armored on the west, and 
the 4th Infantry (Motorized) in the center. The route of attack was 
the same as it had been in the first exercise, except that the units 
15 
would be moving north, not south. 
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The 2d Armored would attack north in three columns. The force 
commander had been verbally instructed to send·reconnaissance and 
advance guard elements to the restraining·line; but·not to cross it 
until ordered to do so by the· division commander~ · At 2330 on 9 
November, Field Order Number 6 was issued; alerting·the division for 
possible employment any time after·1800 that day~ -The·column commanders 
were instructed to leave infantry detachments·· to· guard bridges in 
. . 16 
order to relieve the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion·of the task. 
The Armored Corps issued its attack order at 0630 on·lO November, 
but the message was delayed, not reaching the division headquarters 
until thirty-five minutes later. Initially, the two armored divisions 
were to lead the attack, but because-of the lack of roads there was a 
change in plans, and they were instructed to screen the-4th Infantry 
Division's zone until the 2d Armored passed through Lebanon and 
the 4th Infantry joined the attack. 
The 2d Armored Division started northward, meeting initial 
opposition about 0725, but progressed steadily; despite·problems from 
Jhe retreating Blue forces. One Blue combat team·caused a traffic 
jam at a bridge over Salem Creek and was·attacked by the·Red bombers. 
By 1215, the division was north of Lebanon, and was then ordered to 
clear the roads so that the 4th Infantry Division (Motorized) 
could enter the battle. When the infantrymen did join the fight, 
it freed one tank column to rejoin the division as its reserve. In 
the late after.noon the 107th Cavalry Regiment (Blue) attacked the 
division train (non-combat elements of the division), only to 
be driven off with the loss of two·troops·'(companies). During the 
night of 10-11 November, the division formed two·combat columns 
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instead of three, and the attack resumed·at·0630 the following 
morning. The enemy was retreating and·had no organized defenses. If 
the commanding general had correctly est·imated · the situation, the 
division's attack should gainspeed·aJll9·perhaps·end·the exercise 
17 ahead of schedule. 
'; t 
When the attack resumed, ·B Company; 4lst·Armored Infantry 
Regiment, stumbled onto a motor park containing·cargo--trucks, kitchen, 
and other miscellaneous vehicles belonging·· to a Blue· force artillery 
regiment. One squad captured the motor park guards. A Blue force 
artillery sergeant blew his whistle to rouse his men, and as they came 
out of their tents carrying their mess gear, they were promptly 
captured. The division attack gained momentum, and by noon the 2d 
Armored had captured its objective, twenty-four hours ahead of 
schedule. Patton was pleased. He issued a general order congratulating 
the men for their tireless work and then observed that the "2d Armored 
Division is prepared to acquit itself in the final maneuvers with the 
First Army so as to maintain indisputably its well-earned position as 
18 
"Second to None.'" 
The tankers were given a short rest while the maneuver rules 
were altered. These changes, whether intentionally·designed to handi-
cap the armored force or not, had that effect. The changes permitted 
the destruction of tanks with hand grenades, but mortar fire could 
not destroy antitank guns; also smoke could not·be used·by the armored 
force to cover its advance. To counter these changes, Major General 
Scott ordered the two armored division commanders to use their full 
firepower and to tell the umpires of the amount and types of weapons 
187 
fired. The tank forces were to move·· cross--country; hopefully avoid-
. . h d d d · k 19 ing mines, an grena es, an antitan guns. 
In the next exercise the tankers were·to·have·their·first lesson 
in military government.· The 2d Armored ·l)ivision·was to create a 
civil affairs section (G-5), to function in·the manner prescribed 
by the division commander and by the·War Depar·tment-'s-Field Manual 
27-5. Officers were to be appointed to oversee the··administration 
of public work~, utilities, fiscal affairs, ·public health·and safety, 
communications, and economics, and a judge advocate was to be appointed 
to administer laws.20 The only preclusion was that the military 
government would be simulated, not actually implemented. 
The General Headquarters directed phase of the·maneuvers promised 
to be the most satisfying for Patton personally. The I·· Armored Corps 
was attached to IV Corps, ·commanded·by·Major Generai·<:>scar·w. Griswold. 
, 
The First Army was to oppose this force. Its commander, Lieutenant 
General Hugh A. Drum, was a long-time personal enemy of Patton, and 
there was no love lost between the two men. If either man could pub-
21 licly embarrass theother, he would do so with pleasure. 
As the problem was drawn, the Wateree River formed the boundary 
between two states, with Red on the west bank, and Blue on the east 
bank. The Blue First Army was reportedly concentrating east of the 
Pee Dee River, getting ready to invade Red territory. They had 
established a bridgehead at Rockingham •. , To eliminate this threat, 
the Red I Armored Corps was ordered to attack, defeat all enemy forces, 
and cut Blue's lines of communications west of the Pee Dee River. 
The 2d Armored Division was to attack, capturing the west bank of the 
Pee Dee between Cheraw and Morven. 22 
After dark on 15 November, the division's three combat columns 
moved to concealed bivouac areas west of Great Falls and Camden and 
prepared to attack the following morning. The 82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion and the advance guard elements crossed the Wateree River 
shortly after 0630, while the main body waited for·the 1st Armored 
Division tp cross. By noon, all elements·of·the 2d·Armored were on 
the east bank of the Wateree, hurrying to join the·advanced guard. 
The attack began with one spectacular action~· Captain John H. 
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Huckins, commanding officer of D Company, 82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion, led a patrol to positions east of the·Pee Dee River looking 
for "big game." General Drum had been watching his troops cross 
the Pee Dee River, and was returning to his headquarters when he came 
upon a roadblock. His vehicle stopped, and the young captain greeted 
him with "Good Morning General. Will you join me." McNair was notified 
that his Army Commander had been captured; the umpires ordered the 
general released because he could not be returned to Red country. By 
evening, one column had reached Cheraw •. Part of the 41st Armored 
Infantry Regiment became separated from F-3, the attacking column, 
by a strong enemy attack from the direction of Society Hill. For 
the next forty hours a small force of light tanks, an infantry platoon, 
and an artillery battery, defended themselves·· and· the· 2d Armored' s 
flank from repeated attacks. That evening, Patton issued orders to 
withdraw to a line west of Pageland-Bethune and prepared· to resume the 
attack ei:ther to the east or the south on the·following morning. 23 
After the Cheraw bridghead had been reduced, the·4th Infantry 
.Division (Motorized) took over the defensive area. This permitted 
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the tankers to pull back to refuel· and· regroup; - ·· About midnight, 
Patton issued verbal orders to attackthe·next·morning· against Drum's 
left (south) flank and cut the supply and communication lines, and 
escape routes. If they were successful, the :Blue'Army would be 
trapped and ready to be reduced. In the first hours of the attack, 
a brigade command post, including a brigadier general-and two regi-
mental commanders and their staffs, were-captured~ :By'noon the town 
of Cheraw had been surrounded and within eight·hours·the·town and the 
water and power plants 0 had been captured and-prepared for·destruction. 
The main bridge over the Pee Dee River had·been·destroyed two hours 
earlier. After receiving orders to pull back to·defensible positions 
at 2000, supplies and utilities were destroyed. 24 
After a day of ~intenance and rest, the attack·resumed on 19 
November against the same south flank. The tankers made good progress 
until noon, when resistance began to stiffen near Chesterfield and 
Ruby. The 62d Infantry Regimental combat team, attacked to relieve 
the pressure on the division, but had to pull back in the face of a 
forest fire. In the late afternoon the division was again ordered 
to pull back to the area that it had occupied the evening of 18-19 
25 
November. The attack continued on the morning of November 20. 
The main area was shifted to the region between Pageland and Monroe 
in order to relieve Blue pressure on the 1st Armored-Division. Patton 
directed that the attack begin at 0900, but difficulties caused by the 
night withdrawal delayed one column's attack almost three hours. 
The second column attacked on schedule only to encounter massed antitank 
guns which slowed their attack. More--embarrassingly-the-4th Infantry 
Division (Motorized) attacked straight into the spearhead of the 2d 
I! 
Armored Division, causing considerable confusion on both sides. 
Action was halted at 1515 and the units were directed to pull back 
and regroup and attack the·following morning at·0600. Two and one-
26 
half hours later, at 0840 on 21 November, the·exercise was ended. 
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In the critique, Lieutenant General ·McNair ··stressed mobility and 
its related problems. The Red strategy had .been to-rush its armored 
and motorized divisions east·to protect the-homeland. ·The two slower 
square divisions were to follow and· relieve· the armored·· divisions for 
possbile counterattacks. This was a feasible plan, because the 
Blue Army had eight infantry divisions as compared· to·· five divisions 
in the Red Army. In addition, Blue created six antitank gun hunter 
groups, with a total of 764 guns, to attack the·tanks. In addition, 
the Blue force had over 3,500other antitank guns·and artillery if the 
hunter units were unable to stop the--tanks. · In·the·exercise, 983 
tanks were casualties; 91 percent of·these·were·ruled·out of action 
because of antitank gunfire. McNair acknowledged-that this might be 
' bl 1 d 1 d' · 27 a questiona e ass un er rea con 1t1ons. 
The umpires' manual gave the antitank guns victory over the tanks 
primarily because the gun was a small, concealable weapon. If the 
guns were not·concealed, or if surprised by a tank, then the tank 
should be the victor. Antitank guns could also be neutralized by 
artillery fire or captured by infantry. The tankers were unhappy 
with the rules and one was·heard to·say; "Why goddamit·[sic] we'd go 
so fast in a real war we'd squash those gunners before they could 
fire." Most tankers agreed with the Armored Force·commander, Major 
General Jacob L. Devers when he said, "We were·· licked by a set of 
umpires' rules. 1128 
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General Drum's remarks were· strangely s·i±-ent about his 
capture. He observed that a modern army'·needed··an·-armored force, 
medium bombers, and the darkness of night.··· Infantry could be 
successful against armor with night operations, anf he ·felt that they 
should be trained for these and permitted to·use·them during the 
maneuvers. However, to allow infantry ·to·· operate· against armor at 
night, was giving the infantry an unfair advantag·e·;Abecause tanks 
were not permitted to attack except during daylight hours, for safety 
reasons. Over 80 percent of Drum's First Army had not seen or taken 
part in tank operations, and they suffered initially from "tank fever." 
The men quickly learn~d that the tanks could be contained by antitank 
guns while the main attack continued. Local battle islands were created, 
and the tanks in those islands could be captured·or destroyed, especially 
if they were without infantry support. While these local tank fights 
were occurring the bulk of the army continued its·mission. To the Army 
· · 29 
Commander, this was "a main lesson of·themaneuvers." 
The IV Corps ·Commander disagreed with Drum's·main lesson. To 
him, the need for mobile infantry was acute. The armored divisions 
constantly requested more infantrymen, necessitating the use of every 
available soldier as infantry. The withdrawals of·the 2d Armored 
Division were caused by a shortage of foot soldiers to hold the ground 
taken by the tankers. He recommended that the Armored-corps organ:l-
zation be changed to include one motorized·infantry division, and that 
the armored divisions learn to better use their·infantry regiments. 30 
The final phase of the maneuvers·took_place on·25-28 November. 
Again, the 2d Armored was assigned to the Red I·Armored Corps, controlled 
by the Red IV Corps. The Blue forces were concentrated at Greensboro, 
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North Carolina. The Red Army was to actively defend its bridgehead 
over the Wateree River at Camden. To protect this bridgehead, the 2d 
Armored was to seize and hold the line from'Monroe to Wadesboro along 
U.S. Highway 74. 31 
The division assembled five miles south of-Ruby,-south Carolina, 
organized its three columns, and prepared··to'nrove~north on order. 
The problem started at 0630 on 25 November. As the columns moved 
north they encountered light but increasing resistance. By noon, 
when the division was almost to its objective, it discovered that it 
was opposing the II Corps advance. The 2d Armored's advance was 
stymied, and at one point D Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, 
found itself defending.against an attack by a tank and an infantry 
battalion. 32 The other divisional units were also facing the same 
type of increased pressure. 
Patton issued verbal orders to start withdrawing during the night. 
The withdrawal continued throughout the day against increasing Blue 
pressure. One column, F-2, was overrun and forced·out ·of its positions. 
On the right flank, ·a-gap occurred between F-2 and·an infantry regiment, 
but division artillery fire prevented Blue from using the gap. By 
nightfall the division had pulled back to positions south of Black 
Creek, or about the same positions from which it had started the 
attack the day before. The day's action had been costly. The first 
battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, had been surrounded and when 
the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, was sent to rescue them, 




During the night of 26 November, Columns F-2 ·:'and F-3 were combined 
into one (F-2) under the 2d Armored Brigade, commanded by Brigadier 
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General Willis D. Crittenberger. Orders were issued·to F-1 to attack 
north through Pageland, while F-2 was to move further west and then 
move north through Tradesville. This was an- attempt to get on the 
flank and into the rear areas of the Blue·force, causing.disruption 
to supply and communications lines, and'hopefully to turn the Blue 
force around and make them counterattack northward. 34 
Before F-1 could reach its line of dep·artare at 0600, it was 
attacked by Blue infantry and had to counterattack. However, by 0900 
F-1 had reached and secured Pageland against stiff resistance. It 
extended its forces northwest in time to break up an enemy attack so 
successfully that the.enemy had to retreat. F-2·was making progress 
on the left flank, but by noon Patton had to issue verbal withdrawal 
orders because the 1st Armored Division had encountered very stiff 
. d ld k . h h 2d A d D . . · 35 resistance an cou not eep pace wit t e rmore ivision. 
The 2d Armored was pulled out of the line and ordered to assemble 
north of Kershaw. It was to be under corps control and was ordered not 
to attack unless ordered by the Armored Corps. The 4th Infantry 
Division (Motorized) was to cover the division's withdrawal. However, 
because both the 4th Infantry and the 1st Armored were engaged in a 
heavy struggle and could not pull back on time, Patton had to 
cover the corps front during the night of 27--28·November. The 
division continued to pull back to positions just north of Camden on 
28 November. In McNair's judgment, the problem had been carried to 
completion, and he ended the exercise at 1628. 36 
McNair spoke of the men in his final critique. Their training 
was progressive from the individual, through various units, and 
finally to Army level. Noting that during World War I training had 
gone no further than division lefel, he felt that- the soldier of the 
1940's had improved his chances for survival and had improved the 
"prospect of American success. 1137 The training had-also physically 
conditioned the men, so that in the' direetor''s -otyinion they could 
march as far and as fast as the German footsoldier;· -He was building 
to answer a question that· reporters had ·repeate·d'iy asked during the 
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problem. "Are these troops ready for war?''- McNai:r provided an answer: 
"It is my judgment that, given complete- equipment:·;· they certainly 
could fight effectively. But it is to be added with emphasis that the 
losses would be unduly heavy, and the results of action against an 
adversary such as the Germans might not be all that could be desired. 1138 
He directed that the units return to their home stations to resume 
training and to attempt to raise the high standards even higher. 
Major General Griswald was more concerned that armor should learn 
to cooperate effectively as a team member and cease to operate inde-
pendently of the remainder of the corps. He thought that tanks and 
infantry should work more closely to reduce antitank defenses. These 
maneuvers convinced the IV Corps Commander that the tank, in addition 
to being an offensive weapon, could be valuable in defense or in 
fighting a delaying action. The presence-of tanks·in.Stilled caution 
. 39 
and delay even before they were committed to action. 
The division returned to Fort Benning; ·· The-·tanks; half-tracks, 
and artillery were sent by rail, while the wheeled vehicles made the 
354 mile march. in thirty-four h_ours, in one column on one road. 
Patton and his men had spent sixteen weeks in the field and were 
probably the most maneuvered unit in the Army. Paying tribute to 
the men, Patton issued General Order Number 67: 
You have completed six months of active field 
training under severe conditions. Through Tennessee, 
Louisiana, and Carolina maneuvers, you have acquitted 
yourselves individually and by units as soldiers. 
You were commended by the highest·andmost exper-
ienced officers in the Armyfor your appearance, 
your discipline, your soldierly'deportment, and 
your combat efficiency. By·every·test shorz of 
war you are·veterens~ ·Proteet·your record. O 
Patton used such words as "soldier" and· "veterans" sparingly and 
only in a complimentary fashion.··· ironically; his·order is dated 
6 December 1941, one day before the Japaneseattaek on·Fearl Harbor • 
....... , ·The· two questions, how ·to use an' armored force to repel an 
invasion, and how to stop tanks produced two different answers. 
To repel an invasion required aggressive action as in the General 
Headquarters exercises. The tanks would rush forward, denying the 
invader favorable terrain. Ideally, they would be supported by 
infantry, and the invader would be driven back across his border. 
That was a situation Americans did not face during World War II. 
195 
The 2d Armored Division, however, made two combat landings on foreign 
soil and was part of the second day landing group at Normandy. 
The question of the best means to defeat a tank is still a 
hotly debated issue. The maneuvers created the impression that tank 
hunter groups would be successful. It was ·a·false·impression which 
later caused many tank destroyer units in Europe to suffer high and 
unnecessary losses in men and material. Many tankers, then and now, 
think that the best antitank weapon is another tank. 
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CHAPTER IX 
PREPARATION FOR WAR 
The 2d Armored Division was one of the best trained units in 
the American Army as a result of the three large-scale exercises in 
1941. Many thought that the division was ready for war if it should 
come. However, Lieutenant General L. J. McNair had observed that the 
Army might suffer heavy losses and that the results might not be what 
the American people expected. When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor 
and Germany declared war on the United States, combat became a reality. 
Whether the Army was ready or not, the United States was now actively 
in the conflict and the various division commanders were faced with 
the task of readying their men for combat. 
After returning from Carolina, the 2d Armored Division resumed 
small unit tactics and underwent a fundamental reorganization. In 
December the Armored Force directed that. a tank destroyer battalion 
be activated at Fort Benning and that the men and equipment be furnished 
by the 2d Armored Division. Battery D, 78th Armored Artillery, was 
deactivated and the men and equipment were used to create the 702d 
Tank Destroyer Battalion.1 
The War Department also directed name changes, probably for 
uniformity, and General Order Number 3, from the 2d Armored Division, 
ordered these changes. For a year and a half, the units had been 
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and branch designation. Now, the word ''Armor" was to follow the number 
and come before the branch indication~ ·· The erder· also··directed that 
the 66th and 67th Armored Regiments drop the words "Light'' or "Medium" 
from their names. An indication of the thinking·was the designation 
of the 14th Field Artillery (Armored) as the 14th Armored Field 
Artillery Battalion, 105nnn Howitzer. The 14th Artillery was also 
changed from a regiment to a battalion. 2 
The same day, General Order Numbers 4 and 5 directed that the 
14th Quartermaster Battalion and the 17th Ordnance Battalions be 
deactivated and the personnel transferred to a newly created Main-
tenance Battalion, 2d Armored Division. To supervise this unit, the 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Armored Brigade, was deacti-
vated and the men used to activate the Trains Headquarters Company, a 
new unit that would oversee divisional supply and maintenance. 3 
The 92d Armored Artillery Battalion was activated on 8 January 
1942, its men coming from the 14th and 78th Armored Artillery 
Battalions. Deactivated that same day was the 68th Armored Regiment 
(Light). The War Department directed that the personnel, equipment, 
and property was to be disposed of as the 2d Armored Division commander 
directed. 4 Most of the men and equipment were transferred to the 66th 
and 67th Armored Regiments. 
The maneuvers had indicated that a reorganization was needed at 
the brigade level. During each exercise, attachments were made to 
the brigade; at no time had it fought as a brigade, but rather had been 
divided into combat teams. No one man could control the teams, so the 
brigade was eliminated and two combat commands were substituted for 
it. These were tactical headquarters that had only headquarters 
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personnel permanently attached. In combat, the division commander 
would be able to assign it the troops that he thought necessary. This 
assignment ability permitted the division and combat commanders to 
shape the command to the mission. By intention or by accident, the 
War Department and the Armored Force had created the main character-
istic of armor--flexibility. 5 
By the end of January 1942, the 2d Armored Division had taken its 
new shape. There were five major headquarters: Division, Combat 
Command A, Combat Command B, Division Artillery, and Division Trains. 
In the tank regiments were two medium tank battalions and one light 
tank battalion. The infantry regiment of the division had three 
battalions, and the three division artillery battalions had three 
firing batteries each for a total of fifty-four howitzers. The 
division reconnaissance battalion lost its infantry company, but it 
had three reconnaissance companies and a light tank company. The 
engineer battalion had four companies and a treadway bridge company. 
Altogether the division numbered 141,618 officers and men. 6 
During the maneuvers the 2d Armored Division had been experi-
menting with methods of employing the Air Corps in direct support of 
tanks and mobile units. A Bomber Demand Unit (modern day Forward 
Air Controller) had always been attached to the 82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion, and to each of the mission forces in the maneuvers. 
However, it was felt that too much time was required from the time 
that air support was requested until the planes were over the target. 
The time ranged from twenty minutes to three hours. The problems 
were technological; the best type of communications were telephone 
or teletype, both unsuitable for-armor. The solution, i.n the tank-
ers' opinion, would be radio which was later adopted. 7 
One of the arguments that had existed during the 1920's and 
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1930's was that armor could be ,used to secure and hold vital terrain 
features until conventional troops arrived to relieve them. Lieuten-
ant Colonel Sidney R. Hinds, after witnessing·an airborne demonstration 
at Fort Benning, decided that possibly paratroopers could be used to 
secure an objective and tanks could then be sent quickly to relieve 
them. Working with the 50lst Parachute Infantry Battalion, and using 
the bridge at Albany, Georgia, as their objective, this plan worked to 
perfection. However, when the 2d Armored Division tried to use this 
tactic during World War II, the paratroopers were not available, and 
the division was offered the excuse that it would require more time 
than was available to carry out the maneuver. 8 
While the division was undergoing reorganization, it was also 
getting a new commanding general. Major General George S. Patton, Jr., 
was assigned to command the I Armored Crops. Replacing him was Briga-
dier General Willis D. Crittenberger. Patton had planned to depart 
from the post without fanfare, but the men heard a rumor that he was 
leaving, and they lined the streets waving and cheering. Perhaps, 
because it was the first division which he commanded, perhaps be-
cause of the sendoff, or possibly because of later accomplishments, the 
2d Armored Division was always Patton's favorite armored division. 9 
After the reorganization period, the division settled into a 
routine of platoon and squad tactics. The company and battalion 
commanders tried to include every conceivable type situation that could 
be met on the battlefield. The men could feel the urgency; earlier in 
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1941, after returning from the Carolina exercises, Patton had told 
the assembled men that "this is the last time you will fight with 
blank ammunition. The next time we meet like this the bullets will 
10 
be real." On one of the overnight exercises, the new division 
commander was testing the perimeter defenses·of the various units. 
One company commander, Captain John K~. Waters, received a note, 
"Captain Waters; For the purpose of training, I have directed Captain 
(Lindsey) Harkness to enter your camp by stealth and hand you this 
note." It was signed by Crittenberger. Waters said that after that 
' h h' . d f · d l1 nig t, is perimeter e enses improve. 
In mid-1942, events were taking·place·which·would test the 
division and the men. In June, the Germans· pushed the British back 
from El Alamein, and there was a desperate need for reinforcements 
in Egypt. For a time, General Marshall thought of sending the 2d 
Armored Division either·alone;·or as part of a larger·force, to North 
Africa. This idea was abandoned in favor -of s·ending-every tank and 
self-propelled artillery piece from the division. 12 
The division was out in the field, te·sti:ng· the·0 new M-4 medium 
tanks (Shermans) and the M-7, 105mm self-propelled howitzers, 
whe~ Major General Devers called, directing the division to return 
to Fort Benning and prepare the tanks and the self-propelled howitzers 
for shipment to North Africa. Crittenberger and his personnel did 
as directed, but at the same time, Crittenberger sent·a message to 
Marshall requesting that the men be allowed to follow the equipment. 
This request was disapproved, mainly because the division was to have 
a part in Operation Torch; the western Task Force invasion of North 
Africa, but the men did not know it at the time. 13 
In addition to the equipment, Generals Marshall and Devers 
wanted to send some trained mechanics to maintain the equipment. 
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These mechanics were directed to send each part that needed replacement 
back to the United States for study to determine the reasons for its 
failure. Heading the maintenance and advisory group was Major General 
Charles L. Scott, former comm.anding general, 2d Armored Division. 
As the 1st Armored Division had already sailed· to·· Ireland, most of the 
men came from the 2d Armored Division. 14 
Devers sent Major Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., along with the group, 
as his personal representative. During the Battle of Libya, former 
2d Armored Division personnel, led by Major Lodge and Captain Charles 
Stelling, manned some of the American tanks and destroyed nine German 
tanks in perhaps the first real battle in which·2d Armored personnel 
participated. The American vehicles were hit several times, but 
not damaged, as the battle raged from 3,000 to 700 yards. Following 
the battle, the General Sherman tank was rated as the best tank in 
15 
the desert. 
The second major reason for having the Americans in the desert 
with the British was to study the tactical aspects of the war. Scott 
told Major General Ernest N. Harmon, comm.anding-general 2d Armored 
Division, that the British had the philosophy of stopping their move-
ment when the Germans came into sight and opening fire at long ranges. 
Since the German weapons had a longer range, the British were outgunned, 
wasted ammunition, and suffl!fed a heavier loss of vehicles. The 
solution as Scott saw it was to continue movement towards the enemy, 
reaching the effective range of friendly weapons before firing. 16 
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Although the British were trying to improve, ·their maintenance 
was weak, especially in training. The officers ·tended to delegate 
responsibility to the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers. 
However, the officers did lead in battle·and appeared to die with 
no concern at all. The British apparently had· no concept of air-
ground training. All they did was maneuver and fire. They were 
adding antitank guns and artillery to their armored brigades, and 
increasing the number of antitanks guns and artillery in the infantry 
brigade of their infantry divisions. Unfortunately, with these addi-
tions, there was little or no training between the new elements and 
the units that they were to support. Tank commanders were heard to 
boast of how they were going to stop and shoot it out, even with dug-
in antitank guns. If that happened, Scott predicted, the British 
would suffer even higher losses. His comments were factual and tainted 
with pessimism. However, he concluded that he found·nothing to warrant 
any major changes in American organization, equipment, tactics, or 
h . 17 tee niques. 
Scott continued to observe and to comment on what he saw. The 
British did not use their tanks, infantry, artillery, air, and antitank 
guns in any coordinated manner. This was a major failure and violated 
the basic training doctrines of American armor. The American equipment, 
contrary to press and radio·reports, wassuperior to that of the Germans. 
Therefore, according to Scott, the British situation had to be 
explained in different terms. Tactically, the Germans were superior 
to the British. Most of the British tank losses were due to the 88mm 
antitank-antiaircraft gun and by the British habit of fighting tank 
versus tank. The Germans avoided tank versus tank battles whenever 
207 
possible, using their tanks to go around flanks to attack nerve 
d d . . b' . 18 centers an to get to ec1s1ve o Ject1ves. 
Scott was optimistic when talking of·American equipment and 
organization. The antiaircraft armaments were· similar to the German 
arrangement and superior to the British. The Amerieans;;·however, did 
need to strengthen their organization by·adding dual purpose .50 
caliber and 37mm antitank-antiaircraft guns to their divisions. He 
further believed that the American divisions should have two antitank 
battalions attached to them as priority units. They should be three 
inch, self-propelled weapons. In addition, neither the Germans nor 
the British had armored personnel carriers for their infantry or 
artillery, and lacked self-propelled 88mm antiaircraft.weapons. 
Neither combatant had armored maintenance vehicles, and no assault 
guns in their tank or infantry battalions. The American light tank 
was rated as the most mechanically reliable and the fastest in the 
19 desert. 
To correct any possible deficiencies in maintenance, Scott 
recommended that the 2d Armored Division's Ordnance Battalion have 
nine reserve tanks to support the regiments when necessary. The 
ordnance personnel should be divided so as to be·able to give the 
maximum support to the regiments. He thought that any vehicle that 
had to go to the rear should not be·the division's responsibility. 
There should also be nine reserve tanks in the regimental maintenance 
section. Each maintenance company in the regiments should have some 
type of rescue vehicle, which should be armored and on a medium tank or 
lf 11 d ·11 ~ . 20 se -prope e art1 ery c~,ass1s. 
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The desert experience proved the theory false that a combat 
crew can fight all day and perform maintenance at night. The first 
echelon maintenance should be done by the company maintenance sections, 
which should not have any rescue vehicles-and should not be required to 
evacuate any vehicles to battalion or regiment. That should be the 
21 duty of the higher headquarters. Scott;;·in·passing along his 
observations, stressed those items which·he· thought-might-need improve-
ment, so that the Americans could stay alive. Having been in the 
mechanized brigade and having commanded an armored division, he had 
more than a passing interest in seeking improvements. 
·After sending· its· vehicles· and· a- d·etachment -of men to North 
Africa, the division received replacements and conditioned them for 
use. On 20 June 1941, the Armored Force issued instructions that 
any armored unit might expect overseas orders and·that they would 
"be prepared to execute these orders expeditiously and efficiently." 
The directive then stated that the units should inventory their equip-
ment, especially small items, tool·kits, and spare· parts. Training 
was secondary to preparation for movement. The units were to load 
their vehicles with the equipment that was assigned to it. 22 Since 
the 2d Armored Division was the most experienced division and the 1st 
Armored Division was in Ireland, the alert could only mean that the 
division was slated for deployment somewhere overseas. 
The 2d Armored Division was to take part in its last large 
scale maneuvers--the Carolina maneuvers of 1942.·· The division was 
to return to the same area that it had been in·in 1941. Speculation 
on the possibility of overseas movement increased when Crittenberger 
issued Special Order 160 on 29 June 1942, which stated that the 
division and the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion would depart for 
the main maneuver area about 7 to 8 July, and at the termination 
of the exercise, neither unit would return to Fort Benning. The 
new permanent station would be announced later. 23 
The division went to the maneuver area and for a month raced 
back and forth across the Pee Dee River, testing those ideas that 
were being sent back from the desert. Two essential improvements 
emerged from the exercises. First, communications·were perfected, 
for along with the new M-4 medium tanks came better radios. In 
addition, the division constructed wire lines to its bridgehead 
force, putting those units in direct and secure contact with the 
division. Second, it was the first time that the division had 
received large quantities of materials under field conditions. It 
proved the wisdom of the division emphasis on maintenance and supply 
24 procedures. 
During the Carolina maneuvers, Major General Crittenberger 
was transferred to command the III Armored Corps and Brigadier 
General Ernest N. Harmon assumed command of the 2d Armored Division. 
In spite of following three excellent commanders, Harmon knew that 
he could not lead the division into battle unless he was convinced 
that the men could do their jobs. He had questions that had to be 
answered: could the artillery fire accurately and rapidly, could 
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the tanks support each other, and could the infantry move with the 
tanks? He gave indications of his thinking to the division. Noting 
that although President Franklin D. Roosevelt had praised the division, 
Harmon asked the men to be realistic: "What in hell·does the President 
of the United States know about the 2d Armored? 1125 
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Following the maneuvers, the 2d Armored Division was assigned to 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and began training for a secret assignment. 
When the men moved into their new area, they suffered an epidemic 
of dysentery so severe as to possibly jeopardize·the·combat effective-
ness of the division. At one time it was questionable if it would 
take part in the North African operation, although at that time very 
few in command knew that the operation was in the planning stage. 
The reason or reasons for the epidemic are unknown.- The division 
had stayed in one bivouac area for an extended period during the height 
of the fly season and there were few, if any, sanitary conveniences. 
During this time there was a vigorous campaign to eliminate the flies 
and to control the disease. There were many inspections of kitchen 
sumps and latrines. On one such inspection, Major Thaddeus Coykendall 
and Captain William R. Grimes lowered a lantern into a latrine that 
someone had generously treated with diesel fuel and other combustible 
products. It blew up in their faces, causing injuries that prevented 
their sailing with the division in October 1942. 26 
Training began to intensify for the 2d Armored Division. There 
were long road marches, obstacle courses, and a·new device--a rope 
ladder- which was hung about twenty-five feet high between two pine 
trees. It was easy to climb·, and the novelty of it added to the 
course. In addition to the physical conditioning, the men resumed 
weapons training and firing, and were expected to qualify with their 
individual weapons. They also fired their vehicular weapons. This 
was probably the most intensive and effective training that the 
27 
division had undergone in such a short time. 
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Patton was assigned the command of·the·Western-Task Force on 
24 August 1942. A few days later, Major General Harmon was called to 
Washington to meet with Patton and General Marshall. Patton greeted 
Harmon with the question, "Do you want to· go to war?''· Harmon replied, 
"Sure, when do we start?" Thus the 2d Armored·Dt~ision was connnitted 
to the landing in North Africa in a somewhat casual manner. 28 
In late August or early September, the landing teams were formed 
and began to receive intensified training. The general plan was to 
have three landing teams, each with elements·of"the 2d Armored 
Division. Usually the team would have two light·tank companies, an 
armored infantry company, an artillery battery, two engineer platoons, 
and a reconnaissance platoon. The landing teams were separated from 
the remainder of the division, not to be reuniteduntil Christmas 
29 Day. 
While th.e division was undergoing its training, it began to re-
ceive new equipment, such as gasoline-powered tanks, and advice from 
the African front. When the division received its new tanks, it had 
to turn in the old diesel-powered ones. ·These had·to be in proper 
shape, and even had to be painted, all of which took time that the 
division did not have. The question of half-tracks-came up, and 
for a time it appeared that the infantrymen were on the verge of losing 
their personnel carriers, because the rear idler spindle was fixed in 
place and could not bend or give when moving over rough terrain. 
First Lieutenant Thomas Hauss and Master Sergeant Gerry Noble came 
up with a scheme to replace the fixed idler with an eyebolt and nut, 
and a coil spring from a caterpillar tractor. Colonel Sidney R. 
Hinds personally paid for the items and directed that it be tested 
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and that he be informed of the results. It was successful. Hinds 
took the idea to the Division Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Fred Crabb, who took the suggestion to Major General Harmon. Harmon 
quickly approved it and had the ordnance section buy the modification 
parts and install the device on all the half'""-tracks·that were slated 
for North Africa. 30 
Meanwhile, Major General Scott passed along·to Patton advice 
based on his observations in North Africa: when terrain permitted, 
tanks should lead their infantry; against antitank fire or direct 
artillery fire, tanks should lead with artillery fire, infantry, 
machine guns, and aviation. All the tanks should be marked alike so 
that the enemy could not tell the officers' tanks from the others; 
thus dummy antenna masts should be installed on all tanks. He urged 
making night attacks by illuminating the targets and then firing 
all fire direct, which usually resulted in a massacre. 31 
In September, the assault teams were separated from the remainder 
of the division and began to undergo "amphibious 11 training at Mott 
Lake on the Fort Bragg reservation. All the time Harmon kept stressing 
that the training would save lives. The practice landings, the esta-
blishing of beachheads, and dawn assaults were exactly what was planned 
for the North African venture. The training was good and worth the 
effort. The troops, who were not told of·the actual plans, knew that 
something was about to take place. 32 
The combat team from the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 
went to Camp Pickett, Virginia, was assigned to the 3d Infantry 
Division, and missed the severe epidemic of diarrhea that hit the 
rest of the 2d Armored Division. At Camp Pickett, the men found that 
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all preparations, equipment, and personnel matters had to be kept 
up to date. With all the work to be done, extra·supply personnel 
were brought in to supplement the men of the 2d Armored. By working 
night and day, by begging, borrowing, and sGlll.etimes·using extra-legal 
means, the work was completed and the unit was ready to sail with the 
convoy. Life at Camp Pickett was not the most pleasant, however. 
The camp site itself had been turned into a bog·of·mud by two weeks 
of rain. The men came under the command of Major General Jonathan 
W. Anderson, commanding general,- 3d Infantry Division, and the post 
facilities were· fer the·post· personnelonly;····The· tankers were forced 
to use the facilities of the 3d Infantry Division for movi·es and beer, 
all adding to the crowded conditions. There were few roGlll.s for families 
to visit, and there was even less time to see-the families. The men 
realized that the time was nearing for departure. 33 
The landing team and the infantry began to practice amphibious 
· landings, loadings, and unloadings in the Chesapeake Bay, Little 
Creek, and Solomon Island in October 1942. Once the training began, 
deficiencies in organization, training, planning, and technique 
became known. One ship captain refused··to·participate because he 
claimed that his crew was untrained. The-Navy (Rear·Admiral Henry K. 
Hewitt) issued orders that landings would be limited to one small 
beach for fear of damaging the boats' propellers. Because of that 
edict, the landing teams could only unload their infantry and no 
vehicles. Originally, no night rehearsals·were·penn.itted by order of 
Major General Patton. Hewitt changed the order to permit night 
landing practice, but sailing orders were receive4, and the teams had 
only one or two night landing exercises. 34 
While the divisienal combat teams were training, other members 
of the division went to Transport Quartermaster· Sc·ho·ol· at Norfolk, 
Virginia, to learn combat loading: the·predetermined loading of 
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men, vehicles, and supplies so that they could·· be put ashore in the 
proper sequence. The original plan was to have the vehicles and their 
crews on the same ship. Due to a shortage of shipping, however, 
the vehicles and drivers sailed on the same ship, but the crews went 
on different ships. At the schools and even while loading, there 
were two views that had to be reconciled. The Army·wanted to carry 
as much as possible; the Navy thought that the men should carry the 
minimum and that the heavy supplies and equipment should follow in 
35 
a later convoy. 
In early September, TORCH took final form~ ·The·Western Task 
Force under Rear Admiral Hewitt and Major General Patton was supposed 
to capture Casablanca and Port Lyautey. The task force was actually 
composed of three sub-task forces, each assigned·a separate and 
distinct mission. The Northern Attack Group was to-land and capture 
Port Lyautey and the airport. The Center Attack Group was to land at 
Fedala. The Southern Attack Group was to land at· Safi, secure that 
port, block reinforcements from the south and then aid the center 
group in capturing Casablanca. H/armon pointed out that only those 
persons who had a direct need to know the desti~ation and objectives 
be told. In the 2d Armored Division, the information went to Colonel 
Maurice Rose, Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence R. Dewey, 
G-3, and of course, Harmon. These men were the only·ones to have the 
full details until the convoy had actually sailed. 36 
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In early October 1942, there was a noticeable increase in the 
tempo of preparations. The War Department directed that only those 
items necessary for housekeeping and messing would be taken. The 
remainder would be marked for shipment and turned into·the local post 
commanders for shipment later. About 12,000-·men·and·two-thirds of 
the vehicles would remain behind with Brigadier General Allan Kingman, 
commanding general, Combat Command A. While the remaining men were 
trying to ready themselves, Harmon was worrying about losing trained 
men to Officer Candidate School. About 3,500 men had taken and 
passed the test, and based on past experience, about 1,000 of those 
would be selected to attend. It would hurt the mission forces if 
any of the selected men were taken out of those forces, and it would 
hurt morale if one out of every fifteen men in the· division was 
taken from it at this time. Harmon told Devers that it would be 
"a terrible thing to take leaders away." Devers' reply was for Harmon 
not to worry about the 2d Armored Division, and that the men would 
deliver when they had to. There was no mention of the Officer Candi-
date School question that prompted Harmon to write in the first place. 37 
After all these problems, the assault teamswent to Norfolk and 
entered the dress rehearsal phase of training -in"·the Chesapeake Bay. 
Harmon was concerned about the men unloading into·assault boats, 
forming into assault waves; and landing. During on·e exercise and with 
a light house beacon on, only one boat landed at its assigned place--
Harmon's. While he had landed at the-designated place, he was in the 
first wave, instead of in the third wave, where he was supposed to 
be. The remainder of the men were scattered·, and it required about 
twelve hours to reassemble them. This was directly traceable to the 
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inexperience of the Navy personnel·· involved·.· As if that were not bad 
enough, the training exercises indicated that the chain cargo nets 
were unsatisfactory and the division had to get·rope ones from Fort 
38 
Bragg. 
The 2d Armored Division was ordered to send one element to the 
New York Port of Embarkation to load its equipment. The trains were 
loaded at Fort Bragg so that the loading· could be·done easily. The 
first vehicles onto the ships would be the last ones to come off. 
While enroute one flat car struck a bridge. It did not suffer 
serious damage, but had to be taken to a repair shop, and this 
threatened to delay the loading. To expedite matters, Colonel I. D. 
White personnally called a vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad 
to get priority treatment. As it was, the train was twenty-four 
hours late arriving in New York. 39 
At Fort Bragg, the 2d Armored Division had made·efforts to water-
proof their vehicles, primarily be covering·them with a thick layer 
of grease. At the port, where there were experts todo the job, the 
men had to remove the grease which they had used so generously. This 
only added to the frustrations that were setting in on the command. 40 
The ship, the Seatrain, or properly, the U.S·.s~ Lakehurst, was 
not very impressive. Having recently been a ferry between Florida and 
Cuba, it was without bulkheads or compartments. There was no way to 
block off damaged compartments in the event of being hit by shell 
fire or torpedoes. White remembered the ship's captain telling him 
that if the ship were hit it would probably sink in five minutes, 
if it did not explode because of the large amount of gasoline and 
ammunition that it carried: 175,000 gallons of gas in five gallon 
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cans, and nearly 4,000,000 rounds of annnunition, mines, and grenades. 
In addition, the Seatrain was to carry 13,870 gallons of SAE 30 and 50 
weight oil in quart cans. 41 
Before loading the vehicles, the men had to load·the bulk items. 
The gasoline cans needed to be inspected·· to· be·· sure that they were not 
leaking.· · They were stacked one on top·-of another'"and' probably did leak 
once the ship was under way. Next·· to· the·'·engine· room,-· the men stored 
the annnunition and the rations for thirty days. Vehicle loading was 
a problem, created by the New York Port authorities and the railroad. 
White had planned to move the flat cars alongside the ship and then 
unload them, but the railroad thought differently. When one car was 
unloaded, it was pulled out, the train respotted, and the next car 
unloaded, a time consuming and unnecessary method. When about half 
of the vehicles were loaded it became apparent that the ship could 
not hold them all. A decision was made to cut·the rations by about 
50 percent to make room for the vehicles. In order to insure a 
balanced diet, the men had to call several different quartermaster 
units to determine the contents of the ration boxes, because the 
boxes were not labeled. Somehow the·division managed to cut !ts 
food supply by about half and still maintain a balanced diet. 42 
The rules at the port were strict about ammunition. The port 
officials originally would not permit the combat·loading of ammuni-
tion in the tanks and other vehicles. That would have to wait until 
the ship was at sea. If the division had been held·to·this policy, 
it would have been difficult if not impossible toaccomplish while at 
sea. After much delay, the division was granted permission to load the 
ammunition in the vehicles. As the day for sailing neared, plenty of 
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work remained to be done. It was diffieult' to get'· eiviiians to work 
around the clock, and while the command had a company of military 
engineers for unloading, union rules prevented using·military labor 
to load ships. White and his men were concerned;' fearing that they 
might not go because the ship was not ready-~ When the ship was 
finally loaded, it was angled down four feet at the·bow; This situa-
tion was corrected by shifting fueloil andby·ioading·medium tanks 
on the_stern's upper deck. Some half-tracks that mounted 37mm and 
twin .SO caliber antiaircraft guns wereplaeed·onthe top deck for 
. . f . 43 antiaircra t protection. 
After the Seatrain was loaµed and ready to sail to Hampton 
Roads to join the fleet, the ship's captain announced that they would 
sail unescorted, except for a blimp the might be over them during 
daylight hours. White called Harmon, Harmon called Patton, and 
Patton called who knows, but the Seatrain received·a two destroyer 
escort. A few days after the vessel sailed, the harbor of New York 
was closed because of mines sown by a German submarine. 44 
At Hampton Roads and Norfolk, the loading of men and equipment 
was progressing smoothly. The headquarters of Blackstone, Harmon's 
code name, was aboard the U.S.S. Harris. On the morning of 19 October 
1942, the ships sailed out to Solomon Island, enabling·the men to get 
one last practice at landing from combat vessels. On 22 October they 
had their first abandon ship drill. The men were confined to ship, 
and about midnight on the 23rd, the convoy weighed anchor and headed 
to sea. When the men woke the next morning and went on deck they 
saw the convoy with its destroyer escorts all around them. As the 
2d Armored's Catholic chaplain noted, the destroyers were a very 
comforting thing to view.45 
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Patton had warned the division earlier that the day would come 
when they would be using live ammunition. The men were now on their 
way to war with the destination still unknown to all but a few. 
They could and did ask themselves if they had~trained properly: 
had they learned the lessons that the officers and the maneuvers had 
been designed to teach? The 2d Armored· ·Division'was one of the best 
trained units in the Army, but· their opposition·had been their friends 
and brother units until now. The enemy would be real and·the ammuni-
tion would be live. 
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CHAPTER X 
OPERATION TORCH: THE INVASION OF NORTH AFRICA 
During the Arcadia Conference in December 1941, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed that 
an invasion was necessary to bring the United States into the war. 
The President favored an attack on the European mainland, while the 
Prime Minister favored either North Africaor Norway,"in order to 
build a ring around the Nazis, relieve the pressure on the Russians, 
and ease the pressure on the British, primarilyin Libya and Egypt. 
The Americans and British vacillated until 25·July 1943, at which time 
the President committed the United Statesto Opera.tion TORCH. 1 
The outline of the plan was completed about 6 September. The 
assault was to occur simultaneously at three places~ One group was 
to capture Casablanca, one was to capture the deep water port at 
Safi, and one was to land at Port Lyautey to capture the airfield. 
Patton estimated that the forces needed would be considerable. In 
order to capture the airfield, he thought' that two infantry battalion 
combat teams and a reinforced armored battalion would'be necessary. 
The main landing at Fedala would require a division (minus one regi-
mental combat team), reinforced with an armoredregimental combat 
team. At Safi the forces were to be aff infantry· battalion combat 
team, one armored battalion combat team and a floating reserve of one 
regimental combat team. TORCH was one of the biggest-gambles of the 
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war, and the largest operation to date. Success depended to a great 
extent on political rather than military considerations. There was 
to be no preliminary bombardment or other preparatory barrage. The 
assault forces would start ashore, hoping they did not meet any 
resistance. The landing on the Atlantic Ocean side of French North 
Africa was to be strictly an American venture, while those on the 
Mediterranean Coast, at Oran and Algiers; were to be in partnership 
with the British. 2 
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The Western Task force, under the command -- of· Maj·or General Patton, 
sailed from the United States on 23 October 1942. The convoy numbered 
over 100 ships, with about 35,000 men and 149,000·tons of supplies 
(enough for thirty days). The task forces were built around the 3d 
Infantry Division,most of the 9th Infantry·Division, and the 2d 
Armored Division. During the crossing, the troopsdrilled for hours, 
climbing down rope ladders and landing nets. The officers and non-
commissioned officers studied maps and other information~ The landing 
teams drilled on their specific assignments, so that each man knew his 
mission and what was expected of him. Because of·the problems exper-
ienced during the practice landings, Harmon had maps of the Safi area 
painted on the walls of the ward rooms, and the men memorized the 
terrain features. Harmon also decided that in future operations every 
man "down to the lowest private would be briefed on-the battle plans. 113 
Besides the tactical assignments, the men learned to fire the 
new bazooka. No one in the task forces had seen this new antitank 
weapon until they were at sea. The Army taught the Navy how to use 
the .30 caliber antiaircraft machine guns. Classes were conducted 
in the recognition and avoidance of·booby traps, the customs of the 
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Moslems, camouflage, naval -weapons·, first· aid·,· identification of 
aircraft and armored vehicles, signal·training,·and·proper conduct if 
captured. Each day the men took part· in"-ab-andon··ship and general 
quarters drills. Chaplain Urban J. Wurm ·noted that· the·· men understood 
the gravity of the situation, and that they were·engaged·in a serious 
undertaking. They were told of their·destination·while at sea. 
Wurm was pleased that Patton had beenselected·to command the 
task force. He noted that Patton ''knows hi-s··men; and···whose men know 
him; in knowing him love him, in lov:Lng him will· follow him--Anywhere. 114 
The.convoy elements did not all sail· together, and on 27 October, 
the Y force, which had sailed from· New York, joined the convoy. Led 
by the cruiser U.S.S. Augusta, it included the·carrier·rr.s.s. Ranger 
with approximately ninety planes. The fighting· force was·an impressive 
spectacle to behold. Hopefully the men would·not·have to·hurt anyone, 
but if the coded phrase, "play ball" was passed then there was going 
to be "some gore." Two days later,··theU·.s.s-~·Calvert, joined the 
convoy; on board th~Calvert was Brigadier General Hugh J. Gaffey, 
commanding general, Combat Command B. The submarine threat was a 
constant worry. 'During the voyage, the Navy conducted fire, collision, 
and abandon ship drills, and on 30 October,·· three· days · after Y force 
joined them, the convoy experienced its·first submarine activity, 
but none were actually sighted. Three days later;·they were in the 
midst of a submarine wolf pack and rumors were circulating that a U-
boat had been sunk that morning. However, the convoy-lost no ships to 
submarines on its journey.s 
The French Moroccan coast had almost unlimited sites for amphi-
bious landings; generally the beaches had suitable gradients, fair 
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exits from the beaches, and few obstacles to landing craft. However, 
the exits were sandy, which could be a problem for wheeled vehicles. 
The major hazards were the surf, heavy swells, and strong winds. The 
weather men predicted only one or twodays of acceptable landing 
conditions, which would necessitate rapid landings on a wide front. 
Because there were no navigable rivers to any extent and few capes and 
headlands, obtaining control of the three ports of Safi, Casablanca, 
and Port Lyautey was essential to the allied force; The Navy planned 
to arrive in position by midnight on 7 November -- and spend four hours 
unloading the vessels, with the attack scheduled to take place at 0400 
on 8 November. Initially, the landing teams would have to depend on 
Naval air support until they captured the airfields, enabling them 
to have land-based aircraft support. The Port Lyautey convoy was 
late in arriving at its destination. It should·havebeen on station 
at 2300, but did not arrive until 0300 on 8 November. H-Hour was 
initially changed from 0400 to 0430, but that also proved too early. 6 
The battle for North Africa opened in a most unorthodox manner. 
The President of the United States announced to the people of French 
Morocco that the Army was coming. His message stressed historic 
.American and French ties. The United States and Great Britain were 
striving to restore ideals, liberties, and democracy to those living 
under the Tri-Color. The Allies were attempting to restore the right 
of self-government, the right of religious freedom, and the right to 
live as one pleased. The Americans came to destroy the enemy and 
would leave when the job was done. Concluding, he added, "I am 
appealing to your sense of realism, self-interests, and ideals. Do 
not obstruct this great purpose. Help us and the day of a world of 
peace will be hastened. 117 
The British and American governments issued a joint declaration 
stating that the landings were the first step in the liberation of 
France. The immediate objective was the isolation and destruction 
of the Germans in North Africa. The Allies were-there-as friends; 
French sovereignty-remained unaffected. They also cautioned the 
French in France not to do anything yet, for the-· time was not yet 
8 for them to rise up, 
Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower's proclamation said the 
same; the Allies came as friends to defeat the Italians and the 
Germans, and had no designs on French territory. The Allies would 
take no offensive action against the French if they did not resist 
the landings. If the French wanted to comply with the directions 
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and not resist, they were to fly two Tri-Colors or a Tri-Color and an 
American flag one above the other during the daylight hours. At 
night, searchlights were to be vertical, towards-the sky. Orders 
were issued for the French navy and merchant marine to stay in port 
and not to scuttle their vessels. The coast guard units were to 
withdraw from their stations and not to man the guns, and aviation 
units were to keep their planes on the ground. All Frenchmen were 
to obey the orders of American officers. 9 
The original plan was for the President's message to-be broadcast 
simultaneously with the three landings; Oran, Algiers, and the 
western ones. The message was sent out-at 0300 in order not to 
hazard the two Mediterranean landings, but as it turned out that was 
actually one hour ahead of the Western Task Force landing time. 
Brigadier General Lucian Truscott, commanding general, 9th Infantry 
' I 
Division, observed that due to the premature broadcast, "if the 
French were not waiting beside their guns, we would indeed be 
lucky. 1110 
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Task Force Goalpost was to seize, stock, and maintain the airport 
at Lyautey and Sale, and cover the northern flank··of · the· entire opera-
tion. It was the smallest of the three task·forces and, in some 
respects, had the most difficult time. It was to be·the first tank 
fight in which elements of the 2d Armored-Ilivis·ion participated. To 
carry out his assignment, Truscott had·the 66th·Regimental·Combat Team, 
commanded by Colonel Frederic J. de Rohan from the-9th Infantry Divi-
sion, and the First Battalion Combat Team, 66th Armored Regiment, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Semmes. Both units were in 
excellent condition, the staffs well organized, the units at almost 
full strength, and both had received some amphibious training. 
The planners thought that the French would be defending the 
Port Lyautey area with a regiment of infantry (3,080 men), twelve 
antitank guns, artillery, and engineers. Reinforcements, which would 
be available from the Spanish Moroccan border towns Meknes and Rabat, 
included two regiments of infantry, a battalion of tanks (forty-five) 
and 1,200 mechanized cavalrymen. All could be brought to Lyautey 
anywhere from D+l to D+4. Consideration of possible enemy reactions 
to the landings required that the Americans get their tanks and anti-
tank guns ashore as quickly as possible. ·Unknown to· the Americans, 
there were two opinions among French officers. One group wanted to 
carry out orders regardless, while the other did not want to fight 
the Allies. Comm.anders in the threat~ned area had authority to open 
fire on their own initiative, so when the attack came, they did not 
have to wait for the French government to grant permission. 11 
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The original planning for the Port Lyautey landings·included two 
plans. In Plan A the Americans were to land south of the airport, 
then move onto the field as a unit. Its advantage · lay in its simpli-
city. The disadvantage was that the invading force-was about the same 
strength as the enemy. It was thought·that it~woo·ld·require most of 
the first day for the troops to land and assemble-;· and bad weather 
could prevent the landing of other troops~ In PlanB,·the Americans 
would land in several different locations and··advance on the airport 
from different directions. The advantage·was speed·and surprise of 
attack, and the ability to get men and material·ashore as quickly as 
possible. The major disadvantage was that the Americans would not have 
a superiority of troops at any point and there would be few troop 
reserves. Since the basic factor was the weather, Truscott adopted 
Plan B. 12 
While the men were loading into their assault craft, five French 
vessels sailed past the American ships. One flashed a message which 
read, "Be aware. Alert on shore for 5 a.m." It simply confirmed that 
the task force had failed to surprise the French and that the Presi-
d ' hd h d h F hd '' · l3 ent s message a not.c ange t e renc ec1s1on to resist. The 
armor landing team was to land inside the breakwater at Port Lyautey, 
on the order of the force commander, beginning abuut 0750.· Its mission 
was to assemble, ane' protect the south against0·any· enemy approaching 
from that direction. As the reserve force, it was to be· ready to aid 
in the attacks to secure the airports at PortLyaotey;· Rabat-Sale, and 
Sibi-Yahia, and the radio station at Rabat-Sale. · To aid the Armored 
Battalion, one reinforced infantry company from the 3d Battalion 
Landing Team would be available in a reserve role. · The Third Armored 
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Landing Team personnel were on the John Penn, while·the light tanks were 
on the Electra. The Armored Battalion·was·to·land-as quickly as 
possible after daylight and after·the infantry assault battalions. 
Lieutenant Colonel Harry Semmes, commander· of the 3d Armored 
Landing Team, almost did not get to·go to··North Africa, because he 
was overage for his rank. He had appealed to Pattonp-ersonally, and 
the general decided to take him because of his·· personal loyalty and 
· 18 
because he had served with him in Franc'e during·World War I. 
The surf, rather than French resistance;,·hampered Truscott's 
landing. Three of the landing craft bringing·the"armor ashore 
were swamped, and a light tank, a half-track, and a scout car were lost, 
but the crews escaped injury~ By nightfall, ·the ·tankers had six or 
seven tanks ashore. Semmes was ordered to the south flank and to take 
command of the infantry and antitank units that were there. He went 
into position about a mile south of the lagoon, and the next morning 
had the privilege of fighting the initial 2d Armored Division action of 
the war. On D+l, 9 November, Semmes had his tanks in position to 
oppose any threat from the south. About 0430, fourteen French tanks 
were seen moving north along the Rabat-Port Lyautey road. Pulling 
back to defilade positions behind a low ridge, the Americans opened 
fire when the approaching tanks came within·range. The French retreated 
to a eucalyptus grove, which the Navy shelled, driving·the-·French away. 
Samuel Eliot Morison incorrectly credited the·Navy with breaking up 
that attack, when in fact, it was the small armored·force·that initially 
15 repulsed the French. 
Semmes and his command had their problems. Before leaving the 
United States, they had been issued new radios, but did not have time 
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to calibrate them. While at sea, thecommand·was under·radio silence 
and therefore could not properly care for them~ · ·Moreover the tank 
guns were not bore-sighted (the telescopic .. sight aligned 
parallel to the axis of the main gun), and the·men were·forced to use 
the trial and error method· of aiming:~·-·After··repuhdng··the-·first threat 
to the beachhead, Semmes' small f-orc·e· had· about an-·hour's rest before 
fighting off an infantry attack, at about 0600·~ ·.After routing the 
infantry, the Americans were attacked a second··time··by tanks. The old 
French Renaults were repulsed, and the French ·--lost four· tanks. Se~es 
accounted for two of them himself. ·The-French gunnery had·been accurate, 
as attested to by the two shells imbedded in the front slope armor 
of Semmes' tanks. 16 
The tempo of the action. increased; about 0815, while observing 
the naval gunfire rout the French from the grove of trees, the armored 
group received some reinforcements. About ten tanks from Company C, 
70th Tank Battalion, arrived to aid the 2d Armored Division take on 
about thirty-two French tanks at 0900. The French were attempting 
to reach the American beachhead. The American tanks counterattacked, 
driving the French three miles inland and forcing them to abandon 
twenty-four of their tanks. After this fight ended at about 1500, 
Company C of the 70th Tank Battalion was detached and ordered to help 
the infantry in its attempt to take the airfield~-- Semmes, meanwhile, 
had been reinforced with Cannon Company, 60th Infantry Regiment. 17 
Truscott made repeated appeals for supplies and equipment, but 
the surf, rated as only-moderate, hampered unloadi.ng. ·-The losses in 
landing craft were high; 70 of the available 162 boats had been damaged 
or destroyed. During the night, nine additional·tanks, a platoon of 
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the 443d Coast Artillery (antiaircraft artillery), and the reconnaissance 
platoon joined their parent units at the south endof the lagoon. To 
add to the misery, t::ain began during the night and···continued during 
most of the next day. However, the· d-e-fenders·were in position and 
18 
ready for whatever the French might try on·lO November. 
The next morning the French continued··their attempt to relieve 
the Port Lyautey garrison. About 1100 the reconnaissance platoon 
spotted twenty French tanks moving north on the Rabat""-Port Lyautey 
road. Six American tanks and two assault guns from Cannon Company 
went into the woods east of that road, while the remainder of the 
American force stayed in their positions. The French sent six tanks 
into the woods to flush out the Americans while the remainder of the 
French continued northward. The French tanks which had gone into the 
woods were fired on by the Americans and they quickly withdrew. The 
Navy placed heavy gunfire on the French, who pulled back, losing seven 
t k th t 1 f . d f ·to an·ti•tank fi·re. 19 more ans: ree o nava gun ire an our 
Semmes and his small force were solidly astride the road the 
French needed to resupply their garrison. About 1600 that afternoon, 
a task force of four tanks was sent into the valley northeast (towards 
Port Lyautey) looking for enemy cavalry troops. They found none, but 
did make contact with the First Battalion Combat Team from the 60th 
Infantry Regiment; this contact encircled the French, making their 
positions untenable. About 2300 on 10 November, the Americans received 
a message that the French wanted to discuss ways and means of ending 
hostilities. At 0200 on 11 November, the Americans were informed that 
the French commander, Major General Mathenet, had ordered the French 
resistance to halt and a meeting was arranged for 0800 the same 
234 
morning. Semmes and a company of light· tanks·· accompanied- Truscott to 
the meeting with the French commander·,·· to· "-lend· -something· of military 
display to the event." Major General Mathenetrevea:le-d that he had 
been ordered to end the· fighting, p·ending· -deei.-si-ons· of h±gher headquar-
ters. The local terms were favorable to·· both·the··Americans and the 
ever-sensitive French. The Americans were··to·· ottupy the port and the 
airport, but would not interfere with the French if·they did not 
interfere with the Americans. The French had re·sisted· the landing and 
fought well, inflicting over 200 casualties on the Americans; but their 
zeal declined as the battle continued. With their inability to resupply 
the garrison, caused primarily by the tanks of the 2d Armored Division, 
the French were, as one participant so bluntly stated, ''firing their 
shot for honor. 1120 
The Western Task Force's major objective was Fedala, from which 
it planned to assault the rear of Casablanca. A direct assault was 
considered to be too costly; especially against such well defended 
positions. Patton's letter of instruction to Harmon· said that the 
initial mission of the Western Task Force· was to assault and capture 
Casablanca and the nearby airport; and thenifnecessary to build a 
strike force to secure Spanish Morocco. The second step would be the 
occupation of French Mor?cco in conjunction with the Center Task 
Force that had landed at Oran. 21 
The French garrison at Fedala was estimated to·be approximately 
2,500 men; however, an estimated 6,500 reinforcements were available 
to aid the defenders. Formidable defenses opposed the landing force. 
In the Batterie du Port were three lOOmm guns which faced north-
westerly but could be turned to fire on the center beach. A battery 
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of two fixed 75nnn guns could be brought to bear on several of the beaches. 
The Batterie Pont Blondin, four 138.6nnn with a range ·O'f'"l8,000 yards, 
were in sunken emplacement. These major shore· def·ense·· positions were 
defended by machine gun emplacements and by· mobile,·-batteries of 75nnn 
artillery in unknown locations.22 
Brushwood, code name for the Fedala landing,·was·assigned to the 
3d Infantry Division, connnanded by Maj·or General·-·J·onathan·w. Anderson, 
and the Armored Landing Team built around the Firs·t Battalion, 67th 
Armored Regiment, commanded by Major Richard·E. Nelson. This group 
had a combined strength of 19,783 officers and men·and seventy-seven 
light tanks. Their objectives were Fedala and Casablanca, fifteen 
miles south of the landing· -sites .. ~ Casablancfl, considered the key to 
liberating French North Africa, had a deep water port which could 
serve as the main supply port for any Allied venture in western Africa. 23 
Most of the tankers made the Atlantic crossing on the Biddle, 
along with about a third ofi ·their vehicles, while most of the vehicles 
and about 100 men crossed on the Arcturus. Initially, Anderson 
planned to land two infantry regimental combat teams, keeping one 
infantry regiment and the armored landing team in floating reserve. 
The armor was scheduled to land approxima·tely three··hours after the 
first wave, then join the 7th and 15th Infantry-Regiments for the 
attack on Casablanca. 24 
The infantry landing teams started ashore about 0430 8 November. 
Several factors including troop ships and cargo transports out of 
their assigned positions, and inexperience of Army troops in landing, 
and lack of skill on the part of the Navy, caused a thirty minute 
delay. When the operation started, some of the landing craft 
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foundered on the rocks and reefs and were lost. Shortly after the 
Americans started ashore, the French turned on a searchlight which 
lit up the beaches; it was quickly shot out by a patrol boat. This 
ended any hope that the French would not fight. However, both major 
batteries were silenced by cruiser gunfire, which greatly eased the 
landings. The officers and ~en of the armored landing team were 
awakened by naval gunfire and soon lined the rails of the ships to 
watch the fight. They had a fright as they saw a transport racing 
towards the beach. It was fired on, but beat a hasty retreat: the 
ship was the Biddle, carrying part of their vehicles. At 1600, Nelson 
went ashore, returning at 1800 with instructions to start unloading. 
The loss of landing craft hampered efforts, but by dark a platoon of 
Company A, 67th Armored Regiment, was ashore and had taken up positions 
overlooking Fedala; during the night it met no enemy resistance. 
The remainder of the tanks were to be unloaded the following day, as 
the sea was getting rougher; one tank had been damaged, crashing into 
25 
the side of the ship while it was being unloaded. 
By 1700 on 8 November, about 40 percent of the Center Landing 
Team was ashore. Once again there had been a large loss of landing 
craft. for about half of their 347 boats were casualties. In spite of 
the difficulties, Anderson and his men captured most; if not all, of 
their initial objectives before sunrise on 9 November. Once the port 
was in American hands, emphasis was placed on landing the tanks. The 
Arcturus was brought to the docks and unloaded, while landing craft 
unloaded the Biddle. By 1900, the Armored Landing Team was ashore 
and in position between the railroad and a highway. It was ordered to 
move east of the Qued Mellah to guard against possible infiltrators. 
Defenses were established on the east bank of the·river and guards 
posted on the bridges, but no enemy tested the- tankers that night. 26 
At dawn the armored team sent reconnaissanc~ patrols to its 
front. One platoon of Company A, 67th Armored·Regiment was sent 
towards Mediouna, where it found the 15th·Infantry Regiment and 
acted as a flank guard for the infantry that day. Southwest of 
Casablanca, 600 Moroccan Spahis were in position-to attack the flank 
of the 15th Infantry. There was a minor skirmish, but the French 
forces were driven off without loss to the Americans. · The remainder 
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of the armored force stayed in the Brushwood reserve awaiting orders. 
About dark, the Armored Battalion was ordered to move to positions 
west of Casablanca, and be ready to attack at 0800 on 11 November. 
It started to rain and because of the extreme· darkness ·each tank had 
to be led on foot. In spite of all precautions, there was a minor 
accident; one quarter-ton vehicle went over a cliff. In the morning, 
after a brief artillery concentration, fired by·the 78th Armored 
artillery, the ·tanks began moving forward. At that point Patton 
ordered a cease fire because the French. had surrendered. 27 
The French resistance was not as determined as it could have 
been. One explanation was the surprise of the landings; a second was 
the lack of desire to fight the Americans·. Possibly the French 
fought for honor, but they were willing to join·the·Allies as soon 
as they surrendered. 
The main 2d Armored Division landing was at Safi, about 120 
miles southwest of Casablanca. Patton had issued detailed instructions 
to Major General Ernest N. Harmon, the 2d Armored Division's commanding 
general. Task Force Blackstone was to land,·secure its positions, and 
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be ready to assault the land defenses of Casablanca. That mission 
could only be deterred by actual combat. Once· the troops·were ashore, 
they should move quickly to capture-, und:am.a-ged··i.-f-·possible, the 
telephone exchange, and wireless station,- wh·ich· were considered 
vital to the establishment of civil co~troi. 28 
Safi had to be secured. The mission might be difficult and 
costly, but the city needed to be captured·and·the Seatrain unloaded. 
Harmon was instructed, that if, for any reason beyond his control, he 
could not unload the Seatrain, he was to send it to Fedala. He was 
admonished to be careful with the Seatrain, not to expose it to 
unnecessary dangers, and to make every effort to get·it to the docks 
and unloaded. As the Seatrain carried the only medium tanks in the 
Western Task Force, the admonitions were not unnoticed or unheeded. 
After unloading-the command, Harmon was to get to Casablanca as 
quickly as possible. He had to secure a crossing over the· Bria River, 
while maintaining his lines of conununications to Safi. Any attack 
against Safi was to be the only enemy action that Harmon was to 
consider. If he felt that it was necessary to abandon Safi, he was 
to contact Patton for approval; in the event he could not reach him 
he was authorized to use his own judgment. 29 
Harmon issued a field order detailing much the same information 
that he had received from Patton. In addition, he cautioned the 
commands that they might have to fight the Marrake-ch garrison, about 
100 miles south of Safi. The landing -had· three phases: unloading 
and establishing a 5,000. yard radial beachhead; ·expanding this beach-
head to 10,000 yards; and future operations would occur following the 
enlargement of the beachhead. No plans were made to land any part of 
the command, except the assault troops, anyplace except on the 
. 30 docks at Safi. 
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Safi was a dangerous place to try a landing~ Heavy swells occurred 
that time of year which could·dash the light- landing craft on the 
rocks. There were few suitable beaches, and· those were short and 
butted into high cliffs. The harbor, however, was one of the three 
deep water ports on the Atlantic side of French North Africa. It 
was triangular in shape, with the entrance about·SOO yards wide while 
a narrow opening was formed by a long jetty and a pier that came 
together, forming right angles. Inside the harbor was a quay which 
could handle three ships and, in addition, there were electric cranes 
to help with the unloading. Nearby covered storage sheds were connected 
by a spur railroad track.which led to the interior. If the 2d Armored 
Division could get to these facilities, the unloading of the tanks 
would be greatly eased, as no landing craft could handle the medium 
31 tanks of the task force. 
The invaders expected a force of about 1;000 men opposing them. 
Actually, they found about half that number. At Marrakech there was 
a considerable number of reinforcements available; including 1,400 
cavalry, 2,000 infantry, 2 battalions of horse drawn guns, and 40 tanks 
and armored cars. The Safi harbor defenses were covered by artillery 
and machine guns. The Batterie Roilleuse had four 130mm coast defense 
guns; three batteries of 75mm guns and four 155mm guns; which could 
raise havoc with the landing force,if the French chose to resist. 
The convoy arrived at their positions about 2245 on 7 November. After 
being fed potato salad, sandwiches, and coffee, the men started over the 
side at 2330. To their amazement the lighthouse inside the harbor was 
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blazing and continued to do so until about 0200; Apparently the 
convoy had arrived undetected. The menloadedinto their assault 
craft as early as possible to minimize losses in the event that 
h F h h ld d ·d f" h 32 t e. renc sou ec1 e to put up a 1g t. 
From the time of the first alert at Safi (0320)-until the Allied 
landing, the French had about an hour and tenminutes to prepare. 
A rickety old French vessel, the Alfonse·DeLan&e, fired the first 
shot and was promptly sunk by American gunfire. Shortly after 0500 
Commander Deuve, the French commander at Safi, was notified that ships 
had been sighted, but he refused to give permission to open fire 
until the spotters could identify the ships. Later when he s·aw a 
warship enter the harbor, he gave the order to fire; the French may 
have scored a hit on a torpedo boat. His actions were answered by 
gun flashes that lit up the horizon. 33 
The initial landings were made by the 47th Infantry Regiment 
of the 9th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel E. H. Randel; its 
mission was to establish the initial beachhead. After that, it was to 
hold the beachhead while the medium tanks were being unioaded and the 
Armored Force prepared to move northeast to Casablanca. Harmon 
learned that the French had placed a boom across·the mouth of Safi 
Harbor. He suggested that two destroyers ram it and·en.ter the harbor 
carrying two infantry companies. They needed to take the electric 
cranes intact if the tanks were to be unloaded, Upon arriving at 
Safi, however, they found no boom, but Harmon and Rear Admiral Lyal 
A. Davidson decided to go ahead with the plan to send the destroyers 
into the harbor anyway. As a result, the port was secured without 
serious damage to the facilities. The crane was damaged by a watchman, 
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but the next day he returned and repaired it in about three hours. 
The reconnaissance platoon of the 47th Infantry--Regiment seized the 
telegraph and telephone centers intact·· and successfully cut Safi off 
from the rest of North Africa·. Cempany· L· of· the-·same·regi.ment captured 
the oil storage tanks east of the· harbor;- By dawn···(about 0600), the 
harbor, railroad station, post office·;-· and highways·· to- the south were 
held by the Americans, but they did not have· the· town. The battle 
to take the town began in earnest and was making such progress that 
the Seatrain sailed into the harbor and began to unload the medium 
tanks about 1400. About the same time, the Titania, which carried the 
light tanks of the armored landing.team, tied up to the dock and 
started unloading. As the tanks were unloaded, they went to an 
assembly area near Horseshoe Hill, three miles northeast of town. As 
the unloading started, a boom broke, causing a three hour delay until 
it could be repaired. Even so the medium tanks were unloaded at a 
rate of approximately one tank every five minutes. All the combat 
vehicles were unloaded in forty-eight hours. 34 
Harmon moved his headquarters to Safi about·i530 on- 8 November, 
where he found sniping by the French and inactivity on the part of 
the Americans. He sent tanks and infantry to clean·out the snipers 
and thus cleared up the unloading problems.· The major problem was that 
the task force did not have any Army troops·to move·the supplies inland. 
The Arabs were too slow, indifferent, and unreliable; Finally, the 
men of the 47th Infantry Regiment were used, but they were tired, and 
felt insulted at having to do non-infantry work. They also had to 
send crews on the destoyers Cole and Bernadau to Mazagon to resupply 
the task force as it moved north to take part in the assault on 
Casablanca. 35 
Thus far French resistance had been from the garrison at Safi. 
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The French airforce at Marrakech did not take·off-because of "weather 
conditions"--unlimited visibility. The next··morni:ng at 0630, a 
French plane strafed and bombed the docks, destroying·- several vehicles, 
and causing some casualties. It was·-shot·down-·br·the antiaircraft 
gun crews on the Lakehurst. American aircraft·attacked the French 
Air Force at Marrakech, destroying about· forty-planes on· the ground. 
On their way back to their carrier, the Navy pilots spotted-and attacked 
a French column on its way to counterattack the Americans at Safi. 
The air attack slowed the French, enabling Harmon·to rush troops to 
meet their advance. The French had reached Bou Guedra,about twenty-
six kilometers (approximately fifteen miles) from Safi, when they met 
elements of the 2d Armored Division. About 1350 on 9 November, Harmon 
ordered Brigadier General Gaffey to oppose the French. Gaffey moved 
out at 1413 with the light tanks of the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored 
Regiment, while the medium tanks of the 3d Battalion were kept in 
Combat Command r:'eserve. At 1700 the light tanks, -~ommanded by Lieuten-
ant Colonel William M. Stokes, encountered the enemy about a mile and 
a half east of Bou Guedra, and forced them to pull back to positions 
in the hills, The Americans went into- defensive·:gositions, planning 
to resume the attack the next morning. After firing-about 300 rounds 
of 105mm howitzer ammunition, but not dislodging· the French, it was 
decided to break off the engagement and prepare to move northward to 
Casablanca. A determined attack could have dislodged the French, but 
that would have cost lives and tanks that were needed elsewhere. 
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Harmon thought that the 47th Infantry Regi~ent and Company B, 70th 
Tank Battalion, could handle the situation, while--the 2d Armored 
D. . . d h 36 1v1s1on move nort. 
Having no word from Patton, ~rmon decided to start towards 
Casablanca on the afternoon of 10 November. The· decis·'.ton was risky, 
for the enemy still had considerable· ·forces- -at~·&:rrakech and at 
Mo gad or. Harmon considered that Colone-! Rand·e-1~ c-ou-1.d hold Safi, 
aided by naval gunfire, and if it really be-e-ame- neees-s·s:;ry; ·' the infantry 
could fight its way back to the beach· and-board· the sh:i~s. 37 
At noon, as the preparations for the march·-were being made, 
the French civil authorities loaned the Americans· two buses to 
transport the headquarters personnel. Combat Command B was ordered to 
cease operations at 1715 and pull back for movement to Casablanca. 
The march began at 1900 under blackout conditions, through unknown 
territory, at excessive speeds, and with·a time limit. The command 
had to capture Mazagon, where the Navy was s-endi.ng the· Cole·· and Bernadeu 
to refuel and resupply the tanks. The column stopped several times, and 
each time some of the drivers; who had had very little sleept, went 
to sleep. On one such stop, Harmonand his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel 
Lawrence R. Dewey, found an old French soldierstanding-in uniform 
beside a rock, and holding a light. Harmon listened to the old veteren 
explain that he had done his duty for·-·the·French··Republic·. ··The division 
commander invited the old man to stand aside·, The· o·ld Frenchmen did, 
explaining that he was holding the light because·he did·not want the 
Americans to hurt themselves. 38 
The tankers reached the outskirts of Mazagon at 0430. Harmon, 
not wanting to launch a night attack, decided to wait until dawn 
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(about 0630) and to attack the town with infantry·. Gaffey was sent 
to capture the bridge at Azemmour, which he did. Harmon, meanwhile, 
met with the French commander and, under the thr·eat of air and naval 
bombardment, persuaded the French to surrender at 0745, with full 
military honors, permitting them to keep their weapons. Chaplain 
Wurm was of the opinion that the French were truly glad to see the 
Americans. After the surrender, the column moved· to assembly areas 
just north of town to refuel, and prepared to re·sume the· march north-
ward. While refueling, Harmon was informed that the French had ceased 
operations against the Americans in all of North Africa and that he 
should stop in place. To show his appreciation, Harmon bought 5,000 
eggs for his command, a gesture much appreciated·after a steady diet 
of K-rations. 39 
The Allied landings in North Africa cameas·a complete surprise 
to the Germans. They thought that the landing teams which went ashore 
at Oran and Tunis were destined for the eastern end of the Mediterranean 
Sea. After the landings, the Germans had only the· choice·of surrendering 
or continuing the fight, for evacuation was out of the question. The 
first German explanations to the world pictured·the greedy Americans 
and British as not being ashamed to grab the territory of their former 
ally in violation of all laws. On the third and fourth day following 
the landings, German propaganda claimed that the Allies landed in 
North Africa to make the Mediterranean an A:llied·lake; because they 
were short on shipping and could not wait for their ships to go around 
the Cape of Good Hope. The Nazis dropped the·shipping·argument on the 
fifth day and switched to a new line: Fortress Europa had·a weak link, 
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which was southern France. Therefore·Germany·was justified in moving 
into what had been Vichy France. 40 
After three days, combat ended with· the· French decision to 
surrender. Apparently, the French had been told·by- Germany that if 
they could defend their colonies_ they could keep· them, 'but if Germany 
had to defend the colonies Germany would·take-t-hem·over. · Most of the 
French had no animosity towards the :Americans·;· ·and· seem·ingly fought 
because they had been told to do so. The indifferent resistance 
offered and the quick surrender would· seem·to·verify this point. In 
addition, the threat of American tanks hastened the decision, according 
to French officials. 41 
The 2d Armored Division had taken part in perhaps the most 
difficult of all military operations--an amphibious landing on hostile 
soil. The division proved its training under the most demanding of 
tests: combat. The tankers had had·a variety of missions; at Port 
Lyautey, they defended, preventing the French from resupplying the 
garrison; at Safi,after blocking the reinforc·ing· column, they executed 
a deep penetration against almost no resistance; they were in position 
to attack when the resistance ended. TORCH showed that an amphibious 
force could be transported across an ocean, landed·against opposition, 
and execute its mission against hostile forces. It also revealed that 
better landing methods were needed, if other amphibious·· landings were 
to be carried out. North Africa was a testing·ground for the 2d 
Armored Division and, in a larger sense;· for the Army. 
FOOTNOTES 
1wesley Frank Craven and· Jame-s Lee· ·Cat-e·,-·-E-ur-op-e·:,·''.r·o-rch to Point-
blank August 1942 to December 1~43: ·The···~'Af"'t""'·F5ic-es .. · ·in World War 
Two (7 vols. , Chicago: University of Chicago Pres-s; 1949), Vol. II, 
pp. 42-4.5; George F. Howe, Northwest· Afr-:i:ca-:··- 'Sei-zing·the Initiative 
in the West: United States Army in·Worid War·II·'(Washington: Depart-
ment of the Army, 1957), p. 14; Morison,Operations'in-:N-orth African 
Waters, Vol. II, p. 12; Wilhm·, et al., ''Armor in· the Invasion of North 
Africa," pp. 1-2. 
2cravens and Cate, Eu:r:ope: Torch to Pointblank, Vol. II, p. 50; 
George C. Marshall, Biennial Report of·the·Chief of Staff of the 
United States Army July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1943·to·the Secretary of 
War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 19. 
3Ibid., pp. 41-43, 89; "Ring Tightened Around Axis with Blitz on 
Vichy Empire," Newsweek, Vol. XX, No. 20 (16 November 1942), pp. 17-23; 
Harley Cope, "Play Ball, Navy," United States-Na"Q'ai· Institute Proceed-: 
ings, Vol. LXIX, No. 10 (October 1943), ·p. 1313;-:Harmon, Combat 
Com111ander, p. 81; Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," 
pp. 20, 25. 
4Ibid., p. 25; History 67th Armored Regiment; p. 64; Wurm, Manu-
script Diary, 25 October 1942,·Record Group 407. 
5~bid. , 26, 27, 30 October 1942, 3 November 1_942. 
6wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," p. 111; 
Howe, Northtvest Africa, pp. 17.;.18; Morison-,('.)p·era:tions in North 
African Waters, Vol. II, p. 51; "Attack on Mehdia and the Port Lyautey 
Airdrome," pp. 2-5, Unpublished Manuscript, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Washington, D. C. 
7Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The President's Message to General 
Eisenhower for the People of North Africa," 7 November 1942, 
Press Branch, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Library, 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma. 
8war Department, "Joint American-British Declaration to the 
People of France," 7 November 1942, ibid. 
9Dwight D. Eisenhower, "General Eisenhower's Proclamation to the 
People of French North Africa," 7 November 1942, ibid. 
246 
247 
lOLucian Truscott, Command Missions: A. Personal-Story (New York: 
E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954), p. 96. 
11Howe, Northwest Africa,·· p. 149;· ·Semmes, ·Portrait-of ·Patton, p. 90; 
Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion ·of North"Africa,"p. 110; 
"Attack of Mehdia and the Port Lyautey-Airdrome,·u·p~·62, Office of the 
Chief of Military History; Russell Brooks, "Casab-lanca.:.The French Side 
of the Fence," United State·s·· Navai~ fnst·±tute····Prb'Ceedi:n:g:s ;·· Vol. LXXVII, 
No. 9 (September 1951), p. 916. 
12wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of· North·· Africa," pp. 115-
116. 
13"Attack on Mehdia and the Port Lyautey-Airdrome,"··"p;·· 5-6, 15-18, 
Office of the Chief of Military History. 
14wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion-of North·Africa," pp. 58, 
119; "Attack on Mehdia and the Port Lyautey Airdrome;" p. Ba, Office 
of the Chief of Military History; Howe·; Northwest Africa, p. 153; 
Semmes, Portrait of Patton, p. 86. 
15Morison, Operations in North .African Waters, Vol. II, p. 128; 
Truscott, Command Missions, p. 115; "Attack on Mehdia and the Port 
Lyautey Airdrome," p. 57, Office of the Chief of Military History. 
16Truscott, Command Missions, p. 115. 
1711Attack on Mehdia. and the Port Lyautey Airdrome," pp. 57-58, 
Office of the Chief of Military History; Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the 
Invasion of North Africa," p. 130; Trahan~J·:ed··;,··'A-·Hi'story of the 
Second United States Armored Division, n~p.; ·Howe~' Northwest Africa, 
p. 162. 
181'Attack on Mehdia and the Port Lyautey Airdrome;" pp. 80-83, 
102-103, Office of the Chief of Military History. 
19wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," pp. 137-
138. 
20Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 165; Joseph B.· M-;ittelman; Eight Stars 
se_ Vi:cto!Y: ·A Historr of the V-eteran Ninth-Q-~~·/Infantry Division 
{Columbus: F. J. Heer Printing Company·, :1948}, ·P-· 73; "Attack on Mehdia 
and the Port Lyautey Airdrome,"·pp·. 81"'-82·;·0f·fice·of the Chief of 
Military History; Wilhm, et al. "Armor in the In"7asiort of North Africa," 
pp. 133, 134-135; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 122;·Interview, James 
M. Burt with author, 16 June 1972, Hancock,·New Hampshire. 
21 
George S. Patton, Jr., to Ernest N. Harmon, "Letter of Instruc-
tions," 10 October 1942, White Papers. 
22Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 118; Morison, '{)perati"Ons in North 
African Waters, Vol.' II, pp. 56-58. 
248 
23George S. Patton- Jr~ · War·As- -r··Knew· Tt--{~-ost'On'! Houghton Mifflin ' '--------Company, 1947), p. 392·;· Howe,· Northtrest;·A:fri'ca·; · p·;· 12·1; · "'The Attack on 
Fedala and Its Defenses," p. 2, Unpublished Martusl!ript, Office of the 
Chief of Military History, Washington, D. C. 
24wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasi·on ·of North Africa," pp. 
57, 69, 73; History 67th Armored Regiment; p·;-· 6-5 .. ;·Howe, Northwest 
Africa, pp. 122-123. 
25Donald G. Taggart ·· ed~ · History of the-Third, ·Infantry Division in ' ' ---- - -World War II (Washington: Infantry Journa:l: Pr·ess·; 194·7)·~ pp. 13, 31; 
Wilhm,7t al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," pp. 69-71, 
73-74; Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 125; Morison, ·Operations in North 
African Waters, Vol. II, pp. 75-78; History 6'7th Annored Regiment, 
pp. 65-66. 
26Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 123, 137; Taggart,·ed;, History of 
the Third Infantry Division in World War ··I·I, p. 31; ·History 67th Armored 
Regiment, p. 67; Wilhm, et al., "Armor·in the Invasion of North Africa," 
p. 77. 
27Ibid., pp. 18, 78, 79; Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 144-145; 
"Attack on Fedala and Its Defenses," pp. 81-82, Office of the Chief 
of Military History; History 67th Armored Regiment; pp. 15, 67-68. 
28 Patton to Harmon, "Letter of Instructions," 10 October 1942, 
White Papers. 
29 Ibid. 
30BLACKSTONE, Field Order 1, 18 October 1942, Record Group 407; 
Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," pp. 87-88, 91. 
31cope, "Play Ball, Navy," United States Naval Institute Proc'eedings, 
Vol. LXIX, p. 1312; Howe, Northwest Africa, pp. 97099; Morison, Operations 
in North African Waters, Vol. II, p. 137; Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the 
Invasion of North Africa," p. 91. 
32 
BLACKSTONE, "Final Report of Operation BLACKSTONE 072400-110730, 
November, 1942," (28 November 1942), pp. 3-4, Record Group 407; Howe, 
Northwest Africa, pp. 99-100; Morison, Operations in North African 
Waters, Vol. II, pp. 137-138; Wurm, Manuscript Diary, 7 November 1942, 
Record Group 407; Robert Wallace, "Africa, We Took It and Liked It, 
Part 1," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXV, No. 29 (16 January 1943), 
p. 20; Harmon, Combat Commander, p. 84. 
33Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 100; Ship's Commander Deuve to Command-
ing General of the Marrakech Division and the Sector of Safi-Mogador, 
"Operations for November 8 and 9, 1942," November 14, 1942, pp. 1-3, 
White Papers; Wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africaj" 
pp. 92-93. 
34Mittelman, Eight Stars to Victory, p. 60; Wilham, ~t al., 
"Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," pp. 89,98; Harmon, Co):nbat 
249 
Commander, pp. 79, 85-86; Wallace, "Africa, We Took.It and Liked It,11 
Saturday Evening Post, Vol. CCXV, No. 29, p. 80; White, "State-
ment Regarding the Operations and Activities of the 2d Armored Division, 
Just Prior to and During the Invasion of North Africa," pp. 6-7; 
White Papers; Cope,."Play Ball, Navy," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. LXIX, p. 1314; History 67th Armored Regiment, p. 231; 
Muller, "Second Armored Division Combat Loading, Part One," p. 5. 
35wilhm, et al., "Armor in the Invasion of North Africa," p, 99; 
Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 111; Harmon, Combat Commander, p. 89. 
36wurm, Manuscript Diary, 9 November 1942, Record Group 407; 
White, the 2d Armored Division,. p. 4; White. Papers; BLACKSTO~E, "Final 
Report of Operation BLACKSTONE 072400-110730 November 1942," p. 5, 
Record Group 407; Harmon, Combat Commander, pp. 86-89. 
37wilhm, et al., "Armor in the.Invasion of North Africa," pp. 
103-104. 
38wurm, Manuscript Diary, 10 November 1942, Record Group 407; 
Interview Lawrence.R. Dewey with author, 2 June 1972, Falls Church, 
Virginia; Harmon, Combat Commander, p. 94; Combat Command B, "Report 
of Operations of Combat Command B, 8-llNovember 1942,I' Record.Group 
407. 
39Morison, Operations in North.African Waters, II, p. 155; Wurm, 
Manuscript Diary, 12 November.1942; and Combat Commanq B, "Report.of 
Operations of Combat .·Command B, 8-11 November 1942," Record Group 407; 
White, the 2d Armored Division, pp. 4-5; Harmon, Combat Commander, 
p. 99. 
40George C. Marshall, Biennial Report.of !h!_ Chief of Staff July.!_, 
1943 to June · 30; · 1945, pp, 45, 146; Argus, "Goebbels in a Jam," The 
Nation, vof:"' CLV ,~ 22 (November 28, 1942), p, 575, 
41Brooks, "Casablanca-The French Side of the·Fence," United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol, LXXVII; p. 910; Wallace, ''Africa, 
We Took It and Liked It, Part.2," The Saturday Evening Post, Vo],. CCXV, 
No. 30 (23 January 1943), p. 78; Trahan, ed., A History of the Second 
United Sta.tes Armored Division, n.p. 
CHAPTER XI 
NORTH AFRICAN INTERLUDE 
Operation TORCH was the "wildest adventure" that Major General 
Harmon and the 2d Armored Division had ever experienced. The 
anxiety and suspense were as awesome as they would· ever undergo. 
Everyone, Army and ·Navy alike, was inexperienced, but the initial 
mission of the Western Task Force had been accomplished with only 
nine 2d Armored Division casualties; four dead and five wounded. 
French Morocco had been captured. While Port Lyautey and the Fedala-
Casablanca venture were primarily an infantry operation, the landing 
at Safi was mainly a tank action. Following the French surrender, 
the division settled down to occupation duty, as no plans had been 
made to use the 2d Armored Division in the Tunisian desert campaign. 
Patton permitted the French to retain administrative jurisdiction 
of their colony. As long as the French could control the native 
.population and not interfere with the war effort, the United States 
would not interfere in the internal affairs of French Morocco. 1 
The 2d Armored Division was alerted.fer movement on 13 November 
1942. It was to occupy a bivouac area in the Mamora Cork Forest 
about eighteen miles northeast of Rabat. Lacking transportation for 
its headquarters personnel, the division impressed two charcoal 
burning buses to take them to Casablanca, where thanks to the 
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trip was made in a large deluxe French bus. Chaplain Wurm observed 
that the area was picturesque and that the division did not have a 
better bivouac area, even when on maneuvers back in the States. 
However, the sun blazed down during the day and at night there was 
usually a cold rain. 2 
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While bivouaced in the Cork Forest, the division and the Western 
Task Force faced two serious problems: the French reaction to British 
participation, especially after the British had attacked Dakar, and 
how the governments of Spain, Vichy France, and French North Africa 
would react to the invasion. The .Americans were especially concerned 
about the 130,000 Spanish and native Spanish Moroccan troops causing 
them problems. Spain had made statements about pushing the frontier 
south of the Sebou River (Port Lyautey is on the Sebou River), but the 
.Americans were committed to maintaining French possessions as they 
were. 3 
The 2d Armored Division's mission was to guard the Spanish-
French Moroccan border, to prevent attempts by Spain or Germany to 
attack supply and communications lines, and keep open the single track 
railroad between Casablanca and Oran. The Spanish, under Lieutenant 
General Luis Orgas Yoldi, kept making threats about their frontier. 
To discourage any such venture, Patton decided to invite the Spanish 
general to a reyiew presented by the 2d Armored Division. He came, 
and as the Spanish did not have any weapon to combat the tanks, there 
was no more talk about expanding to the Sebou River. Harmon confessed 
that while he had been opposed to the idea of permitting the Spanish 
to view the division, the gamble worked, and that was the major 
consideration. 4 
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The next problem facing the men was how to get along with the 
native population. The Sultan of Morocco was friendly to the Ameri-
cans, but the situation could be very serious· if·anything were to occur 
to change his mind. Chaplain Wurm knew thatRabat·was the second 
principal holy city for the Moslems. The young men·of the division 
were warned about "youthful indiscretions. 115 Harmon was· able to solve 
many problems which arose by liberal dosages of money. This was 
especially true if the natives found dud ammunition while·scavengering 
in the target or impact area. If the dud exploded in a home, the 
Army paid for the losses. He also established a Souk-el-Harmon 
(Harmon's market), so that the American soldierscould buy products 
from the Arabs and not be robbed. At night the soldiers cooked their 
purchases over stoves made from number ten cans filled with sand and 
soaked with gasoline. Patton initially objected to the consumption of 
approximately 500 gallons of gasoline a week for this purpose, but 
6 
he gave his consent and found that the morale soared at the same time. 
The division resumed training, but all was not work. There was 
time for socializing and experimentation. Since there·was an abun-
dance of wine, but a lack of hard liquor, Captain Tom Wishard discovered 
that by heating wine almost to the boiling point and ·condensing the 
steam, a fairly tasty liquid called "Kickapoo Joy Juice" could be 
distilled. When mixed with grapefruit juice, it satisfied the wants 
of most of the men. However, the "still" had the same end as most 
moonshine operations. One day the "revenooer'·'·, Colonel I. D. White, 
walked into the mess tent while a batch was being· run off, and that 
was the end of the "experiment". 7 
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Back in the states, the remainder of the division was preparing 
to sail for North Africa. The 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion was re-
lieved from assignment to the division- and· reassi:gned--·to Army Ground 
Forces. The other units continued training· whi·le-·-pre-paring their 
equipment for North Africa. After most of the-org-an-izational equipment 
had been packed, the men spent i-ong hours· ·on-·the· rifle ranges. On 1 
November 1942, the division moved to Fort Dix·; New ·Jersey, where 
they loaded on the transports on 11 Dec·ember-·194·2; ··f·or· the trip to 
Casablanca. The bulk of the division. landed Christmas Day and were 
treated to a memorable.Christmas dinner: C-rations in the rain. The 
traditional and promised turkey arrived for New Year's. The new arri-
vals remained at Casablanca for several days before moving to the 
Cork Forest. Chaplain Wurm observed an undercurrent·of petty jealousy 
among the new arrivals for when Casablanca was bombed on ·28 December; 
the new men wanted to know how soon they could place a star on their 
. "bb 8 service r1 ons. 
The area around the Cork Forest afforded the·,division excellent 
terrain for training. Basics were restressed: crew dril~s, marches, 
range firing, and tactical problems. Lieutenant·Colonel Lawrence R. 
Dewey was not pleased with the tank sights-. Using several destroyed 
tank hulls as targets, he soon discovered that until the sights were 
improved, the tankers would have to use the artillery bra'cketing method 
to hit the target: firing over and short of the target, and then 
splitting the difference. Colonel Thomas H. Roberts,· commander of 
Division Artillery, and Colonel John H. Collier, commanding officer, 
66th Armored Regiment, experimented with attacking under overhead 
artillery fire. The artillery, using time fuses, fired so that the 
shells burst in the air and the shrapnel fell around the tanks, 
permitting the tanks to attack with artillery support and forcing 
defenders to keep their heads down. 9 
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Training became more realistic. Major General Harmon remembered 
that on one exercise, when he stopped a·point·man and-asked him his 
assignment, the man recited what he was supposed·· ·to d·o-. Harmon decided 
that the men needed to be trained to react, not- to recite· procedures. 
The training began to reflect lessons learned-in-Tunis. In late 
November, Companies G and H, 67th Armored Regiment, left French 
Morocco and joined the British 78th Division at Beja. On Christmas 
Day they took part in some of the heaviest fighting of the African 
campaign, and then returned to French Morocco on 11 January 1943. 
That experience was invaluable, because the men had received battle 
training that the American service schools could not offer. 10 
In January 1943, the division was alerted that something signifi-
cant was about to occur in North Africa. While sitting in his tent 
one night, Lieutenant Colonel Dewey heard a radio bulletin referring 
to an impending visit by the President of the United States to Casa-
blanca. Realizing the importance of such a message, he ordered the 
radio operator to answer in code, while he·alerted·Harmon. Company 
A, 67th Armored Regiment, served as an honor guard for the President 
and the British Prime Minister when they met in conference. The 
meeting was so secret, that while President Roosevelt addressed the 
men of the division and had lunch with them in the field, some doubted 
that he was in North Africa. Chaplain Wurm, who was-meeting with 
Archbishop Francis Spellman at Rabat, found it difficult to believe 
that Roosevelt was in Casablanca. He agreed that "Anything is 
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possible, thought this story to our mind reaches the height of fantasy 
even though some men swear that they were a few·yards from the 
11 President." 
The Casablanca Conference had a direct influence on future 
operations of the 2d Armored Division. It wa-s·decided to conduct 
further operations in the Mediterranean· region· to··he:l::p··ease the pres-
sure on the Russians, and since the troops were·already there, it would 
be easier than attempting a cross-channe·l a·ttack;·· Any cross-channel 
attack would have to be successful on the first· landing, which was 
not viewed as a definite possibility at the ti.me.· Britain argued that 
it would be better to force the Germans to stretch their military 
forces across the continent of Europe. They felt that·the best way 
to do this would be to eliminate Italy from the war. It was therefore 
decided to attack Sicily as soon as conditions permitted; meanwhile the 
Allies would rearm the French. This decision posed a problem; however, 
since the Americans did not have sufficient shipping to send additional 
equipment, and the French would require ·training in the use of the 
Am • • 12 erican equipment. 
While the 2d Armored Division was beginning to meet the demands 
placed on it by the Casablanca Conference, in the Tunisian battle the 
Germans attacked and routed the 1st Armored Division at Kasserine Pass 
in February 1943. There was an immediate·need f-or··replacements. Since 
it was not possible to resupply the tanks, self-propelled artillery, and 
the personnel from the United States, owing to the lack of shipping, 
replacements had to come from the 2d Armored Division~ Eisenhower 
was of the opinion that "Hell on Wheels" could be relieved of its 
occupation duty and sent to the Tunisian front, but his supply people 
told him t~at additional combat troops could not be supplied and 
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maintained there. For this reason, the 2d Armored· and 3d Infantry 
Divisions were stripped of trucks to send to the front~ Eisenhower 
wanted to send one armored regiment to the east, but concluded that 
there was not enough equipment left in the 2d Armored Division to get 
a regiment ready for action. In addition-to-·losing its·men and most 
of its tanks, Harmon was transferred to ·the· front·;· · -Originally he was 
to relieve the 1st Armored Division commander,- but·becam-e deputy corps 
' 13 
connnander instead and did not have to perform that unpleasant task. 
After driving the Germans out of·· Kass-erine· Pass; ·Harmon returned 
to the 2d Armored Division, and reported~to· hi:s···men·-·about the fighting 
on the Tunisian front. Since Patton had r-e·plac-ed- Major Lloyd 
Frendenhall, Harmon thought that the division might be called to the 
front. If the division was not sent there, he indicated to the men 
that there would still be a bigger job ahead of them. Hinting that 
something was in the wind, he t_old them that they would be sent to 
amphibious school in the second week of March. 14 
Later, when Harmon was reassigned to be the new commanding general 
of the 1st Armored Division, he was replaced by Brigadier General 
Allen F. Kingman, and Colonel John H. Collier became commanding officer 
of Combat Command A. Colonel I. D. White assumed command of Combat 
Command B. About this same time, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark 
began looking for a general officer who spoke French and had a 
technical knowledge of American equipment, to become the senior 
adviser to the French armored units. Since Kingman had studied at 
the French Armor· School between the wars and met the other-requirement, 
he was offered the job and took it. When he arrived at his new 
headquarters, he found that many of the enlisted men assigned to him 
were the same men that·he··had-se-lee·ted-·to--go-·t'CT'·a:±d-·the· British a 
year earlier. Brigadier General'· ·Hugh· J ;· Gaff·ey ,,· fotnrer commanding 
general of Combat Command B, and most recently, Chief of Staff of II 
Corps (Patton's command), replaced Kingman as divi·sion commander. 
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In spite of losing two connnanders within·' thi.rty days·, the men did not 
display a defeatest attitude; they had confidenc·e in Gaffey. 15 
While the division was training ·for the· invas'ion· of Sicily, and 
simultaneously rearming the French and the 1st Armored Division, 
General George C. Marshall inquired if it would· he· ptrss·ible to rotate 
the 3d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions··with tho·ere in II Corps 
reserve. Eisenhower and Major General Omar N. Bradley discussed the 
situation. They advised against it because a major offensive was to 
begin in a few days, and the training for the invasion of Sicily was 
too advanced to justify wholesale transfers. Patton had been asked 
for his opinion about the transfer, and if the changes could be 
completed in about a week. His answer, apparently lost for 
historical purposes, must have been in the negative, for the plan 
16 
was not adopted. 
The division was applying the lessons learned from its observers 
who had gone to the Tunisian fron for extended duty with the 1st 
Armored Division. When they returned, they passed aloµg the knowledge 
gained to the remainder of the division, which was·training from dawn 
to after dark. The division reinstituted chemicaltraining·and defenses 
against chemical agents. Live ammunition was being used to make the 
men more cautious, and to get them accustomed to·the sounds of the 
battlefield. Many times they were supported by fighter~bomber 
aircraft. The men realized that··while· they· were-·making progress, 
17 
they still had much to learn. 
Major General Harmon, while visiting the 2d Armored Division, 
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compared the battle ability of the· ·American:s··-and-··G-erman-s-, concluding 
that he thought that American do·ctrine··was"··s·ound·; 'but that the 
Germans were superior to the Americans in their thoroughness and 
greater discipline. He was of the opinion that·the·Americans tried 
to do many things instead of trying to do a few things well. Based 
on experience, he thought that tank battles· were·W'Otr·by· ·the combatant 
which got in the first shot. The Americans needed to be trained to 
respond automatically, not to think. Addressing the officers and the 
noncommissioned officers, he advised them to be aware of the battle-
weary soldier. When casualties reduced a squad or p'latoon to two or 
three men, they should be pulled out of the line and rested; at that 
point, green but vigorous men would be of more value than tired 
veterallS. He stressed that every man in the unit should be briefed 
·· on the mission, since leaders might be killed ·or wounded and a 
private might have to assume command. Such a briefing would insure 
h h 1 . f h . . 18 t e smoot comp etion o t emission. 
Harmon was of the opinion that· the Americans should have tank 
destroyers, with their three inch guns, up with the tanks, unless 
the tanks had heavier guns. Tanks should move forward by bounds: one 
tank firing from a hull defilade position, while the second tank 
moved forward. That movement might be rapid or slow, depending on 
the situation. In addition, the tanks must learn to coordinate their 
movements with supporting infantry. He was somewhat critical of 
previous armor theory. Speed was missing from the battlefield; 
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movement was slow and deliberate~· The·maneuvers···had··given the soldiers 
a false picture because of their failure to portray supply situations 
accurately, their lack of casualty evacuations, ·and·' their failure to 
properly conduct reconnaissanc-es. Speaking· dire-etiy-1:·tt7-··'the division, 
and in a critical tone, he·said,-·"In·maneuvers·we-'-have·been guilty of 
rewarding officers and men for -grand·stand···move-s- -such as would be 
impossible to make on the battlefield and which gave a false impression 
of what can be accomplished. 1118 He warned· the- men··ttrbe· aware that if 
the Germans lost any ground it was axiomati-c·that·they counterattacked 
to regain it. When capturing positions from the Germans, the American 
soldiers must be ready to meet that counterattack. 19 
The plans for Operations HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, were 
made in 1943. The assaulting forces, with the exception of Oklahoma's 
45th Infantry Division, were battletested. The 2d Armored Division 
was to provide the armor·for the assaulting divisions and to be their 
fl . 20 oat1.ng reserve. 
In late April 1943, the division moved to Oran to begin their 
amphibious training. They had been ordered to send one·combat command 
to the Fifth Army Training Center for attachment·to the· 3d Infantry 
Division. Combat Command A, commanded by Colonel John H. Collier, 
was selected for this duty. The command was composed of the 66th 
Armored Regiment; 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (minus one battalion); 
14th Artillery Battalion; B Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion; 
B Company, 48th Medical Battalion; A Company, 2d· Armored Division 
Supply Battalion; and C Company, 2d Armored Division Maintenance 
Battalion. Combat Command headquarters was augmented with personnel 
from division headquarters and the 142d Signal Company. Because of a 
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shortage of rail equipment, a flash flood:;· and·a·heavy·concentration of 
both rail and road traffic it took amonth·to complete the·move. After 
Combat Comm.and A completed its move, Colonel Maurice Rose returned to 
the division and assumed the command of Combat Command A. On 3 June 
1943, Combat Command A moved to Bizerta, be·came part- of·the 3d Infantry 
Division (Reinforced), and began rigorous traintng-f·or the assault. 
This training consisted of speed marching,·attack:s on pillboxes, 
street fighting, and the loading and··unloading-·-of various types of 
landing craft. On 25 June the 3d Infantry Divis-ion (Reinforced) 
made a practice invasion near Bizerta and·ElDJe-bel, with apparent 
success. After this landing the combat command returned to its 
bivouac area, without its vehicles, and spent the next several days 
checking the waterproofing of equipment, completing basic loads, and 
making final arrangements for embarkation for the invasion. 
Eisenhower's deputy, Major General John P. Lucas, observing·the landing, 
was impressed by the men and the apparent competence of Rose. 21 
The remainder of the division assembled at Monad for the move to 
Port aux Paules, about twenty miles east of Oran. Moving the tanks 
and half-tracks of the division took a month, because the move 
was made over a single track railroad, which was subject to frequent 
washouts, and the number of freight cars available only permitted 
shipping about one medium tank company at a time. The wheeled vehicles 
moved overland. While the division was preparing for the invasion of 
Sicily, it had to resupply itself with tanks arid artillery. Since 
supplies from the United States were slow in getting ·to·North Africa, 
the division had to get some equipment from the lst·Armored Division. 
One supply officer, First Lieutenant James M. Burt, recalled signing 
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a hand receipt for "so many acres of armored equipment." First Lieu-
tenant Morton Eustis unofficially modified the jeeps of C Company, 
82d Reconnaissance Battalion, by mounting British-machine guns on them. 
Feeling that the jeeps did not afford sufficient firepower, he decided 
to see if he could "beg, borrow, or steal" some 0maehine guns and 
mounts. Putting on his old Air Corps insignia, Eustis went to an 
Air Corps base and got ten British machine guns and 150,000 rounds 
of ammunition. He designed the mount, taught the·men" how to use the 
weapons,_ and finally gained approval for the use of the weapons from 
h . b 1 · d d · · · d 22 is atta ion an 1v1s1on comman ers. 
For the invasion, Combat Cotmnand B, commanded by Colonel I. D. 
White, had the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment (minus two 
platoons): A Company, 4lst Armored Infantry; three firing batteries of 
the 78th Artillery; C Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion; B 
Company, 17th Engineer Battalion, and a detachment from Company E of 
the same battalion; D Battery, 107th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft 
Artillery); and a detachment from the 48th Medical Battalion. The 
remainder of the division, not assigned to Combat Command A, was con-
trolled by the 2d Armored Division commander to be used at his 
discretion. 
Combat Command B trained for the assault in much the same way as 
Combat Command A. Tactical training consisted of fighting and capturing 
villages, and combined arms team work, all making the maximum use of 
live ammunition. The command underwent amphibious training: for 
the most part, the loading and·unloading of the various types of 
assault ships; some practice landings to familiarize the troops with 
landing problems; and experimentation with firing tank guns from the 
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decks of the ships. Major General Gaffey was not' entirely satisfied 
with the naval support. Beach gradients·had forced the Navy to experi-
ment with various unloading procedures. One m·ethod was to unload the 
tanks from an LST (Landing Ship Tank) to an LCT(Landing Craft Tank) 
which had had its sides cut out. This method; slotv and laborious during 
very calm seas, was difficult at night, and·aii but impossible if the 
sea was running. Gaffey later stated that "exc·e'Pt · for very junior 
officers" the Navy paid little attention to the practice landings and 
did not mention LST weight limitatioris. Later, the Navy indicated 
that the LST's were overloaded and that the Combat'Command B would 
have to meet weight limitations imposed by the Navy.-·-- If the division 
had accepted the weight limitations, there was a serious possibility 
that only one medium tank -- company could have been taken to Sicily. 23 
While training was being conducted,- Combat Connnand B started to 
load the transports. The ships lacked sufficient antiaircraft weapons, 
so for the seond time, the 2d Armored Division placed its antiaircraft 
weapons on the decks to help protect the ships. Army personnel at this 
time were under the control of the lfavy. When the order came to load, 
the actual loading-of personnel was done at night for security reasons. 
The vacated bivouac areas were taken over by those who were staying 
behind. The rear detachment constructed dunnny tents, and other facilities 
to indicate to any spying eyes that all was normal. A signal detach-
ment tciok over the radio traffic patterns to confuse the Germans and 
Italians. All orders and plans were kept under guard in a locked room; 
all orders to subordinates were given without explanation or discussion. 24 
One final inspection occurred before the convoy sailed. On 23 
June, a review was conducted before George VI of England. ·Accompanying 
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the monarch, Eisenhower had an opportunity to inspect the 2d Armored 
Division and the 82d Airborne Division, which he pronounced to be in 
splendid shape with fine discipline. The convoy carrying Combat Command 
A sailed from Bizerta on D minus 6. It stopped at Tunis, rendezvousing 
with the other elements of the convoy which had sailed later. All 
elements met off the coast of Malta on D minus one. During the 
trip, the convoy was hit by a storm, the most severe in recent years, . ' ' 
which caused some loss of small craft and equipment. The misery of 
sea sickness among the men did little to calm minds or improve morale. 
There was also damage to some of the special floating ramps which 
were to be used to unload the equipment. 25 
During the North African interlude, the 2d Armored Division faced 
situations reminiscent of its maneuver exercises. The men had to 
~uard the border between French and Spanish Morocco, preventing 
pro-Axis Spain from attacking the supply lines which linked Casablanca 
and the Tunisian front. In aadition, the division supplied men and 
materials to both the United States 1st Armored Division and the French 
Armored Division, an activity that paralleled its exper~ences at 
Fort Benning. The training engaged in by the division was based on 
the tactical lessons learned in the desert operations. The men ol the 
division prepared for the invasion of Sicily while completing other 
missions with their customary thoroughness, in spite of having three 
different division commanders during this period. It would appear 
that it was not the division commander that made the difference, 
although he would impart his personality to the division. However, 
the success of the 2d Armored Division seemed to lie in its continuity 
of command at the combat command, regime~tal, and battalion level. 
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While preparing .for Sicily, -the division 1 s-··seni:or c-ommanders (except 
Gaffey and Rose) were those who-·had· been-·witti--the di.vision from its 
activation at Fort Benning, and who had the respe-ct·and confidence 
of their men. 
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CHAPTER XII 
OPERATION HUSKY: THE INVASION OF SICILY 
The Americans still wanted a cross-channel attack, but realized 
they did not have the men or equipment to stage such an assault at 
the time. Sicily was the next logical invasion site if the Allies 
were to continue operations in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the island 
located two miles from Italy and ninety miles from North Africa, 
straddled British supply lines, forcing the British to keep two fleets 
in the Mediterranean area. The invasion of Sicily was intended to 
make the Mediterranean supply lines more secure, to ease German pressure 
on Russia, to intensify pressure on Italy, and to keep the United 
States active in the conflict. 
The decision to attack Sicily was aided and abetted by a unique 
British intelligence plan. Plan MINCEME)\T was carried out in May 
1943. The scheme was to take a corpse, plant false documents on it, 
and place the body in the waters off the coast of Spain, so that 
Spanish, and later German officials, could get their ~ands on the 
documents. The correspondence indicated that the landin~ on Sicily 
was only a cover for landings that were to occur on the Qr~ek coast 
or on the island of Sardinia. "The Man Who Never Was" lured some 
f S . ·1 1 German reinforcements ro~ 1c1 y. 
Intelligence sources estimated that initial resistance would come 
from six or seven Italian coastal and field divisions and two German 
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divisions, a force of perhaps 208,000 Italians and 30,000 Germans. 
The German units were the Hermann Goering Panzer Division and the 15th 
Panzer Grenadier Division. Since the Italian Air Force was flying 
obsolete and inferior aircraft, the Germans had taken over the air 
defense of Italy. Intelligence indicated that the Germans 
and Italians would have about 1,104 planes available as compared to 
the Allies' 3,680. While at sea, the task forces learned that the 
German airfields at Gela and Comiso had been bombed and put out of 
operation; this freed an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 additional Germans 
to man defenses in the area where Combat Conunand B was to land. The 
Americans were warned to expect to encounter concrete pillboxes, strong 
points surrounded by barbed wire, machine gun emplacements, tank traps, 
and tank ditches. It was thought that the beaches were wired and 
mined. 2 
The Axis navies, while also a concern of the planners, proved to 
be a neglible factor. The Italians lacked radar and aircraft carriers. 
Because of their previous heavy losses and the distances involved, 
the Italian Navy was reluctant to use its fleet in Sicilian waters, 
unless "an extraordinarily good opportunity presented itself" and air 
protection was available. The Germans had a few landing craft at 
Messina and a few submarines in the Mediterranean, but the German 
admiralty decided not to reinforce the submarine: fleet because of 
the increased danger posed by Gibraltar. Because of these factors, 
the main defensive burden would rest upon the Axis ground forces. Also 
to the advantage of the Allies was the friction between the Axis partners 
caused by their own North African experiences. 3 
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The enemy was thought to have three options: defend at the beaches 
and counterattack when the Allies' attack slowed down; withdraw to fav-
orable defensive positions and battle the invaders there; or surrender, 
which was not considered a serious possibility. The Americans thought 
that the Germans would not be involved in counterattacks against the 
beachhead. The Italians planned to fight at the water's edge, with a 
small force close to the beaches, and a reserve force available to shift 
to any seriously threatened sector. The.major flaw of the Axis plan was 
their lack of transportation. The German units would have to be the 
reserve because of their mobility. They would be capable of independent 
action and able to move without orders from the Italian commander, for 
the Germans thought that the Italian will to fight had all but disappear-
ed. If a determined counterattack was launched before the Americans 
could land tanks and artillery, the Germans felt that it might be possi-
ble to push them back into the sea. At Gela this plan almost worked. 4 
The Americans planned to land in the Gulf of Gela over a distance 
of about seventy miles. About half of that distance was sandy shore 
line; the remainder was rocky points and low cliffs, while inland there 
we~e plains surrounded by mountains. The three American beaches were 
considered ideal for landing, but they were also ideal counte.rattack 
country. If the Italians and Germans carried out their plans to defend 
the island, then the Americans could be in for a difficult time. The 
invasion forces were commanded by British General Sir Harold R. L. G. 
Alexander. In his opinion, the main effort would fall on the British 
Eighth Army, commanded by General Bernard L. Montgomery, while the Amer-
icans Seventh Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Georges. Patton, Jr., 
would be the shield protecting the British left flank. This plan 
relegated the Americans to a secondary role, which neither the men 
nor their firey, hard fighting commander thought appropriate. 5 
The American Seventh Army was scheduled to land at three 
different sites. On the east, CENT FORCE, the 45th Infantry 
Division (the Oklahoma National Guard division), was to land at 
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Scoglitti. In the center, DIME FORCE, the 1st Infantry Division and 
the 2d Armored Division (minus Combat Command A), was to land at 
• 
Gela. These two landings were under the American II Corps, commanded 
by Major General Omar N. Bradley. On the west, JOSS FORCE, the 3d 
Infantry Division reinforced by Combat Command A of the 2d Armored, 
was to land at Licata. One other division, the 82d Airborne, was sup-
posed to make an air drop in the Gela region to aid the landing force. 
JOSS was a separate command from II Corps, whose composition had been 
decided before it left North Africa. The infantrymen and Combat 
Command A had trained together in landing operations, securing initial 
objectives, and establishing beachheads. Its first day mission was 
to capture the port and airfield at Licata, and take the high ground 
soon after. Patton wanted all three forces to take their initial 
6 
objectives in three days. 
Combat Command A sailed with the 3d Infantry Division as its 
reserve force. It was to be ready to execute one of four missions: 
to advance north on Campbello di Licata, to move west on Palma di 
Montechiaro, to move east to reinforce II Corps, or to meet and destroy 
any enemy counterattack from the east, north, or west. Colonel John 
H. Collier warned his 66th Armored Regiment that they were to insure 
the maintenance of American ideals in human relations. The men were 
charged with the proper care and treatment of women and children; no 
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misconduct along that line would be tolerated. The task force arrived 
at its station at 0245 on 10 July 1943 and the 3d Infantry Division 
and the 3d Ranger Battalion went ashore a few minutes later. The 
initial assault, supported by the 3d Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 
aided the infantry landing teams in clearing and establishing the 
beachhead. By daylight most resistance had been overcome, with the 
landings carried out on schedule. The other elements of Combat Command 
A were to land as quickly as the situation permitted. 7 
The bulk of Combat Connnand A spent most of the day on their 
LST's, subjected to continuous bombing. By noon, infantry and engineers 
landed at the port of Licata and began unloading. By working all night, 
the men were able to unload all the personnel and about two-thirds 
of the equipment. After unloading, the men went to assembly areas 
north of the town. On 11 July, enemy bombers hit an LST carrying 
about half the equipment for Combat Connnand Headquarters, a medium 
tank company, and vehicles for an infantry company. Before the LST 
sank, the men managed to unload fourteen medium tanks, but were unable 
to save the remainder of the gear. Personnel losses were estimated 
to be about 25 percent of the men on the ship. 8 
During the night of 10-11 July, the 62d Armored Field Artillery 
Battalion and two batteries of the 443d Coast Artillery Battalion 
(Antiaircraft Artillery) were attached to Combat Command A. For the 
62d, this was the first of a long series of attachments to tpe division. 
At midnight, Brigadier General Maurice Rose was ordered to attack at 
0600 on 11 July, to secure the towns of Naro and Canacatti, and the 
hills north of Canacatti, against possible counterattacks from the 
German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which had been spotted returning 
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to the west by air observers. Rose gave orders that the remainder of 
the command should close on the main body by company size units as 
soon as they landed. 9 
The reconnaissance company moved out at 0330, leading the combat 
command into Naro. The remainder of the command followed at 0600. 
Initially the men met resistance from snipers and some machine 
guns. Enemy planes strafed and bombed the column, but inflicted 
little damage. The worst problems were caused by the poor roads and 
difficult terrain. Just outside the town, the column was met by 
two civilians, the mayor and his small son. The mayor told them that 
the town was unoccupied and the people were not hostile. They rode 
back into town on the hood of Colonel Sidney R. Hinds' half-track, 
at the head of the column. The exits to the town were quickly secured 
and two officers and a platoon of infantry were left to police the town, 
while awaiting AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory) 
officials. The combat command then moved north, coiling in the woods, 
The 2d Armored Division had captured its first Sicilian town. 10 
Shortly after Naro was captured, the American Air Corps sent over 
a flight of eighteen B-26 bombers, and partially destroyed the town. 
The attack resulted from the Air. Corps refusal to permit direct air-
ground communications and by their refusal to recognize that the 
situation on a battlefield is fluid, which could change without notice. 
Unfortunately, the Air Corps was using phase lines and refused to 
recognize that some advances were more rapid than others. Usually, 
the Air Corps was about twenty~four hours behind the actual battlefield 
situations. This was not the first time, nor would it be the last, 
in which American tr9ops. suffered because of the uncoordinated efforts 
of the Air Corps and ground troops. 11 
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After taking Naro, Major General Lucian Truscott, commanding 
general of the 3d Infantry Division, ordered the Combat Command to 
send reconnaissance elements towards Canacatti. B Company, 82d Re-
connaissance Battalion proceeded about a mile before spotting some 
Italian soldiers. First Lieutenant W.R. Neilson brought up two light 
tanks and started through the pass. The tanks halted before proceed-
ing around a curve in the narrow road, a curve that was found to be 
covered by four large caliber guns. Two 37mm assault guns were brought 
forward to help the advance, but Italian machine guns on the high 
ground took the reconnaissance company under fire. The Americans, 
however, were able to fight their way out of the trap without a loss. 
The remainder of the column, moving north behind the reconnaissance 
company, was attacked from the air by German aircraft. After fighting 
off the planes,_the command proceeded on their way with the infantry-
men of G Company, 4lst Armored Infantry Regiment, riding the tanks of 
D Company, 66th Armored Regiment; this was possibly the first time that 
this had happened, at least in actual battle. 12 
Since the enemy was dug in, B Company, 82d Reconnaissance Batta-
lion, called for infantry help. After G Company, 4lst Armored Infantry 
Regiment, arrived, riding the tanks of D Company, 66th Armored Regi-
ment, they made slow progress against the Italians. Under the cover 
of darkness, the enemy pulled out and the Americans had the pass, 
four miles short of their objective, Canacatti. During the night 
the Americans moved forward to capture the high ground south of the 
town and made plans to resume th.e attack the following morning. 13 
The attack to take Canacatti was to be proceeded by a ten minute 
artillery barrage after which Companies F and G, 66th Armored Regiment, 
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and Company G, 41st Armored Infantry, were to attack, seizing the 
southern entrances to the town. When the barrage lifted, a white 
flag was seen flying from a building in the town. Brigadier General 
Rose and Colonel Hinds mounted their vehicles and headed into town 
to receive the surrender. While making their way along the road, they 
were fired on by artillery. Rose and his party dived into a nearby 
ditch and a thirty minute artillery barrage followed. The town was 
finally captured about 1500 on 12 July and the confusion of the white 
flag was explained. It was found to be a Red Cross flag atop a 
h . l 14 osp1ta. 
After the town was secured, the infantrymen mounted the tanks 
and moved to take the high ground northeast of town._ H Company, 
41st Armored Infantry Regiment, attacked to take the ridges north 
of town. Progress was slow, but the infantrymen secured their 
objectives against enemy machine gun and antitank fire. During the 
night the command was reorganized and the following morning (13 July) 
attacks were launched to clear the high ground northwe-st··of Canacatti. 
The attack started at 1600 and by 1030 the enemy had been driven out of 
positions overlooking the town~ After capturing the high ground, 
Combat Command A sent reconnaissance patrols toward the outskirts of 
Caltanissetta. During the night two men, an officer and an enlisted 
man, moved through enemy lines into Caltanissetta·, stole two bicycles 
and rode them back, reporting to their regime:ntalcommander, Colonel 
Hinds. After seizing Canacatti, Combat Conunand A·was the 3d Infantry 
Division's reserve force. While in that role, Rose continued to send 
out reconnaissance patrols which were so aggressive that they actually 
captured several towns without the aid of the main body of the combat 
command. 15 
278 
Patton, an aggressive leader,did not like conducting secondary 
attacks, and he requested permission from Alexander to capture Arigento. 
The Army Group connnander replied that he would permit that if Patton 
could capture the town by a reconnaissance in force. Patton promptly 
ordered Truscott to take the town by a reconnaissance in force--all the 
force he had: the 3d Infantry Division, part of the 82d Airborne 
Division, two Ranger Battalions, and a task force from the 2d Armored 
Division. 16 
When on 17 July it was reported that a strong enemy column was 
approaching from the northwest towards Aragona and Comotini, the 1st 
Battalion, '66th Armored Regiment, and the 14th Armored Artillery 
Battalion were alerted to meet the threat. However, air reconnaissance 
failed to reveal any such enemy and the armored troops were not used. 
That night, Combat Con$D.and A was ordered to assist the 15th Infantry 
Regimental Combat Team in its attack on Serradiffalco. Again Rose 
pushed strong reconnaissance elements into the area. Patrols of the 
4lst Armored Infantry Regiment moved towards San Cataldo and 
Caltanissetta ahead of the 15th Infantry Regiment. A reserve force of 
tanks and infantry went into assembly areas north of Canacatti ready 
for use. Patrols from the reconnaissance company, 66th Armored 
Regiment, captured and secured Serradiffalco by 2230. Art hour later, 
Company E of the 4lst Armored Infantry Regiment captured San Cataldo. 
The next morning, by 0730, patrols from the 66th Armored and the 4lst 
Armored Infantry Regiment had captured and secured Caltanissetta. 
By 18 July, the area of the 3d Infantry Division was secure and Patton 
ordered Combat Gonnnand A to rejoin the 2d Armored Division in Army 
reserve. 17 
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The 2d Armored Division (minus Combat Command A) sailed with the 
assault convoy. KOOL FORCE, as the Seventh Army reserve, was to 
execute one of two plans. Using Plan A, the tanks would land on an 
established beachhead, assemble, and await the orders of the 7th Army 
Commander. If the division had to carry out Plan B, it would force a 
landing at one or more beaches, and aid one of the other assaulting 
forces. Either plan would be carried out on Patton's order. KOOL 
FORCE, commanded by Major General Hugh J. Gaffey (an artilleryman and 
a pioneer in armor warfare), was composed of two major groups--the 
18th Infantry Regimental -_combat Team, commanded by·-colonel George A. 
Smith; and Combat Command B, c~mmanded by Colonel I. D. White. In 
Smith's force was his infantry regiment from the-lst Infantry Divi-
sion, an artillery battalion (the 32d), a company of engineers, a 
medical company, and two platoons of tanks from· I Company, 67th Armored 
Regiment. Combat Command B contained the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored 
Regiment; the first battalion, 41st _Armored Infantry Regiment; the 
78th Armored Artillery Battalion; Companies C and D of the 82d 
Reconnaissance Battalion; and B Company of the 17th Engineer Battalion. 18 
The convoy arrived off the Gela coast about·-0200 on 10 July. 
As the reserve, it had to spend most of the day aboard ship, enduring 
shell fire and bombing attacks. At 1330 Gaffey went to the flagship 
and received orders from Patton that Plan A was in effect. Gaffey sent 
a landing party ~shore, under Colonel Redding F. Perry (division 
Chief of Staff), to make provisions for assembly areas, routes and 
guides. Gaffey had beea told that the Navy would select the proper 
beach. However, either Major General Terry Allen, commanding general 
of the 1st Infantry Division, or his assistant division commander, 
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Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, decided that the tanks should 
land at a different site than the one originally selected, because of 
their concern that the beaches might be mined. Other factors in the 
change were the deep draft of the LST's, the unsatisfactory gradient of 
the original landing site, and the fact that some of the pontoons to 
be used in unloading the tanks were damaged, while others had landed 
at Scoglitti, out of the division zone. These changes, and the task 
force's arrival in cruising form~tion rather than landing formation, 
caused a two hour delay in the landing. Because of the delay the 
infantry elements were to be landed first as it was not feasible to 
return to sea, regroup, and arrive in landing formation. 19 
The first troops to land were the headquarters of Combat Command 
B, which went ashore about 1700 on D Day (10 July). Colonel I. D. 
White decided to use the area near the Gela-Faullo landing zone as 
the assembly area. The infantry elements started ashore about 1800 
and by midnight all Combat Command personnel were ashore. The tanks 
were in the process of being off-loaded from the LST's to the LCT's, 
but fatigue and the high seas caused the Navy to postpone landing more 
vehicles until daylight on 11 July. Two platoons of medium tanks had 
been landed about 0200 on 11 July, but they got stuck in the soft sand 
of the beach. The first day had been a rough one for the Americans. 
They had withstoocl several counterattacks by the Italian, but had also 
lost the pontoons to bring their tanks ashore. If the Germans decided 
to attack the Qeachhead before the 2d Armored Division could land its 
armored vehicles, the situation could become desperate. 20 
The next morning, when unloading resumed, the third platoon, 
C C011Jpany, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, received its vehicles and was 
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given the mission of locating enemy tanks whichwere supposedly 
operating against the east flank of the lst·Infantry Division near 
the Acata River. Finding the enemy, they kept·him·under observation 
until later in the day, when G Company·, 67 th Armored Regiment, engaged 
the enemy and drove him off. Two German divisions formed in the 
valley northeast of Gela, attacked towards the beachhead, and came 
very close to defeating the American landing efforts. When the German 
counterattack began about 0800 on 11 July, an estimated thirty to forty 
German tanks attacked the second battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, on 
• the 1st Infantry Division's right ~;lank -between Geia and Niscemi. 
Six officers and forty-five enlisted men kept beating off German 
attacks with one antitank gun, a bazooka, and finally a tank destroyer 
that joined them later in the day. This action saved the right flank. 21 
The headquarters element of Combat Command B had stayed ashore 
during the night. In the morning Colonel I. D. White returned to 
the beach, attempting to find any LST's that might be carrying the 
tanks. The Combat Command executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Briard 
P. Johnson, remained at the command post to guide any troops and vehicles 
to the assembly areas. Johnson and the headquarters·personnel were 
watching the 26th Regimental Combat Team attack along the Gela-Ponto 
Olivo road when they saw thirty or forty German tanks attack and 
penetrate the regiment. This put the Germans on the ~lain north of 
22 
Gela and gave them an apparent uqopposed approach to the beach. 
Johnson immediately sent the Combat Command S-2 to alert Colonel 
White and to bring First Lieutenant James A. White and his platoon of 
four medium tanks to the command post area. Whi~e the messenger was 
gone, Johnson tried unsuccessfully to locate the 33d Artillery Battalion. 
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Returning to the command post and surveying the situation through 
binoculars, he observed shells falling in and around the German tanks, 
apparently causing damage to one, for the crew dismounted and fled to 
the rear. While Johnson was placing the medium tanks in position to 
fire, others at the command post continued to count and determined 
that forty tanks came onto the plain, headed for the beach. 23 
The four American tanks were placed in firing positions astride 
the Gela-Vittorio road about where·it enters the high ground on the east 
side of the plain. Three tanks were on the north side of the road; 
one was on the south (Lieutenant White's). The·four·American tanks 
began firing, with Johnson standing on the b~ck deck of the platoon 
leader's tank, pointing out targets. The tanks were scoring hits 
against the approaching German Panzers at the same time that indirect 
fire from artillery batteries, 4.2 inch mortars, and perhaps naval 
gunfire, was landing in the area. The huge amount of indirect fire 
concealed the fact that direct fire weapons were there and firing. 
About the time that the American tanks started firing, a lone 105mm 
howitzer, from the 32d Artillery Battalion arrived, and the chief of 
section reported to Johnson for instructions. The howitzer was placed 
in position about forty to fifty yards from Lieutenant White's tank 
and started firing at the Germans. 24 
Colonel White rushed Companies D and C · (minus one .platoon) of 
the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, armed only with their side arms, to 
the command post. He feared that the Germans might be supporting 
their tanks with infantry. The men from the reconnaissance battalion 
had a grandstand view of the fight, as no enemy fire was falling in 
their location at that time. Suddenly fire began to· fall at the 
command post. The men took cover behind some nearby sand dunes. 
The use of reconnaissance personnel in such a manner caused their 
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel PaulA. Disney, to later 
say that this was a case of "grasping at straws. 1125 
283 
Four to six German tanks reached the main road, stopping close to 
a farm building. Johnson, who had visited the howitzer and given the 
gun crew a lesson in leading targets, returned to the tanks and resumed 
pointing out targets. The Germans were difficult to see because of 
the buildings. The tanks on the north side of the toad expended their 
ammunition and pulled back 400 to 500 yards, reloaded, and one tank 
returned to the fight. The Germans stopped near the farm buildings 
started moving forward; they were taken under fire by White's tanks and 
by the 105nnn howitzer. One tank was destroyed and the others pulled 
back. 26 
Johnson sent Major Joe A. Clema to ·the rear to find more ammuni-
tion, as White and the howitzer each had about four rounds left. He 
was unable to find any ammunition, but did return with an M-7 
self-propelled 105mm howitzer belonging to Cannon Company, 16th 
Infantry Regiment. One German tank that had stayed near the farm 
buildings had its turret turned towards the Americans. The infantry 
Captain commanding Cannon Company did not think that stanqing guard 
over a German tank was a proper mission for the self-propelled howitzer, 
but Clema finally persuaded him. The towed howitzer belonging to the 
32d Artillery Battalion departed to find its unit. 27 
The 2d Armored Division was acutely aware that tanks were 
needed, and did not spend time de-waterproofing them, as Samuel 
Eliot Morison has alleged, but rushed them inland as quickly as 
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they landed. The tank tracks became entangled in the Summerville 
matting (chicken wire placed on the ground to give better traction) 
which had to be cut from the tracks and drive sprockets. Several tanks 
tried to avoid the matting by traversing the soft sand which resulted 
in their throwing one or both tracks. 28 
When Major Clifton B. Batchelder, executive officer of the Third 
Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, came ashore, Colonel White told him 
to take the American tanks inland to meet the German Panzer attack. 
Batchelder asked what the plans and orders were. White remembered 
being told later that his rather abrupt answer was, "Plans Hell! 
This may be Custer's last stand." The executive officer led the tanks 
of G Company to the nearby sand dunes at about the time that the Germans 
started retreating through the smoke, and about the time that the 
self-propelled howitzer from Cannon Company arrived to help the 
American tankers. 29 
The attack of the Herman Goering Panzer Division was beaten off 
with a loss of fifteen German tanks, while the Americans had only 
three men wounded. Sheer bravery won the day for the Americans. 
During the battle, two tanks had stoppages or malfunctions with 
their main gun. The tank commanders (sergeants) calmly got out of 
their tanks and cleaned the bores of their weapons while under fire. 
One tank commander then led his tank to a better firing position. 30 
About 1100, the first battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment 
(minus Company A) was s·ent to join the Rangers at Gela for a proposed 
attack on Mount Lapa. The tanks were later pulled out about noon to 
support the regiments of the 1st Infantry Division. By dark, all the 
tanks of the third battalion, 67th Armored Regiment were ashore, along 
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with eight light tanks of D Company, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion. 
The remainder of the tanks came ashore the following day, giving the 
force a total of forty-two medium tanks attached to the 1st Infantry 
Division, and twenty-two medium and twenty-one light tanks under Combat 
Command B control. 31 
Gaffey issued orders late in the night on 11 July for KOOL FORCE 
to protect the flanks of the 1st Infantry Division, and to be prepared 
to counterattack enemy advances from the northwest or northeast. 
Combat Command B was to assemble, and be prepared to counterattack to 
the northwest, northeast, or southeast. It was to extend reconnaissance 
efforts to the southeast. This was done by sending out the 18th Infantry, 
tank remnants, and the engineers. C Company, 82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion, took numerous prisoners, and established contact with the 
45th Infantry Division at Vittoria and Cosimo. The engineers (B 
Company, 17th Engineer Battalion) put in minefields, prepared the 
bridges for demolition, and removed several enemy minefields. 32 
G Company, 67th Armored Regiment, was attached to the 16th 
Regiment. The following morning this force encountered antitank fire, 
artillery, and bombing and straffing attacks. The tanks were ordered 
to withdraw. When they started to do so, the lead tank, commanded 
by First Lieutenant K. E. Beichley, suffered damage and fell behind. 
The next four tanks passed him and stumbled into a German ambush. 
One tank, commanded by Sergeant William Belz, fought the German Tiger 
tank at a range of 100 yards but lost. However, ·as three German tanks 
passed Beichley's position, he destroyed them. The fight continued 
to rage in the 16th Infantry zone. The Germans attacked several times 
with tanks and infantry supported by aircraft. Their apparerit_goals 
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were to drive a wedge between the American forces or to reach the 
beachhead. By evening, after losing six tanks and three other vehicles, 
33 
the Germans withdrew, leaving the Americans in position. 
The third platoon of H Company was assigned a separate road 
blocking mission. It, and later in the day, A Company of the 41st 
Armored Infantry Regiment, was put in the gap on Hill 211 northeast 
of Gela, between the 16th and 26th Infantry Regiments. During the day, 
the tank platoon destroyed three German tanks and a command car. 
Being on dominant terrain, these two platoons were subjected to heavy 
artillery fire. However, they maintained their positions until reas-
signed to their parent units on 16 July.34 
In the 26th Infantry Regimental zone, two platoons of H Comapny, 
67th Armored R~giment, were supporting its advance to capture the 
Ponto Olivo airdrome. Supported by tanks firing as artillery, the 
infantry captured Il Costelluccia, after the tanks had knocked out 
several pillboxes and machine gun nests. First Lieutenant Van 
Valkenberg's tanks overran the airdrome, losing one tank to a land 
mine. The third platoon of H Company, on Hill 211, could see the battle 
below, and their fire knocked out two tanks, a weapons carrier, a 
motorcycle, and a personnel carrier. As the tankers overran the 
airfield, they captured a German artillery officer, four enlisted men, 
and uncounted Italians. 35 
The two platoons originally sent to Gela to support the Ranger 
attack on Mount Lapa had their mission changed, One platoon stayed 
to help the Rangers while the other was sent to aid the 26th Infantry. 
The attack to capture Mount Lapa was scheduled for the night of 11 
July, and the infantry phase had been accomplished. The attack was 
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supported by Company A, 83rd Chemical Battalion, firing 4.2 inch mortars 
and high explosive shells. At dawn the tanks were told to expose 
themselves, hopefully drawing enemy fire: they did! Returning 
the fire, they destroyed several enemy pillboxes and machine guns. 
Mount Lapa was captured ahead of schedule. The tanks then reconnoitered 
the high ground beyond, destroying two artillery and mortar observa-
. d h R k M N' 1 36 tion posts an t e angers too aunt ico a. 
The night of 13 July the Rangers and the 41st Armored Infantry 
were ordered to capture Butera, which the Navy had begun shelling 
earlier in the day. Company C, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, was to 
protect the flanks of the attacking force while the tank company 
(Company D, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion) was the force reserve. 
The Rangers, after capturing the city, were to take the high ground 
around Mount Lungo. American possession of that terrain would protect 
the left flank of the 1st Infantry Division. The attackers had seen 
a white flag from the town, but the attack proceeded as scheduled. 
Nearing the town, the Americans encountered heavy resistance on the 
outskirts. This was overcome, and with the capture of Butera by 0300, 
a large number of Italian prisoners were taken. The reconnaissance 
platoons continued northward and were in position to aid the 1st 
Infantry Division to capture Mazsarina, Pietroperzia, and Caltanissetta. 37 
In the period 11 to 14 July, Combat CommandB·had·attached most 
of its tanks to the 1st Infantry Division, and guarded the flanks and 
filled in the gaps that had existed in the American lines. On the 
morning of 14 July, all the tanks came under the control of the 2d 
Armored Division. Reports that enemy armor was massing southwest of 
Caltagirone required that the armor of Combat Command B be used to 
again protect the right flank of the 1st Infantry Division. The 
outpost road-blocking units were relieved by the 18th Infantry 
Regiment and rejoined Combat Command B, which was massed as force 
38 reserve from that date. 
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On the morning of the 16th, Allen reported that the 26th Infantry 
Regiment was being attacked by German tanks and needed help. Gaffey 
and Major General Geoffrey Keyes, who happened to be in the head-
quarters at the time, departed to examine the situation. The division 
commander alerted D Company, 82d Reconnaissance, and the 78th Armored 
Artillery Battalion and led them to meet the enemy. Arriving at 
Mazzarino, the two generals received word that the attack had been 
repulsed and that their help was not needed. The armored force returned 
. bl 39 to its assem y areas near Butera. 
That same day, Patton relieved the 2d Armored forces from patrols 
and outpost duty for maintenance and rehabilitation, and ordered the 
division to assemble near Campobello. This rest period resulted from 
the need to consolidate the division for a move planned by Patton. 
At this time, Patton and others thought that the Americans were being 
improperly used in the Sicilian campaign. He planned a spectacular 
move which, if successful, would capture public attention and gain 
favorable publicity which he thought the American soldiers needed. He 
created a provisional corps under Major General Geoffrey Keyes, the 
original chief of staff of the 2d Armored Division~ Keyes requested 
the "Hell on Wheels" division as part of this force,· In addition, 
he had the 3d Infantry and the 82 Airborne Divisions and the Ranger 
Battalions. The missions of this provisional corps were to clean out 
western Sicily and capture Palarmo. The 2d Armored Division was to 
follow the infantry division, ready to exploit their successes. 
Palermo attracted Patton like a "lode star." The city, although a 
port and the original landing site favored by Patton, had ceased to 
be of strategic value. It was hoped that by capturing the Sicilian 
capital, they would seize headlines at hOl!le and hopefully convince 
the British that the Americans could fulfill their role in the war. 
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Patton wanted the city taken in five days. The provisional corps 
assembled 100 miles from their objective, and with little or no 
transportation for the troops, captured the city in only four days. 40 
On 18 July, Combat Command A was relieved of its attachment to 
the 3d Infantry Division. The Combat Command also lost its attach-
ments (the 62d Armored Artillery Battalion, and two batteries of the 
443d Coast Artillery) and by 1330 had joined the division at 
Campobello. While the division was assembling, the 82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion sent a patrol to Pietraperzia and captured it by 1200; 
the men were favorably received by the civil population. The 82d 
Reconnaissance Battalion was then assigned the mission of providing 
reconnaissance for the provisional corps. At the same time the divi-
sion moved from its assembly area towards Castelvotrano and went into 
assembly areas south of Agrigento before morning on 19 July. 41 
While the 2d Armored Division was moving and preparing for 
battle, the intelligence section was making estimates of the situation 
based on the information being received. The enemy was thought to 
have about 60,000 Italian soldiers guarding western Sicily, which 
were believed to be badly equipped, pborly armed, . and for the most 
part were considered to be second-rate troops. They were thoµght 
to have three options: defend in place; defend in successt~e positions 
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and wage limited objective counterattacks; or defend in position and 
counterattack the western flank of the advancing corps. Based on enemy 
reactions up to that time, it was thought that the Italians would 
probably occupy the American troops while the Germans withdrew to 
final defensive positions near Messina. 42 
The 2d Armored Division stayed in reserve positions on 19 to 20 
July, but late in the evening of 20 July it was alerted to move to 
Ribera. They had to provide transportation for the 1st and 4th 
Ranger Battalions, to enable them to be in position to attack 
Castelvetrano. Meanwhile the Italian prisoners were helpfully 
providing information. They reported that the shoulders of the roads 
were mined, especially near roadblocks; and that booby traps could 
be expected. There was a report that the enemy w~s using gas, but 
this was considered erroneous, for Sicily produced·about ninety-five 
percent of the world's sulphur supply. The burni9g sulphur produced 
a pungent odor and gas, which was non-toxic.43 
The Provisional Corps issued the attack order on 20 July. The 
2d Armored Division, reinforced by the 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions, 
was to move to assembly areas, refuel, and be prepared for offensive 
action. Combat Command A was to lead the attack followed by Combat 
Command B, which was to be ready to exploit the success of or support 
Combat Command A. Combat Command B was to'assumeprotection of defiles 
after Combat Command A passed through them. The82d Reconnaissance 
Battalion was to conduct reconnaissance on the front and flanks.of 
Combat Command A, to block the southern exits from Castelvetrano and 
to protect the left flank and rear of the division. All artillery 
units were to be in direct support of Combat Co:qnnand A initially and, 
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except when actually moving, were to be in position to fire. Gaffey 
authorized and encouraged the use of captured enemy vehicles for clear-
ing enemy minefields, and supplementing the division's supply vehicles. 44 
Company C, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, preceded the 82d Airborne 
Division, making enemy contact at the Magazzola River. After a brief 
fight, the company took fifty-five pris.oners and continued to Ribera 
after removing the mines from the road. In taking the town, they 
acquired an additional seventy prisoners. On 21 ···July, C Company 
reached Alcamo, where the Italian garrison surrendered with great 
pomp and ceremony. The company captured a gasoline dump outside town, 
posted guards, and the rest of the unit pulled back to San Ninfa for 
the night. In the morning (22 July), C Company was to lead the 2d 
Armored Division into Palermo. Since their gas tanks were almost 
empty, because the company had not been resupplied during the 
night, the decision was made to use the captured gas. An armed convoy 
was sent for it, and apparently none of the vehicles were damaged from 
its use. This situation had arisen because supply vehicles had been 
pulled off the road by over-zealous and ill-advised staff officers who 
were attempting to insure that the division's combat elements reached 
their proper assembly areas. Because of damage to the roads, the 
company did have difficulty mov.ing from Alcamo. Some of the roads 
were cratered because of bombing, artillery fir~, and land mines. 
Bridges had been destroyed and in some places tpe road was blown away 
from the side of the hilt. 45 
The 2d Armored's move from Agrigento to assetnblyareas west of the 
Belice River was made against great difficulties. The main bridges 
had been destroyed, causing a detour through precipitous gorges, and 
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at times through railroad tunnels. Engineers worked to remove mines 
which were encountered, to construct bypasses, and to widen trails to 
serve as roads. In addition, the division had to move across the 
rear of two infantry divisions, sharing the same road with the two 
Ranger battalions, and a separate infantry regiment. Orders were 
received to attack at 0600 on 22 July to capture Palermo by 2000 that 
same day. The division was charged with securing the port area and the 
shipping in the harbor and preventing their sabotage. It was to 
patrol the city and docks and restore and maintain order until relieved 
by the 3d Infantry Division. This order led to the 4lst Armored 
Infantry receiving one of its most unusual •orders of the war: capture 
an enemy battleship that was ~.upposed to be in the Palermo harbor. 46 
Combat Command A crossed the Belice River line at 0600. The 
reconnaissance elements had made contact with the enemy and the 
advanced guard (3d Battalion, 4lst Infantry and E Company, 66th 
Armored Regiment) was moving across the river when the command was 
ordered to halt, permitting the 39th Infantry Regimental Combat Team, 
9th Infantry Division, and the 4th Ranger Battalion to pass through 
their lines. When the 2d Armored Division started moving again after 
the delay, it found the defiles defended by antitank guns and machine 
guns, which were wisely emplaced and well defended by infantry. 
Each strong point had to be eliminated one by one. The Italians 
continued to defend each position until surrounded by infantry and 
shelled by artillery or the tanks. These skirmishes were fought by 
the reconnaissance and leading.elements. 47 
The first determined enemy resistance occurred at the pass north 
of San Guiseppe. Company C, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, having 
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captured San Ninfa at 0930, disarmed the defenders, put their weapons 
into their jeep, and prepared to continue northward. At this time one 
of the Italians told them that the road ahead was mined and there 
were guns in position at the next pass. The company set out, using 
its customary precautions. The location was ideal for an ambush, for 
the road climbed up through a series of hairpin curves to a narrow 
pass at the top. As they started up the narrow r·oad, they ran into 
a minefield. However, the mines had been stacked by the side of the 
road, rather than put into the ground. Proceedingonward, they 
encountered thirty Italians who laid down their weapons and surrendered. 
The lead scout car had gone about a hundred yards further, when the 
prisoners indicated that something was ahead. Eustis and First 
Lieutenant Donald Chace conducted a reconnaissance by fire (firing into 
an area to see if any enemy fire would be returned), which was answered 
by heavy weapons; the second shot destroyed the scout car. Every 
weapon started firing and the two officers were trapped between 
the German fire and American artillery fire which had been called in 
and was falling in the area. Finally, the American artillery stopped, 
and the men moved forward, finding the first antitank gun destroyed 
by the American fire. All resistance was overcome by 1315 and the 
column moved through the pass. The enemy had been caught off guard 
and did not have time to prepare for the 2d Armored Division. The 
original thought, that the enemy would delay in a series of positions 
was correct, but the division was moving so rapidly that instead of 
falling back to successive positions, the enemy was having to fall back 
to alternate positions (i.e., instead of falling back from line A to 
line B, they had to fall back from line A to line C, and so on). 48 
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After the battle at San Guiseppe,· the 0 next·-f·ighewas the pass 
at Monreale. The 2d Armored Division surprised the Germans, who were 
emplacing mines and demolitions. Colonel Hinds, ·with the advance 
guard, had been disappointed with the performance of G Company, 4lst 
Armored Infantry Regiment, and promised them the regiment's next rough 
assignment. This was it. The Germans had three or four antitank 
guns in position and protected with infantry and machine guns. Mortar 
and artillery fire destroyed several of the enemy gurts and the last 
one was taken out by a platoon of G Company, led by Second Lieutenant 
Naupis. The platoon leader remembered the Fort Benning Platoon 
Problem A, and in the attack, the men killed or captured the entire 
gun crew. An American assault gun fired around into the casement, 
insuring that the German gun would not be fired again. The gate to 
49 Palermo was open. 
About 0930 Combat Command B moved from its assembly area, following 
Combat Command A, until ordered into bivouac about Camporeale. Colonel 
White went to division headquarters, where he was ordered to advance 
along the division's west (left) flank, generally along Highway 113. 
He was to clear enemy resistance to the north and west and to assist 
Combat Command A's capture of Palermo. Leading elements made contact 
about 1200, approximately four miles south of Partinico, when they were 
fired on by four 105nnn guns and mortars. After destroying the guns 
and capturing an ammunition dump, their march continued, with the command 
meeting resistance all the way to Partinico, which it entered about 1500. 
Light and medium tanks took the lead, and the advance continued against 
lessening enemy resistance. About four miles south of Terracini, 
Combat Command B captured 350 mountain troops and continued their 
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march northward. Three miles north of town, leading elements came 
on a large crater blown in the road. After the engineers constructed 
a bypass, and about twenty-five German prisoners had been taken, the 
reconnaissance elements scouted the defile ahead; ·removing mines and 
overcoming several tank traps. The march resumed ·towards Carini, 
where the mountain had been blown down over the road, but reconnaissance 
found a trail over the mountain. The command passed over the mountain, 
descended to the town, and captured about 600 amazed Italians. White 
halted his men about three miles north of Carini for the night. 50 
As Combat Command A moved north from Monreale, B Company, 82d 
Reconnaissance Battalion, sent the first patrols into Palermo about 
1200. By 1500 the leading elements of Combat Command A reached the 
corps restraining line, after passing through minor sporadic resistance. 
When the patrols entered the outskirts about 1558, they met resistance 
from German gun crews. When the main body of the 2d Armored Division 
started moving, they were surprised by a Mercedes-Benz from Palermo 
that went speeding by. Realizing that it contained"several of the 
Italian staff, Colonel Hinds, who was with the advanced·guard, radioed 
back to stop the car and return the occupants and car to him. One of 
the occupants, General di Brigata Guiseppe Molenero, commander of the 
port defensles, volunteered to surrender to Keyes which he did at 1900 
at the Royal Palace, The reconnaissance battalion continued to patrol 
the city until relieved the next day. Patton, guided by the division 
chief of staff, entered the city about 2100.51 
The question of which division first entered the city has been 
argued ever since. Major General John P. Lucas expressed the hope 
that someone would eventually decide who entered the city first: the 
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2d Armored Division or the 3d Infantry Division. It has been alleged 
that Patton ordered the 3d Infantry to hold back so that he could 
make a triumphal entry with the 2d Armored. The Third Infantry 
Division history maintains that when the tankers entered the city they 
found the streets patrolled by Lieutenant Colonel-John A. Heintges' 
battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment. 52 
Colonel Sidney R. Hinds, with the advance guard, ·was riding in 
the third vehicle of the column. His regiment had been given the 
mission of capturing a battleship that was supposed to be in the harbor, 
but which had actually sailed the day previously. He maintained that 
the only American troops that beat him into the city were the two 
armored cars in front of his. Combat Command A's after-action report 
stated that the Reconnaissance Company, 66th Armored Regiment, patrolled 
the city during the night and were relieved by the 3d Infantry Division 
the following day. Further evidence that the 3d Infantry Division did 
not arrive prior to the 2d Armored Division was the staff car carrying 
the Italian general, who was looking for someone to whom to surrender. 
Had the 3d arrived before the tankers, he could have surrendered to 
them. 53 
On 23 July, both combat commands had entered·the city and began 
patrolling and guarding the docks, banks, utilities, ·and·other impor-
tant buildings as a precaution against looting.·· The same day, Combat 
Connnand B was ordered to clean out the western end of the island, 
which it did. Major General Gaffey divided the 2d Armored Division 
zone of occupation into three parts,_assigning the city proper to 
Colonel Thomas H. Roberts, division artillery connnander. The combat 
connnands had approximately equal size areas on the outskirts and sur-
rounding area. 54 
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By utilizing the speed attained by tracked vehicles, the 2d Armored 
Division suffered only 56 killed, 250 wounded, 32 ~issing, and had 5 
men captured. During combat, the division captured-16,199 Germans 
and Italians. However, the division was not used advantageously. 
Had it been concentrated and landed as a whole, then the attacks may 
well have been quicker and the results more productive. The decision 
to split the division into combat commands, operating ·separately in 
two different roles pointed out the same vital lesson the maneuvers 
had demonstrated: senior commanders needed to be familiar with armor 
tactics. The division learned that something woqld have to be d,one 
to correct the inability to work with the Air Cqrps. During the 
Sicilian campaign, the Americans suffered more from the errors of the 
American Air Corps than it did from the Luftwaffe. In one weelf~ 
Combat Command A lost fourteen vehicles and seyenty-five men killed ., 
or wounded by friendly aircraft. Brigadier General Rose had ordered 
the command not to fire on friendly aircraft, but one day the ~ericans, 
l .. · • ·. 1 
l 
in self-defense, shot down a P-38. The pilot b~iled out and s~ffered n9 
\ 
injury, except to his pride. The Air.Corps got the message, however, 
and air attacks stopped for the duration of the c~~paign. 55 
: l .· 
The capture of Palermo was a brilliant maneuv~r which closely 
I , • • • 
resembled several exercises that the 2d Armored, D!yision·had partici-
pated in during the Tennessee and Louisiana tp.ane-q~~rs of 1941. Several 
men in the reconnaissance battalion commented Fh~t they had pulled the 
wide sweeping, flanking movement before. Thoq.f;'titis expressed during th,f 
prewar exercises, that the tankers could not do ~ucµ during wartime, 
56 
were proven to be erroneous. · The division clearly demonstrated that 
its previous training had been valid, and the long hours spent in the 
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maneuver field saved lives; with the battl:e-·shcrrt"en·ect··accordingly. 
Patton, who wanted Palermo·"taken· in five days, ·started the attack from 
100 miles distant. The city was in Americans-hands··±n four days; the 
2d Armored Division had entered the fight; shortened "it, .as it had 
repeatedly done during training. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
THE SICILIAN-ENGLISH INTERMISSION 
Following twelve days of combat in Sicily, the 2d Armored Division 
entered a period of military occupation. Unlike its duty in North 
Africa, the tankers had an active role in the military government of 
Sicily. The island was the testing ground for the government of occu-
pied territories, and the military worked out procedures which would 
later be employed in c·aptured towns and cities in Germany, 
The 2d Armored Division was ordered to be ready to carry out one of 
several missions, Its primary mission was to administer and police the 
Provisional Corps' zone of occupation. As the Seventh Army reserve, 
it had to be ready to move east into combat on twelve hours notice, 
while division artillery was to be. ready to move east.:on six hours 
notice. Also the men were to be ready to embark and engage in amphi-
bious operations with only seventy-two hours notice.l 
While making plans for their tactical assignments, the men had to 
get their vehicles and equipment into battle condition. The first con-
sideration was the thorough maintenance.of.vehicles, arms, and equipment. 
After that the men were to. resume trabling, with calisthenics and other 
hardening exercises, which were to be led by the officers. The combat 
vehicles had been in constant and heavy use since landing. The light 
tanks apparently caused the-most problems, for their tracks were.almost 
worn throu&h, Combat· .. efficiency was low because of the lack of spare 
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parts, particularly tank engines and tracks. The tank engines needed 
extensive overhaul or replacing, and the wheeled vehicles had not been 
serviced or checked during operations. The situation began to improve 
in the latter part of August 1943, as.replacement parts began to arrive. 
On 21 August, the division received a report that replacement tracks 
for the light tanks had been lost at sea, However, by the time the 
division left Sicily, the tracks had been replaced and the equipment was 
ready for use, as the needed parts finally arrived,2 
Training resumed in earnest, starting with school for the soldier 
and progressing to small unit problems. The men were also given every 
opportunity to swim. They were cautioned that they would maintain high 
standards of military courtesy, discipline, conduct, and dress; cormnand-
ers were to stress proper wearing of the uniform, The men were to 
shave daily, except when engaged in actual operations; then they woul9 
have to shave at least every other day. They were to wear their steel 
helmets and to carry their appropriate weapons. One added feature in 
the training was the firing of.captured weapons. The men received in-
structions in handling civil disorders., as that was one of their primary 
missions at that time.· They took long road marches despite bad weather. 
One platoon leader, Morton Eustis, thought that it was high time that 
the men got back into condition,3 
As much as the vehicles needed maintenance, and as much as the men 
needed to be kept at a peak of efficiency, the division's main mission 
was to police and govern the occupied area of Sicily. The Allies 
attempted to make maximum usage of the civilian authorities. AMGOT 
(Allied Government of Occupied Territory) was brought into existence 
with the P\lJ:'pose of keeping the military out of government as much as 
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possible. The thinking was. simple; by not-having to.worry about the 
civil population, the military was free to concentrate on fighting the 
war. The AMGOT officials worked through local officials, mayors, 
priests, and police. Their goal.was to preserve order, feed the people, 
and make few changes, while removing as many of the Fascist trappings 
as possible. The local officials were interviewed and, if their record 
was acceptable, were retained in office; if not, they were removed and 
replacements were found.4 
Two days after entering Palermo, th~ 2d Armored Division G-2 issued 
a warning that while the enemy would probably not-interfere with the 
occupation, sabotage could be expected; therefore guards, sentries, and 
patrols should be on the alert to prevent hostile acts. He·cautioned 
that time would be needed to clean out small pockets of resistance, to 
disarm the civilians and deserters, and to institute a system of govern-
ment. The western end of the island (the 2d Armored's sector) was 
divided into three sections, with each combat 1 command responsible for 
the policing of its sector. The Palermo military district was the res-
ponsibility of Colonel Thomas H. Roberts, Jr., the division artillery 
commander. The three area commanders: Brigadier General Maurice Rose 
of Combat Command A, Colonel I. D. White of Combat Command B, and 
Roberts, were to include route reconnaissances, guard posts, patrols, 
and to draw up plans to repel any attacks, seaborne or airborne. 5 
Palermo, itself, was divided into two equal sections and assigned 
to Companies Band C, 82d Reconnaissance Battalion. The main streets 
were constantly patrolled, while the smaller or less important ones 
were patrolled at staggered intervals; the outlying districts were 
patrolled once daily. Permanent guard posts were established at the 
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railroad yards, water works, fuel pumping stations, public buildings, 
and the radio station, Members of the Carabinieri Reale, the civil 
police, rode in patrol cars with the Americans. Bars and eating estab-
lishments were inspected to insure cleanliness; .if any discrepancies 
were noted, they were placed off limits.6 
The downtown area was filled with craters and destroyed buildings. 
with the waterfront a mass of rubble. When the division took over, the 
civilians had scattered to thecountryside. Those that had stayed had 
been without food and water for about, five days. The division began 
to help make the city livable again. The engineers removed mines, 
filled in tank traps, removed roadblocks and built bypasses around the 
destroyed buildings and craters, and restored radio and telecommunica-
tions within the division zone. The men extended a.helping hand in the 
restoration of health, food supplies, and public finances. The city 
began to recover and, by the time the·division left.Sicily, signs had 
appeared in hotels saying "the officers, under officers, and soldiers 
are begged to pay for their rooms on advance, and signed by the direc-
tions .• 117 
While carrying out the military government of the island, and while 
patrolling, the 2d Armored Division arrested those who violated curfew 
or blackout regulations, had weapons in their possession, or who were 
illegally transporting grain or flour. The prime candidates for arrest 
were military age males who could not account for not being in the 
military. Some Italians had deserted their units and gotten civilian 
jobs while the 2d Armored Division was overrunning the western end of 
the island. Some Germans were reported on the island and patrols went 
in search.of them; apparently several were captured. 8 
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A nonfraternization policy had been instituted after an American 
soldier was arrested for driving a weapons carrier that· con·tained· seven 
male and female civilians. Blackmarket activities began to surface~ 
and many civilians with government issue items in their possession.were 
arrested. Investigations revealed that the prima~y offenders were from 
the 53d Quartermaster Battalion in Palermo.9 
Much of the credit for stopping looting must be given to the 
Carabinieri, who were under American control. The primary concern of 
the Sicilian police and the Americans was the maint~nance of order; the 
best way to accomplish this was by a rationing system, insuring that 
the people received a fair amount of food. Many farmers refused to 
bring their grain to town; instead they held it back to sell at an in-
flated price or hoarded it. At Pirizzi, the citizens rioted when local 
officials started taking grain from the warehouses, and men.from.the 2d 
Armored Division were promptly dispatched. The situation was- soon. under 
control. Near San Cipirello a Carabinieri,was wounded attempting to 
stop a man for illegally transporting grain. His assailant escaped, 
and the local police considered th~ incident part of the Mafia activi-
ties. The division G-3 report noted that, when distributing grain, it . 
was necessary for t}J.e division to do it, because the local authorities 
did not give the ._matt~r proper. supervision. 10 
The 2d Arm.ored Division also had to secure and capture all weapons 
and ammunition that co4ld possibly fall into enemy hands.· All the 
ammunitie>n was to be collected into a central area. At one dump near 
Perciain, the ammunition e~ploded for some unknown reason, sending an 
American soldier and eight prisoner of war laborers to the hospital with 
second degree burns. Investigation later revealed that the division 
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ammunition officer, Second Lieutenant.L. E. Lawrence, heard a loud pop, 
probably a booby trap, then saw a flash as the powder exploded. Thir-
teen people were killed when an ammunition dump exploded near San 
Guiseppe, and several other dumps exploded for unknown and unexplained 
reasons.: Civilians were apprehended for having military equipment in 
their possession. One, who threw hand grenades at a guard near the 
division water point, was arrested, taken to Partinico, and his house 
locked up, A fisherman was arrested and jailed for fishing with dyna-
mite, and a second man was jailed for allegedly giving the explosives 
to him. 11 
About 1950 on 20 August 1943, a patrol from the Third Battalion, 
41st Armored Infantry Regiment, found sixty-nine drums of mustard gas. 
The. following day the 2d Armored Division took over sixty barrels of a 
persistent gas (probably mustard gas) from the 82d Airborne Division. 
The barrels (50 gallons each) totalled 6,450 gallons, This may well 
have been the most.frightening experience the division had on Sicily. 
Earlier the odor of burning sulphur had raised the possibility that the 
Axis was using gas. The men had received chemical training in North 
Africa before going to Sicily, and they did have gas masks available. 12 
One of the most serious situations was the apparent sabotage of 
the 2d Armored Division's communic~tion lines. Patton ordered the 
lines patrolled according tq standard procedure and authorized the shoot-
ing of anyone caught trying tq sabatage the lines. He indicated that 
the house or nearest dwelling to the scene of the sabotage, on a second 
attempt, would be torn down. Brigadier General Rose bluntly ordered the. 
wire guards to shoot on sight.anyone cutting communications •. Four days 
after the order was issued, a wire guard shot and wounded a civilian. 
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The same day, Gaffey sent a message.to Hinds: "the Commanding General 
desires. to compliment . the soldier who shot the wire saboteur today.'·' 
Patton was apparently not entirely pleased, for two days later he sent 
a message to Gaffey: "target practice for wire guards indicated." 
Apparently the civilian that had been shot was going to be tried for 
sabotage, for on 11 August Keyes-indicated that he wanted to make an 
example of him. The shooting of the civilian, however, did not stop 
the wire cuttings. Periodic reports and the regimental and battalion 
logs indicate that they conttnued and perhaps even increased during 
August, but.decreased and then stopped as the division spent more time 
on the island. 13 
Along with the wire problems, there were several reports of clan-
destine radios and other illegal means of communications. In late 
August.a special team was formed to try to find these radios. A few 
days later, the 2d Armored Division was also informed that someone was 
burning flares in Borgetto. Investigation revealed that a civilian was 
watering his tomatoes when a stoppage occurred in the communal water 
system, which flowed through his garden. He _had lit several cornstalks, 
and walked back and forth several times along the water system, in an 
effort to find where the problem was. This explanation was deemed un-
satisfactory at the tim~, and the man was jailed. Apparently his case 
was decided by AMGOT, for the division records do not mention this 
again. Another light scare was caused by several unshielded lights in 
civilian homes and by brushfires. These incidents were.viewed as 
accidental and not.intended to signal enemy ships or planes. In October, 
an Italian seaplane landed near Palermo. The crew said that the G~rmans' 
in Rome had burned the planes there when the Italian crews refused to 
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fly them to Germany. This one seaplane was repaired and the Italians 
flew it to Sicily so that they could surrender to the Americans. 14 
All was not work, even though Morton Eustis lamented in the middle 
of October that they were still patroling, and "God knows if we will 
ever fightagain." In September, Gaffey had issued a directive that 5 
percent ot the command could be issued passes in accordance with exist-
ing policies. However; enlisted men were forbidden to enter Palermo 
and Sterrativallo except on official business. In August, the troops 
were treated to a U.S.O. (United Service Organization) show featuring 
Bob Hope and Francis Langford.15 
Eustis described the daily life of patrols in his letters home. 
The reconnaissance.personnel conducted raids against blackmarketeers, 
stopped riots at breadlines, escorted drunks to the stockades, and on 
one.occasion, while taking a woman to a hospital, al~ost.had a baby 
born in their vehicle; they beat the stork by about two minutes. As a 
result of the patroiling, members of the 82d Reconnaissance.Battalion 
were familiar with all.the back alleys and bombed-out rooms, because 
they were attempting to stop the "migrant women'' who moved from room to 
room in pursuit of their trade. 16 
In lighter moments, the officers had parties which were fun, once 
the generals departed. C Company, 82d Recortnaissance Battalion had a 
unique.party. The men.swamped the town with invitations to "Gentile 
Signorina", telling them to be at a certain loading point at a certain 
time. The more than forty girls "of questionable virtue" may have in-
cluded some "genteel" ones, but as Eustis confessed, "who cares in that 
kind of party. 11 17 
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The Germans, during thefr stay on the island, had waged a propa-
ganda war against the United States. As the 2d Ar~ored Division's civil 
government personnel moved through the town of.San Guiseppe they saw a 
civilian carrying a sign reading, "Long Live the United Nations.· Long 
Live Liberty. For twenty years we have been forced to keep silent. We 
welcome you so that we may again have Liberty and Freedom." Many 
civilians were surprised that the women were not raped, and that homes 
were not looted or pillaged during combat or the American occupation. 
The Americans had been portrayed as vicious, barbaric, and bloodthirsty. 
The Americans did make one startling discovery; the Germans had fed 
their troops the same horror stories as those told to the Sicilians. 
However, because German prisoners in Canada had been permitted to write 
about their conditions and treatment, refuting the Nazi propaganda, the 
German troops apparently did not believe the propaganda. 18 
Prisoner of war interrogation teams of th~ 2d Armored Division were 
busy questioning the large number.of prisoners. The Germans talked 
about their equipment and munitions. A mine had been developed that 
could only be removed by exploding it after it had been emplaced. The 
Germans also had a new type "S" mine, which looked exactly like the 
older model, but had an antilifting device built into it. The new model 
had a hole in its base to install a pull igniter. Also developed was 
an antitank weapon made of two containers connected by wires; once on a 
tank, the weight of the containers pulled the wire that was also the 
fuze. The Russians had combated this device by surrounding their tanks 
with barbed wire. In another type device, the Germans used the prin-
ciple of the shaped charge. The "Hollow Magnetic Grenade" was held on 
the tank by three magnets, and the detonation was concentrated at one 
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point. Also described was a flamethrower.with a range of fifteen to 
twenty-five meters and a life of seven to eight seconds •. The inter-
ragator noted that the source of this information said that this piece 
of equipment never.functioned properly.19 
The questioning also revealed much about American soldiers and 
their weapons.· American infantrymen were reported not.to take proper 
concealment measures during advances towards an objective. Their artil-
lery and mortar fire had adverse effects on German and Italian morale. 
One prisoner, Lieutenant Colonel Altini, said that the main reason many 
surrendered was to get away from the artillery and mortar fire. The 
American fragmentation grenade was not considered equal to the German. 
one because the American grenade fragmented into large chunks, while 
the German one fragmented into small chunks. 20 
Where AMGOT officials were not available, the men of the 2d Armored 
Division had to be their representatives. Their instructions were care-
fully detailed, so as not to cause problems. They were to request 
permission before using civilian cars or billet$, and captured enemy 
supplies and equipment. The town commanders were to call local meet-
ings, establish the local judiciary, and reopen minor courts at once. 
The banks were to be closed except to lend the city money, and if money 
was not available, then the town commanders were to notify AMGOT, who 
would make funds available. At Godrano, where tax collectors were con~ 
fiscating private property, allegedly for use by the United States 
21 government, the tax collectors were arrested. 
In the latter part of September 1943, the 2d Armored Division had 
been alerted for movement to another theater of operations. The men. 
were to take their clothing, two wool blankets, two pairs of service 
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shoes, and three pairs of light wool socks. They would carry one 
magazine or clip for their individual' weapons.· The units were permitted 
to take those housekeeping items that were necessary for administrative 
work: typewriters, desks, safes, coin counting, duplicating, computing, 
adding, mimeographing, and pay roll machines. They could take all 
signal equipment not mou~ted in combat vehicles, with the exception of 
the SCR-299's. The division was also permitted to take one steel tread-
way bridge.and the vehicles necessary for it. That the division's 
destination was England, was known to very few. In October, an order 
assigning code numbers for the movement arrived, and the order was sent 
to several other headquarters, including the "CG ETO," (Commanding 
General, European Theater of Operattons).22 
Patton had issued an order alerting the 2d Armored Division for 
movement, and directing that the division would be.organized according 
to the latest T/0 and T/E (Table of Organization and Tables of Equip-
ment). The new organization, which would be termed "Light'.', would have 
the division lose three regiments: the 66th and 67th Armored, and the 
41st Armored Infantry. In their place the.division would have three 
tank battalions and three infantry battalions. In effect, the division 
was to lose over.fifty percent of its tank strength and a lesser part 
of its infantry strength.23 
The pace began to quicken; in the last week of October 1943, the 
division was ordered to assemble.(minus the detachments that were in 
North Africa) near Capaci by 3 November. They were to be relieved of 
their area of police responsibility by 1 November. Once at Capaci, the 
men were.to be.restricted to the area. On 27 October, Brigadier General 
Maurice Rose was selected to.lead an advance party of three officers 
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and eighty-one enlisted personnel to their new area. These personnel, 
primarily from the 17th Engineer Battalion, the Maintenance and Supply 
Battalions, the 142d Signal Company and two from division headquarters, 
were to make the necessary advance arrangements for th~ division. 24 
The 2d Armored Division was ordered to turn in its property, e~cept 
for the vehicles that were necessary to move to the staging area, between 
25 and 29 October. The equipment was to be made ready for use; the 
vehicles and weapons were to be thoroughly cleaned and oiled. On 9 
November the destination was revealed to some of the officers. Major 
General Gaffey issued a memorandum to a select number of officers, 
stating that the division was going to the United Kingdom, where.they 
would draw new equipment and make preparations for the continuation of 
the war against the enemy; the troops were to be told of their destina-
tion once they were at sea.25 
In North Africa, the rear echelon of the 2d Armored Division was 
undergoing the same preparations as it$ parent unit on Sicily. In the 
latter part of September, they were ordered to the port of Oran, turned 
in their equipment.and prepared to depart for the United Kingdom; they 
sailed on 14 November.26 
During the movement from Sicily and North Africa to England, the 
division took only those items necessary to start again. After the men 
loaded aboard ships and the ships were at sea, rumors began to circulate 
as to their destination. One story was that the division was returning 
to Fort Benning; the ships proceeded so far west, that one.man swore. 
that,he saw the.Empire State Building in New York City. On board ship 
the bunks were four high and close.t~gether, and the men slept in their 
clothing. 'l'hey were fed two meals a day, but could buy candy and crackers 
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from the ship's PX (Post Exchange) if they wanted anything else. Usually 
there was a high stakes dice game going on at each end of the various 
compartments. The ships docked at Liverpool, England, on Thanksgiving 
Day. The men ate Thanksgiving dinner aboard ship, but.in the words of 
the men of one unit, "it was som~thing not to _be thankful for. 1127 
After debarking, the men of the 2d Armored Division boarded.a train 
for the trip to Tidworth Barracks on the Salisbury Plain, a former 
English Army cavalry post,. The division was to draw new equipment, the 
main area of co~centration for the first few weeks. Arriving at their 
new post, the men. found that they would not have to live in pup tents 
as they had in North Africa. The 3d Armored Division had prepared the 
billets and bunks for the men to move into, as well as putting the 
kitchens ,in operating order, Later, 2d Armored would do the same for 
the 4th Armored. 28 
During the first week the men got settled into their barracks. 
There was-no central heat, but there were coal grates in each room. 
Although the weather was chilly and damp, the men.were not unhappy, for 
they were only sixty-four.miles fro~ London. Life in England was en-
joyable, at least the soldiers thought so. There were post exchanges, 
beer, movies, and one theater. They could get.daily passes to Salis-
bury, Andover, and Amesburg; forty-eight hour passes to London; and 
seven day furloughs to any other part of England or Scotland. The di-
vision maintained cordial relations with the British civil and military 
populations, Weekly dances were held, which were extremely popular with 
the British women. One especially popular feature of.these dances was 
the food which consisted of sandwiches, doughnut~, and coffee. On 
Christmas Day, the division played host to British war orphans. The 
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officers and men had saved their candy ration to share with the children, 
and later their turkey and Christmas extras. The men also vied with 
each ether to see who would wear the homemade Santa Claus suit. Some 
wondered who.had the most fun -- the kids or the men. 29 
There were,of course, some.complaints about the lµnericans being in 
England, However, Eustis told about the.local pub run by an elderly 
couple.that took the Americans in on.the strength of their tipping.· The 
pub owners seemed glad to have the Americans. Eustis also noted that 
the Americans had too much money, that.they were.too loud and boister-
ous, and that some were stealing British girls from their British boy-
friends. This caused friction. Eustis clo~ed a letter ta his mother 
by noting that the "Limeys" said there were "too bloody many Yanks 
around;" or as someone unknown put-it, the "Americans were overpaid, 
over sexed, and over here."30 
After getting settled into their new barracks, the men of the 2d 
Armored Division drew new equipment and began cleaning and testing the 
gear. Training resumed in earnest. The division started with the.in-
dividual and crew drill and went on to driver instructi.on •. The 66th 
Armored Regiment had a most unusual teaching method for drivers: chasing 
jackrabbits, the idea being that a rabbit.demonstrated all the moves 
necessary on the battlefield. After crew and squad training, the units 
progressed to platoon and company training. This was followed.by 
weapons firing and tactical training; then first .aid and weapons qual-
ifications, as well as supply discipline, This was basic training all 
over again, but designed to insure that nothing had been omitted, The 
division sent its regiments to the Imber and Minehead r~nges for man~ 
euvers and firing of tank guns,31 
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Training continued during the cold, wet winter for the 2d Armored 
Division. Many of the men had been at Fort Benning with Patton, and 
remembered that his philosophy of rugged, demanding training saved lives. 
In some respects the division packed the training they had received at 
Fort Benning and on the maneuvers into the few months now available. 
Special emphasis was placed on amphibious operations, mine detection, 
and booby-traps. Each division in England was required to train at 
least ten men to use mine dectors in the infantry, artillery, and sig-
nal battalions. All company grade officers (lieutenants and captains) 
of infantry and engineers were to be trained in directing artillery 
fire. The 2d Armored required this of its tank officers,32 
In January 1944, the 195th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Auto-
matic Weapons) (Self Propelled) was attached to the 2d Armored Division, 
and the division was ordered to incorporate it into its training; this 
attachment was to last throughout the rest of the.war. On 8 February 
1944, the division was assigned to XIX Corps, commanded by Major General 
Charles H. Corlett. Eisenhower told the Corps Commander to create a 
family feeling in the organization He did not want genius or brillance, 
but he did want common sense. The 2d Armored Division established ex-
tremely good relations with its fellow corps members, a relationship 
that was also to last through the conflict on the continent.33 
In April 1944, the Reconnaissance Battalion went to the British 
antiaircraft range. The men felt that it was better than garrison life 
with all the paperwork, policing, and emphasis on spit and polish. They 
spent a good deal of ttme firing at target sleeves; although this was 
not like the real thing to them, it .did teach them· a great deal. The 
other parts of the division were undergoing combined exercises with 
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their fellow corps partners and the British at Broadsands. 34 
While training, the 2d Armored Division was.threatened with having 
to reorganize into a smaller division. Under the proposed plan, the 
division would lose three regiments and get three tank battalions and 
three infantry battalions •. There would be 2,187 men.in the three tank 
battalions, as compared to 4,848 in the tank regiments. The three in-
fantry battalions would have 3,003 men as compared to 2,389 in the old 
armored infantry regiment. Division artillery would lose about 500 men, 
but the reconnaissance.battalion would have more men, 935 as compared to 
872; The most.drastic reduction would be in the engineer battalion 
which was to be cut.approximately fifty percent, from 1,174 to 693, 
while the supply.battalion was.to be.eliminated altogether. The new 
division structure was to have 10,937 men as compared to 14,620 men in 
the old structure. 
In equipment, the new·2d Armored Division organization would have 
127 fewer tanks (263 compared tq 390); fewer half tracks (501 compared 
to 733); and 977 less vehicles (3,630 compared to 2,653). The new 
arrangement would call for an increase in weapons: 174 more .30 caliber 
machine guns (465 compared to 291); 301 more .50 caliber machine guns 
(404 compared to 103); 643 more .45 caliber submachine guns (2,803 com-
pared to 2,160); 1,035 more M-1 rifles (2,063 compared to 1,628); but 
fewer- .30 caliber carbines (5,286 compared to 6,042), For some unknown 
reason, perhaps because of strong influential leaders such as Patton, 
Gaffey, and others who were in England, Eisenhower amended the order, 
permitting the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions to retain the regimental 
structure and directed them to draw up a list of needed equipment to 
send them into battle. So while the division did undergo some 
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reorganization, it .was internal. The old regimental structure was 
altered somewhat, for instead of having two medium and one light,battal~ 
ions per-tank reigment, they now had three battalions of.two medium 
companies and one.light company. This caused confusion because the 
light tank companies retained their old unit designation instead of 
being relettered.35 
Major General Earnest N. Harmon, conµnander of the .2d Armored 
Division in tqe landing of North Africa who had assumed corrnnand of the 
1st Armored Division in April 1943, was-in England. Harman, who prob-
ably had mare command experience in an armored division than anyone 
else in the Army at the time, recomme~ded that the infantry and armored 
elements be balanced to forge a team, with a second regiment attached 
to the division. He foresaw using the heavy divisions, with one.or 
two infantry divisions on the armored division's flanks, much like the 
opening exercise in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941. 36 
The 2d Armored Division commander, Major General Gaffey, wanted to 
eliminate the half tracks from the Armored Infantry regiment and re-
place them with trucks. Colonel Sidney Hinds argued with Gaffey about 
the idea. He teld Gaffey that if i~ were done, any infantry could 
function with the tankers. To Hinds' mind, armored infantrymen were 
specially trained for their role. In Sicily, the 41st Armored Infantry 
used half-tracks with tow hooks attached, permitting the regiment to 
capture and save enemy equipment found on the battlefield. Gaffey cast 
some aspersions on the "Gypsy Caravan," but,the half tracks and their 
strange assortment of.equipment contributed to the health, well being, 
and most importantly, the morale of the men. Apparently what Gaffey 
did not understand was that the infantrymen viewed their half-tracks 
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in the same manner as the tankers or artillerymen viewed their vehicles. 
The half-tracks could follow the advancing foot.soldier closely, carry-
ing those items that the infantryman could not.carry on his person, 
such as extra ammunition, mines, barbed wire, weapons and food, and, 
if necessary, could be used to evacuate the wounded or dead. 37 
Hinds was of the opinion that the current tables of equipment did 
not.provide for the maximum firepower and recommended that some.thought 
be given to the substitution of antiaircraft .SO caliber machine gums 
for the antiaircraft .30 caliber machine guns which the regiment then 
had. The regiment would need 42, but-the men would have a weapon of 
increased range-to defend themselves. He also wanted 108 .30 caliber 
ground-mounted machine guns (one for each rifle squad), and 27 quarter-
ton trucks in the·regiment. The Browning Automatic Rifle had been 
substituted for 81 M-1 rifles in the regiment (one per.squad), but he. 
would like to see the 60mm. mortar replaced with .27 longer-ranged 81mm 
mortars, mounted in M-4 weapons carrie~s. In additio~, the regimental 
commander wanted permission to have 3 M-8 reconnaissance cars added to 
the regiment mounting a 37mm gun, and grenade launchers for each 
vehicle·that did not.have a 37mm or larger weapon, He was of the 
opinion that the reconnaissance-units cquld be improved if they mounted 
a 37mm antitank gun in their M-3 carriers. Hinds pointed out that 
this had been done in Sicily, with deadly results for an enemy ten-man 
38 patrol and a 90mm enemy gun. 
Apparently Hinds' arguments were successful, for two weeks later, 
Gaffey submitted a requisition to VII Corps for the needed equipment. 
Gaffey requested 71 .SO caliber and 132 .30 caliber machine guns for the 
infantry regiment, and 4 7SO-gallon gasoline tankers for the maintenance 
322 
battalion, and 710 grenade launchers. The stated rationale was that 
the division had turned these items in at Sicily when ordered out of 
the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Gaffey apparently had littie 
success with his original request, for in the last week of February 
1944, he again submitted a letter, saying that shortages of equipment 
would constit~te a serious handicap to the 2d Armored Division once it 
was committed to battle. He stated that the maintenance battalion 
needed, and sho~ld carry, spare parts for the armored vehicles; by 
doing so, they would be readily available for, immediate use. The di-
vision needed antiaircraft mounts for its .SO caliber machine guns, for 
at the moment.the M-8 armored reconnaissance car had no means to defend 
itself against an air attack. The Broc~way bridge equipment trucks 
that the division had in North Africa and Sicily were·worn out and not 
fit for service. Finally, the division needed twelve-volt batteries 
for their quarter-ton trucks which were equipped with radios. The di~ 
vision had seventy-one of these vehicles, but only one twelve-volt. 
battery. The men could switch to amphibious half-ton trucks, but there 
would still be a shortage of thirty-six batteries. 39 
The letter slowly wound its way through channels, gaining endorse-
ments, but little else. XIX Corps ac~epted Gaffey's recommendations, 
then mentioned each item individually. The 2d Armored Division coulq 
get.spare parts in three weeks; antiaircraft mounts wer,e to be obtained 
through supply channels or the division could make them; as for the 
engineer trucks, the division could either get them (note here that 
Corps did not believe them to be available) or cannibalize others to 
repair the trucks. The radio mounts and twelve-volt battery converters 
were on their way from the United States. First Army, the next step on 
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the command ladder, expressed hope that the spare parts could be ob-
tained from existent stocks, without having to.open-the reserves already 
packed for shipment to the conttnent. They had no comment on the 
availability of machine gun mounts; First Army was short 140 engineer 
trucks, and neither trucks nor parts were available. After saying that 
there was a definite need for the radio conversion kits, they indicated 
that they had no idea of when, or if, the kits would be available. 
Eisenhower's headquarters said that 80 percent of the needed spare 
parts had been.made available to the division, with.the remainder on 
order from the United States. As to machine gun mounts, the supply per-
sonnel were instructed to issue substit~tes that could be modified to 
the needs of the division. In the case of trucks, they were to be re-
leased by the Engineer service; some spare parts were available and the 
remainder were to be sent over. As for the.conversion kits, they had 
been issued and cannibalization was not,authorized. In late April 1944, 
Major General Edward H. Brooks (the new division commander) was told 
that some radio conversion kits would be supplied and he could expect 
more.later. 40 
About mid-April, the 2d Armored Division asked that Eisenhower's 
headquarters seek to supply items that were authorized above.the Table 
of Equipment, as these items were needed for training, testing, and 
qualification of men prior to the invasion of Europe. The division also 
asked for Ford engine tanks because of their increased power and longer 
engine life. Other items requested included 132 .30 caliber ground-
mounted machine guns; 95 .SO caliber machine guns; 81 Browning Automatic 
Rifles; 21 personnel carriers, and 16 battery conversion kits. Even~ 
tually, almost all the needed items were obtained through depots, with 
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few if any, being drawn from marshalling areas.41 · 
The preceding year, in late September 1943, General Eisenhower-
had told General George C. Marshall that he would like to use the newer 
divisions to make the.initial landings and to.save the veteran divi-
sions as follow-up units, to pass through and seize the early objectives. 
The units assigned to the First Army were either battle experienced or 
supposedly well trained. 42 
In March 1944, the Army activated the headquarters of the Third 
Army, under the command of Lieutenant General .Pattqn, He was supposed 
to have told Eisenhower- that.he did not.want a brillant staff, but 
rather a loyal one. To get that loyalty, he turned to the 2d Armored 
Division, taking Major General Gaffey, the division commander, and 
Colo~el Redding F •. Perry, the Chief of Staff, Replacing these men in 
the 2d Armored were Major General Edward H, Brooks (an artilleryman 
and developer of .the M-7 105 mm self-propelled howitzer), and Colonel 
Charles Palmer.43 
In the middle of April 1944, all passes and leaves were cancelled. 
Two weeks later all men were restricted to their regimental or battalion 
areas. In May, the 2d Armored and the.9th Infantry took part in an 
exercise of marshalling the.build-up units.· This problem, do"Qe under 
the protection of fighter aircraft, revealed deficiencies that needed 
correction. Fortunately, this discovery came early enough to permit 
corrections, instec;1d of having to live or die with the problems, as had 
occurred in North Africa and Sicily. 44 
As D-Day approached, the 2d Armored Division engaged in practice 
landing operations at the actual camps.and ports they would be using. 
Brooks cortducted a series of map problems, terrain board exercises, 
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and staff conferences on the forthcoming landing. During thi~ time of 
planning probably many in the division echoed the thoughts of Morton 
Eustis, who hoped that the Germans did not collapse until the division 
had a chance to hit them good from the west; he.added, "I hope my pla-
toon is.the first.to set foot in Berlin. 1145 
Brigadier General Maurice Rose and the advance command post.per-
sonnel departed from Tidworth Barracks to join.the 9th Infantry Regiment 
of the 2d Infantry Division at the Barry, Wales, marshalling area. They 
went aboard the S.S. Charles Sumner the following day, and on 5 June, 
sailed for the rendezvous off the.Isle of Wight. Two days later they 
were off the coast of France. The advance group landed about 1830, and 
established their command post north of St. Laurent-Sur-Mer. The pur-
pose of the advance group was to gain information on the progress of the 
operation, receive and organize Combat Command A, and to receive, orient, 
and command all units of the.division until the.division commander 
landed. 46 
The 2d Armored Division moved from Tidworth Barracks on 6-7 June 
to the marshalling areas of Portsmouth and Southampton. The major part 
of the division loaded and started for France that night, landing on 9 
June. While the division was not entitled to. its third bronze arrow-
head for being part of the.initial landing group, it was in its third 
combat landing, as part of the initial follow-up force. It was about.to 
take part in battles that would test it as it had not been tested be-
fore.47 
During the period 23 July 1943 to 6 June.1944, the.2d Armored 
Division had made the circle from war. to peace and back to war. In 
Sicily, after initially landing as separate units the division united 
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and for the first time in its history, fought as a division. It did 
not take part in the final two-thirds of the Sicilian campaign, but 
served in a military government role. This was to prove beneficial, for 
it would have to assume that role again. While acting as ''policeman," 
its secondary mission was. to be,ready for deployment if the Seventh 
Army Commander thought it necessary, He.never did, 
When in England, preparing for the eventual landings in France, the 
2d Ar~ored Division in many instances trained even harder than it had 
in the past. It _had the operations.in North Africa and Sicily to draw 
on for battle experience. While the previous battles had been against 
second and third rate troops, fighting without conviction, this time 
the enemy would be the cream of the German,Army, which was battle test~ 
ed and battle,hardened, 
The 2d Armored Division started ashore at Utah Beach on 7 June 
1944, led by the advance.detachment under Brigadier General Maurice 
Rose. Soon afterwards the entire division was ashore, the first armored 
division to land on the continent of Europe. Shortly after landing, 
Combat Command A was sent to Carentan to aid the lOlst Airborne's de-
fense of.that town. Had the Germans been s~ccessful in their counter-. 
attack, they would have split the American beachheads, affording an 
excellent opportunity to defeat each. The tankers earned the begrudg-
ing respect of the Germans when the enemy pinned the nickname·. 
"Roosevelt's Butchers" on them, In that fight with an SS Parachute 
Reigment, the tankers took less than a dozen prisoners, while killing 
about 800 · of the finest soldiers Hitler had· in his army, · 
For a month after landing in Europe, the 2d Armored Division was 
held as a reserve force, ready for instant deployment if needed. In 
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late July, the division prepared for one of its most spectacular actions. 
Combat Command A, which was to prevent reinforcements from arriving to 
aid the Germans, led the attack in the breakout at St. Lo. Combat 
Command B attacked the following day, 27 July, and while initially 
having a secondary role in the operation, soon assumed the primary at~ 
tack role because.of the heavy enemy resistance being met. Spearheading 
the advance, Combat Command B built an armored ring around the retreat-
ing German Seventh Army, trapping the;bulk of the enemy forces inside. 
The men slowly inched their way towards Vire, where Eisenhower-had de-
cided to pivot the Americans and move the~ northward. 
The Germans launched a serious counterattack to prevent entrapment 
and free.their troops still inside the Contentin Peninsula. Fighting 
in two different corps, the 2d Armored Division battled the spearhead 
of the German effort.at Martain and Barentan, defeating the enemy and 
causing them to flee in complete disarray. The-Americans started a 
pursuit-of which the theorists of the 19201s and 1930's had d~eamed. 
Stopping only to.refuel and resupply, the 2d Armored Division raced the 
Germans for the crossings over the Seine River at Elbeuf and won, trap-
ping the enemy in the Pais de Calais area. 
The 2d.Armored Division was then ordered to move on to Tournai, 
Belgium, and to capture it within forty-eight hours. Attacking in an 
around-the-clock effort, they took the town with two hours to spare. 
By taking the objective, the paratroopers, who were.making plans to 
capture the town, cancelled their attack because of "bad weather." The 
tankers regrouped their forces and start~d towards the German border, 
only to be stalled by a serious fuel shortage. Apparently no one in the 
Allied high command structure considered that the enemy armies would be. 
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routed as quickly as they were. The.slowdown.of the Allies gave the 
enemy time to regroup his forces and prepare defenses along the Sieg-
fried Line. 
After crossing the Albert.Canal, the 2d Armored Division moved 
eastward, attacking through the 30th Infantry Divisio~, to take its 
portion of the vaunted West Wall. For about eight days the men strug-
gled against some of the stiffest enemy resistance they were to encoun-
ter. The tanks were handicapped by the severe weather which had turned 
the terrain into a sea of mud. Because the American VII Corps on the 
south flank could not·keep pace with XIX Corps, and because the enemy 
still retained control of three dams on the Roer River, the advance was 
delayed. In.November 1944, the 2d Armore9 Division was.ordered to move 
to the Roer River. For two weeks, the tankers struggled against fanat-
ical resistance, mud, rain, and snow, advancing about.ten miles. They 
became somewhat of a magnet, drawing the attention of three German 
Panzer Divisions. The fight was, according to many, the most.savage 
tank battle on the western.front. 
In December 1944, the.Germans launched a counterattack which took 
the Americans by complete surprise. The 2d Armored Division was alerted 
for movement, and conducted one of the outstanding road marches of the 
war. It moved some 100 miles in twenty-two hours, positioning itself 
at the point where the German 2d Panzer Division would have to turn 
north to reach the bridges over the Meuse River. On Christmas Day, 
attacking contrary to the wishes of the Army and Army Group commanders, 
the 2d Armored Division in four days totally destroyed its exact coun~ 
terpart in the German Army. By stopping the German spearhead, the 
tankers stopped the German westward movement. In January 1945, after a 
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few days of rest, the 2d Armored Division led the attack towards 
Houffalize, where the First and Third Armies were to join hands and seal 
the base of the Bulge. For two weeks, the tankers battled snow, ice-
caked roads, and zero visibility, advancing some.fourteen miles. The 
Germans had spent.their efforts, and for them the prospect of winning the 
conflict vanished. Now, when the Allies resumed.their offensive, the 
Germans would have little possibility of stopping their advance. 
The 2d Armored Division attacked on 28 February 1945; its assign-
ment was to pull up to the Rhine and prepare for the last offensive 
eastward. The men knew that it would mean the defeat of Germany. There 
was. little reason to expect that .the Allies could capture a bridge across. 
the Rhine, but.on 1 March 1944, Combat Command B was ordered to make 
every effort to seize the Krefeld-Uerdingen Bridge. Again the men 
attacked in around-the-clock efforts to take the prize--the Adolph Hitler 
Bridge, an appropriate reward for "Roosevelt's Butchers." After two 
patrols had crossed the bridge and plans were being made to rush two 
infantry battalions over to the east bank, the Germans destroyed the 
bridge, literally in Combat Command B's face, denying them that re-
ward. 
Once.across the Rhine on a bridge built by the 17th Armored Engin-
eer Battalion, and fulfilling a Patton prophesy, the Division started 
eastward with one goal in mind: Berlin, After starting its advance, 
Combat Command B was ordered south to link with the 3d Armored Division 
at.Lippstadt, sealing the Ruhr pocket and trapping more enemy troops 
inside it than the Russians captured at Stalingrad. The division labor-
ed for four days through the Teutoberger Wald, a freak geological 
formation resembling the eastern Ardennes, which had traditionally served 
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as a protective barrier against invading armies from the west. Once 
through the Teutoberger Wald, the 2d Armored Division was on the north 
German plain with few barriers to slow its attack. The division was 
forced to halt at Hildesheim to permit the other armies to pull along-
side the Ninth Army. On 10 April 1945, the division started eastward 
one last time. The next day, division headquarters was electrified by 
the message that Combat Command B was on the Elbe River, only fifty-two 
miles from Berlin. 
Hinds sent three battalions of infantry across the Elbe to estab-
lish a bridgehead, while the engineers built a bridge to move tanks 
across. The Germans met this threat with extremely accurate artillery 
fire, wh~ch defeated every attempt. Finally, on 14 April, after re-
peated efforts to build a bridge, including moving the bridging site to 
get out.of the range of enemy guns, Hinds had to.give the only retreat 
order issued in thirty months of combat. The next day Eisenhower 
ordered the Americans to maintain their positions while the Russians 
were given the opportunity to capture Berlin. The 2d Armored Division, 
with the 30th Infantry Division, was ordered to capture Magdeberg, 
which it did in about twenty-four hours. 
As a reward for its able performance, the 2d Armored Division was 
ordered into.Berlin, to be the first American division performing 
occupation duty in the German capital. While there, the division did 
honor guard duty for the Potsdam Conference, and staged several reviews 
for the Allied political and military leaders. 
The 2d Armored Division wrote its history across two continents, 
earning the respect of friend and foe alike. Its brillant performance 
empitomized armored warfare and totally justified the claims made by 
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the theorists during the preceding two decades. Through sunshi~e, snow, 
rain, fog, and mud, and against some of the best enemy soldiers faced 
by any unit, the 2d Armored Division showed that it,had earned the right 
to be called t4e "Hell on Wheels" Division, 
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CHAPTER XIV 
A BACKWARD GLANCE 
Through~ut history ~an had attempted to devise better weapons with 
which to impose.his will on his enemy. In attempting to find such. 
weapons, man has experimented with many vehicles to increase mobility, 
permitting an attacker to position himself on the flanks or in the rear 
areas of his foe. Once the attacker has gained this advantage, he is 
usually able to cause confusion and disrupt supply and communications. 
routes which are necessary for controlling an army. The ancients used 
chariots.and later cavalry for this purpose. Leonardo di Vinci devised 
a tank-like vehicle, wn~ch had a cannon mounted inside a protective 
covering, and was propelled by horse$. As.time ,progressed, battlefield 
movement was reserved for cavalry, while the infantry usually attacked 
over open ground against entrenchments, whtch reached their maximum 
employment during World War I. 
During the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the internal combustion engine was developed, which 
was to make revolutionary changes in warfare, With the engine man was. 
able to develop the airplane, permitting a new look at the battlefield, 
and at the;same time employ trucks to rapidly move large bodies of 
troops to various sectors of the battlefield wpen needed for offensive 
or defensive purposes. In World War I, all the necessary factors, en-
trenchments, massed artillery, automatic weapons, barbed wire, and 
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no-man's-land, were present and forced a new concept in warfare. To 
break the stalemate which had endured for almost three years, the tank, 
crude and slow, was introduced. It proved to be successful when measured 
in terms of efficiency and reliability of the time. Since it was a new 
weapon, its use was dictated both by necessity and traditional concepts. 
It was to be an infantry support weapon, reducing strong points which 
prevented or delayed an infantry attack, 
When World War I ended and the American Tank Corps returned to the 
United States, it fell victim to historical traditions, the new feeling 
of international disarmament, and bitter feuding between the.service 
branches. The tank, since it was slow and because it had been an in-
fantry support weapon, was given to.the infantry and was to labor there 
for two decades. A few farseeing officers sought to make the tank into 
a powerful offensive weapon, but they were told to hold to branch lines 
or face disciplinary action. Given these possibilities, most.chose to 
remain silent, or to discuss forbidden matters within a circle of well-
chosen friends. These men at times risked their careers to advocate 
creation of a tank unit which would employ tactics designed to increase 
battlefield mobility and cause panic among the enemy. 
The international situation began to change, and this was to have 
a tremendous effect on the evolution of armor in the United States Army. 
In the late 1920's, Great Britain developed an armored force and demon-
strated it to foreign visitors. The American Secretary of War witnessed 
the demonstration, and when he returned to the United States, he dir-
ected that the Army begin to develop a similar force. Attempting to 
comply with the Secretary's direction, the Army encountered resistance 
from the Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry, as well as a Federal statute 
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which gave tanks-to the infantry. This controversy was to mar develop-
ment of armored vehicles and tactics for the next twelve to fifteen 
years •. 
Armor leaders received their training during the late 1920's and 
1930's through a skillful evasion of the law which detailed tan~s to. 
the infantry. When the Mechanized Force was created, it was to serve as 
a laboratory for the;training of armor leaders and the development of 
tactics. This was a crucial period in armor-evolution, for many wanted 
to see .· the experiment fail. However, it _was successful, anq when the . 
Armored Force was created in 1940; a second evasion of the 1920,statute, 
the leaders which had served with the Mechanized Force emerged to take 
command of the armored divisions and regiments. 
Armor historians like to point to the 1930's as being the period 
where cavalry tactics were adopted for the tank. Infantry maintained 
that the,tank was merely another weapon with which infantrymen could 
better carry out the~r assignments. A closer examination of the facts 
reveals that both cavalry and infant;ry were correct. The tactics of 
deep thrusts, penetrations, wide turning movements, and exploitation of 
enemy flanks and rear areas are the traditional role of cavalry. 
However, once committed to battle, tanks usually advanced at a much. 
slower rate; resembling the support role which infantry had advocated, 
Thus it would appear that instead of being one or the other, armor 
tactics were the skillful blending of both. 
The far-sighted theorists of the 1920's and 1930's knew that for 
armor warfare to be successful, more than tanks would be needed. Armor 
had to develop the team concept, including the.addition of artillery, 
antiaircraft protection, engineers, infantry, and chemical troops. 
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During experimentation, Adna Chaffee, Daniei Van,Voorhis, and others 
had become aware that airplanes were also needed to perform.reconnis~ 
sance and attack missions. Their beliefs and ideas were totally justi-
fied when the Germans attacked and quickly defeated their neighboring 
nations. 
The· 2d Armored Division was activated during controversy at the 
War Department. Some, especially the Chiefs of Cavalry and Infantry, 
denied that such a force was needed and that in reality it already 
existed within their own areas of.responsibility. General George C. 
Marshall denied such a contention, implying that the two branch. chiefs 
had had an opportunity to create such a force, but they had been reluc-
tant.·. to do. so. Others at the War Department, primarily those whose 
branches had traditionally been support branches, endorsed the plan 
readily, and suggested improvements in the organization. Later some of 
the suggestions were to be incorporated. 
Activated by Brigadier General Charles L. Scott, the men of the 2d 
Armored Division were pushed to achieve a state.of readiness before the. 
end of 1940; This was difficult because of the shortage of ~en and 
equipment. Scott started the men on their way to becoming a battle-
ready force; but.soon he was assigned to.replace the dying Adna Chaffee 
as 1st Armored Corps Connnander. Succeeding Scott was perhaps the most 
famous connnander the division was to have, Major General George S. 
Patton, Jr.· He followed the model outlined by Scott, and then led the 
division to achieve even higher standards. Training was emphasized to 
keep the men. alive, while inflicting maximum damage on.the enemy. 
Patton, a firm believer in publicity, led the division on an extenq.ed 
road march and in three peacetime maneuvers. While the press made·the 
341 
division, it~ exploits, and its colorful commander famous on these 
maneuvers, critics said that the division would not do as well in com-
bat. When Patton left the division in 1942, he had a trained, battle-
ready force, which was polished and honed by his successors. One 
officer's wife, Mrs. Sidney R. (Regina) Hinds, said that as a result of 
the training the division received, there was no doubt in her mind that 
her husband would return alive. That tribute was all that any division 
commander could ask. 
Once committed to battle, the 2d Armored Division showed that armor 
doctrine had been founded on a solid footing. Most int~restingly, when 
permitted to exploit gains or holes which the infantry created, as in 
Sicily, their advance was rapid. The men showed that contrary to the 
critics comments on the peacetime maneuvers, they could make long sus-
tained marches and attacks against an enemy. Battle revealed that the 
men needed more training, and that became the main activity of the 
division when not in actual combat. After its initial battle, the.di-
vision constantly trained, incorporating those ideas learned from 
experience and observers who witnessed other forces in combat. The 
division learned a new technique, attac~ing under overhead artillery 
fire. The remainder of its skills were those that had been imparted at 
Fort.Benning or during the maneuvers. 
The 2d Armored Division owed its success to several factors: 
training, which created a will for the offensive, continuity of command, 
and its organization. At no time did the division avoid a fight, unless 
specifically ordered to do so. Even so, the men had several engagements 
which might have slowed a less determined division. The most serious 
struggles faced came after D-Day at Vire, Martain, Barentan, through 
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the siegfried Line, the closing to the Roer River, and the bitter strug-
gle through the January 1945 phase of the Battle of the Bulge. They 
failed to daunt the offensive spirit of the division. At times, the 
division was slowed to a snail's pace in these actions, but the men 
continued to move forward against formidable opposition, Then, with a 
few days of rest and maintenance, they continued to.attack. 
The 2d Armored Division commanders, Generals Scott, Patton, 
Crittenberger, Harmon, Kingman, Gaffey, and Brooks, each had the desire 
to fight. the enemy. Removing individual personalities and judging the 
men on tactical ability, the historian finds that they were all well 
qualified to command the division. With the exceptions of Brooks and 
Harmon, the division commanders were promoted to that assignment from 
within the division, Commanders at all levels demonstrated a concern 
for the welfare of their men, which the men in the ranks were well aware 
of and acted to appreciate that concern. 
Organizationally, the heavy division was the primary factor in the 
2d Armored Division's success. With two armored regiments and an ar-
mored infantry regiment, the division was able to maintain itself, in 
spite of heavy losses. With the huge attachments added, usually an 
infantry regiment and five to seven artillery battalions, the 2d Armored 
Division had a combat strength more than twice that of the light di-
visions, which had only three tank and three infantry battalions. No 
less an authority on armor warfare than General Patton knew that there 
was no comparison between the light division and the 2d Armored Division 
with its powerful attachments. 
The 2d Armored Division usually planned only one or two days ahead 
when operating against the enemy. Flexibility, one of the primary 
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characteristics of armor, permitted the division commander to shape the 
combat teams which were employed. With the division's organization, and 
the usual attachment of an additional infantry regiment, the division 
commander could create three equal-strength c~mbat teams. Employing 
mission orders, which gave an objective anq zone of attack, also em-
phasized flexibility and permitted the best utilization of armor. When 
the·division received an.assignment·of method, it was usually slowed 
down and suffered higher losses.of men and material. 
The history of. the.2d Armored Division reveals that it came into 
e~istence during controversy, th~t it trained rigorously, and that it 
became a battle-ready division only after more than two years. As it 
moved through the war it impressed friend and foe alike. Perhaps one of 
the greatest compliments. it received was. during the Battle·of the Bulge 
when, after capturing a German General, he asked how many 2d Ar~ored 
Divisions the:Americans had. He added that the last intelligence re-
ports which the Germans had placed the division north of Aachen. Appar-
ently the enemy failed to consider that the tankers could move the 
distance involved and be ready for a major fight. 
Many students of behavior, then and now, feared the release of the 
2d Armored Division's trained killers into society. They thought that 
the battle hardened veteran would be unable to adjust to a quieter life, 
What·they failed to consider was that, for the most.part, the soldier 
was a civilian at heart, and was simple doing what he thought was his 
duty. While the soldiers did kill, and delighted in seeing the "master 
race" fight.for discarded cigarettes, the men fed the Sicilian and 
German.children, often denying themselves to do so. 
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The 2d Armored Division is justly proud of its history, written 
across.two continents, through blazing sun, rain, fog, and snow. It~ 
professional performances revealed an aggressive determination and desire 
to be.a great combat.team. Attacking across mud and through snow, it 
has written its story in blood, sweat, and tears, Bravery was an accept-
ed standard; often the deeds were rewarded with less than the merited 
decoration. For thirty months, the division fought, and its battle 
history revealed that once it started toward greatness, it would continue 
until it had attained that stat~s. The 2d Armored Division epitomized 
armor warfare during World War II and demonstrated convincingly that it 
was second to none. 
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